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TOWARD A NEW ETHICAL STANDARD REGULATING THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (MCPR) in 1969 by the American Bar Association (ABA), its ninth canon's admonition of avoiding the appearance of impropriety has been used to regulate the private practice of former government attorneys.1 Because of the uncertainty of the actual prohibitions of the Disciplinary Rules of Canon 9, the federal common law on the disqualification of those attorneys is in a state of confusion and the bar has been unable to adequately clarify the applicable code provisions for the courts and members of the bar.2

In 1978 Congress identified conflict of interest situations for former government lawyers by passing the Ethics in Government Act (the Act).3 The Act imposed criminal sanctions against former government lawyers4 and created the Office of Govern-
ment Ethics  to enforce a newly-drafted set of federal regulations.

This comment advocates the elimination of the "appearance of impropriety" as a legal and ethical standard governing the disqualification of former government lawyers and urges the ABA to adopt Rule 1.11 of the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Model Rule 1.11, Successive Government and Private Employment, provides a comprehensible, precise ethical rule regulating the post-government practice of lawyers in conformity with federal statute and regulation.

II. BACKGROUND

The "revolving door" is a derisive term used to describe the practice of lawyers passing back and forth between government service and private practice. After a number of years with the government, and having gained expertise in a field, the revolving door lawyer represents clients before the agency in which the lawyer previously worked. Some revolving door lawyers begin

9. Id.

In 1980, there were approximately 17,300 lawyers employed in the executive agencies and departments of the federal government. U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Occupations of Federal White Collar Workers, October 31, 1981 (Washington, D.C.; American Statistical Index 82 (1981) at 26). The lawyer turnover rate in federal agencies is more than twice that of the national average for private law firms. See Jenkins, Working for Uncle Sam; The Flyway Problem of Federal Attorneys, STUDENT LAW., Apr. 1977, at 51. The government does not keep exact statistics on the federal turnover rate. However, the various agencies do record the percentages of attorneys who resign each year. Id.

11. Restricting Private Practice, supra note 10, at 371; G. Hazard, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978). Professor Hazard discusses the advantages of entering the government at the beginning of a legal career at competitive salaries and with opportunities for more responsibility than lawyers in the private sector. Id. at 107.
their careers in the private sector and later move to the executive branch to serve for a period of time in the government.\textsuperscript{18}

The ethical rule that evolved over the years forbids a former government lawyer from being involved in a matter for a private client, for which the attorney had responsibility while working for the government.\textsuperscript{18} The problem of the revolving door practice occurs when an apparent conflict of interest arises. This may warrant the disqualification of a former government lawyer or the firm with which the lawyer has become associated.\textsuperscript{14}

The ABA regulates the conduct of former government lawyers in Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B): "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."\textsuperscript{16} The admonition of Canon 9, "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety,"\textsuperscript{16} coupled with the prohibition of DR9-101(B), fail to provide clear ethical guidelines for the private practice of former government attorneys.\textsuperscript{17}

The federal courts employ DR9-101(B) of the MCPR\textsuperscript{18} to

\textsuperscript{12} Mundheim, Conflict of Interest and the Former Government Employee: Rethinking the Revolving Door, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 707 (1981) [hereafter Rethinking the Revolving Door.]

\textsuperscript{13} G. Hazard, Ethics in the Practice of Law 109 (1978).

\textsuperscript{14} Id. at 110. There is a problem with identifying on what matter the former government lawyer worked. It may have been a lawsuit, contract negotiation, a policy or regulation, drafting the administration's legislative program, or lobbying a legislative program. Factors considered are the duration of the lawyer's responsibility and type of office held.

The problem becomes severe when disqualification takes the revolving door lawyer out of the job market or when the threat of disqualification forces the lawyer to become a lifetime career servant. Either possibility would prevent the government from attracting competent lawyers. Id. at 112-114.

\textsuperscript{15} MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR9-101(B) (1981).


\textsuperscript{17} See supra note 2.

\textsuperscript{18} The 1969 MCPR was essentially a redraft of the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics. They were modeled from the 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics which was inspired by the 1850 Lectures of George Sharswood, a Philadelphia judge. Kutak, A Commitment to Clients and the Law, 68 A.B.A.J. 804, 805 (1982).
disqualify former government lawyers from litigating a matter in private practice. The federal judiciary also applies DR9-101(B) to disqualify by imputation a law firm whose associate is a disqualified former government lawyer under DR5-105(D). Case law has developed a prohibition against the “appearance of impropriety” as a rule to discipline former government attorneys in private practice. Since the ABA’s adoption of the MCPR in 1969, the “appearance of impropriety” has evolved into an independent standard applied by federal judges to disqualify former government lawyers whether or not they have actually breached

Canon 36 of the 1908 draft was the applicable ethical restriction preceding the Code’s Canon 9 and DR9-101(B). Canon 36 stated:

Retirement From Judicial Position or Public Employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or, having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.

American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics (1908).

19. The genesis of this comment was a Motion for Disqualification in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, CR-81-205-Misc. In that case, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 207 was charged in order to disqualify two recently reigned Strike Force attorneys who were hired to represent an unindicted defendant against charges of prostitution which had been under investigation during their tenure in the Department of Justice. These former government attorneys were disqualified for violating DR9-101(B)’s prohibition against the “appearance of impropriety.” The evidence showed an actual conflict of interest and potential breach of confidentiality of government information.

This author has found no federal cases disqualifying former government attorneys for violating 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982) or 5 C.F.R. § 737 (1982).

The Disciplinary Rules of the MCPR are usually enforced by disqualifying an attorney from representing a client. Professor Sutton, the reporter for the ABA Committee that drafted the MCPR in 1969, has said that the MCPR’s Disciplinary Rules were drafted for use in disciplinary proceedings and were not intended to be procedural rules in civil or criminal cases. Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsibility, 57 N.C.L. Rev. 497, 514-15 (1979). Nevertheless, the courts have regularly used the disciplinary rules in disqualification motions.

20. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR5-105(D) (1981) states: “If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, no associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such employment.” See, United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198 (3d Cir. 1980). The circuit court upheld the district court’s disqualification of a former Strike Force lawyer as well as the disqualification of his entire law firm. The court viewed the “appearance of impropriety” through the eyes of a hypothetical private person. But see Board of Education v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979) (the court found that the appearance of impropriety was too slender a reed on which to grant a motion to disqualify an entire law firm); Kesselhaut v. United States, 556 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (screening procedures precluded disqualification of an entire law firm).
an ethical consideration of the MCPR or violated DR9-101(B)’s minimal standard of conduct.\footnote{21}

After observing the catastrophic ramifications of firm disqualification, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (CEPR) issued Formal Opinion 342 (Opinion 342) to interpret and limit the application of DR9-101(B).\footnote{22} The CEPR concluded that the appearance of professional impropriety was not a “standard, test, or element embodied in DR9-101(B).”\footnote{23} The committee said the “‘appearance of professional impropriety’ was only a policy consideration supporting the existence of the Disciplinary Rule.”\footnote{24} As a practical alternative to firm disqualification, the CEPR recommended screening the disqualified former government lawyer-associate and obtaining the government’s waiver of the screening process. Unfortunately, Opinion 342 did not define with precision any test for the appearance of impropriety; rather, the committee gave examples of actual improper conflict of interest situations or of clear breaches of client confidentiality.\footnote{25}

Opinion 342 represents the bar’s formal position on ethical restraints of the practice of revolving door lawyers. The opinion addressed two issues: (1) what ethical considerations of the MCPR warrant disqualification of a former government lawyer under DR9-101(B)?; and, (2) should disqualification be imputed to a law firm whose associate is disqualified? Opinion 342 is the sole commentary from the bar on the ethical restrictions prescribed by the MCPR on the private practice of former government attorneys. Despite its limitation on DR9-101(B)’s applica-


\footnote{23. \textit{Id.} at 3.

\footnote{24. \textit{Id.}

bility to disqualification of former government lawyers and their law firms, the federal courts have generally ignored Opinion 342 and have continued to disqualify on the basis of the "appearance of impropriety."^{26}

In discussing ethical restrictions on the practice of former government lawyers, the CEPR in Opinion 342 briefly discussed the relevance of MCPR Canon 4's mandate of preserving confidentiality and Canon 5's prohibition against lawyers' representation of differing interests. However, the focus of Opinion 342 was its interpretation of Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) in its application to the disqualification of former government lawyers and law firms with which they become associated. First, the CEPR found that the drafters of the MCPR did not intend the "ap-

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Under Canon 4, DR4-101(B) prohibits an attorney from revealing a confidence either to the disadvantage of his client or to his own or a third person's advantage, unless the client consents after full disclosure. An attorney violates DR4-101(B) by knowingly revealing a confidence of a client or by using such a confidence improperly. Judge Kaufman, in Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex Inc., 478 F.2d 652, 670 (2d Cir. 1973), described the purpose of Canon 4 to encourage a client to discuss his problem freely and in depth. This prevents a client from fearing that "information he reveals to his lawyer on one day may be used against him on the next." Emle emphasized the need to strictly enforce Canon 4 to prevent the possibility, however slight, that confidential information acquired from a client during a previous relationship may be used subsequently to the client's disadvantage. Id. at 571.

In the context of the revolving door, Canon 4's disciplinary rules protect the government's need to preserve confidential information acquired by lawyers in federal agencies. The federal courts have enforced Canon 4's disciplinary provisions to disqualify former government lawyers in private practice when the circumstances reveal an apparent or actual conflict of interest violative of the government's privilege of confidentiality. Opinion 342 explained that DR4-101(B) has been the basis for disqualifying former government lawyers not because they actually breached the Rule, but as a prophylactic measure against a possible future violation. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 2.


DR5-105(A) states:

A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing different interests, except to the extent permitted under DR5-105(C).
pearance of professional impropriety" to be a standard, test or element embodied in DR9-101(B). According to the CEPR, the "appearance of professional impropriety" is only a policy consideration supporting the disciplinary rule. The authors acknowledged that: "The appearance of evil is only one of the underlying considerations, however, and is probably not the most important reason for the creation and existence of the rule itself."

Why then is DR9-101(B) included under Canon 9's prohibition against the appearance of professional impropriety? The committee listed the policy arguments justifying its position in Canon 9 as: (1) the treachery inherent in switching sides; (2) protection of confidential government information from use in future litigation against the government; (3) the need to discourage government lawyers from structuring their government service to advance their own careers in the private sector; and (4) the benefit to the profession derived from avoiding the appearance of evil.

On the other hand, the CEPR recognized weighty policy arguments against having a special disciplinary rule limiting the employment of former government lawyers in conjunction with Canon 9's "appearance of impropriety" standard. The arguments given were that: (1) such a rule restricts the government's ability to recruit young professional and competent lawyers without penalizing them when they subsequently enter private practice; (2) disqualification motions often are a tool to delay

30. "DR9-101(B) is located under Canon 9 because the 'appearance of professional impropriety' is a policy consideration supporting the existence of the disciplinary rule." Id.
31. Id.
Defendants seem to suggest that the complexities of the factual determination to be made by this court should be avoided by a decision couched in notions of possible appearance of impropriety. On the contrary, the importance of the underlying policy considerations call for careful analysis of the matters embraced by previous and present litigations. Vague or indefinite allegations do not suffice . . . . The danger of damage to public confidence in the legal profession would be great if we were to allow unfounded charges of impropriety to form the sole basis for an unjust disqualification. Id. at 589.
litigation and enhance counsel's prospects of winning by dispos­
ing of an opponent's competent counsel; and, (3) a litigant has a
right to have counsel of choice, particularly in specialized areas
of law.\footnote{33}

In balancing the policy considerations of DR9-101(B)'s exis­
tence in Canon 9 of the MCPR, the authors of Opinion 342 con­
cluded that the rule should be given a narrow construction by
the courts. Such construction would limit neither the govern­
ment's ability to recruit competent lawyers nor an individual's
right to have counsel of his choice.\footnote{34} The opinion also stated that
firm disqualification was adverse to the government's interests
to recruit qualified lawyers and the public's interest to obtain
counsel of choice, particularly in specialized areas.\footnote{35} The authors
limited the provision which could allow disqualification of an en­
tire firm when one of its attorneys was unable to appear as a
representative against a former agency.\footnote{36}

Thus, the CEPR, without further reason, and in direct con­
tradiction to Canon 5's disciplinary rule 105(D), found that
screening the disqualified former government lawyer from par­
ticipation in the matter, and from the firm's compensation gen­
erated from the matter, satisfied DR-105(D). The committee
also recommended that the government agency should approve
or waive the screening of the disqualified former government

\footnote{33. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 4-5.}
\footnote{34. Id. at 11.}
\footnote{35. "Only allegiance to form over substance would justify blanket application of
DR5-105(D) in a manner that thwarts and distorts the policy considerations behind
DR9-101(B)." Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 11.}
\footnote{36. In 1974, the ABA amended DR5-105(D) to read: "If a lawyer is required to de­
cline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no part­
ner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm may accept or con­
tinue such employment."

Soon after this amendment, controversy arose as to the imputed disqualification of a
law firm which had hired a former government lawyer who had switched sides and was
thereby disqualified. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Cl. Ct. 1977). Evi­
dently, the ABA had given no consideration to the impact of DR5-105(D) on the revolv­
ing door lawyer, his partners or associates. Restricting Private Practice, supra note 10,
at 379.

As stated, the CEPR attempted to limit DR5-105(D)'s application to DR9-101(B) in
Opinion 342. Opinion 342 found that a disqualified former government attorney's law
firm would not be disqualified if: (1) the disqualified former government lawyer was
screened from participation in the action and from sharing in fees derived from the cli­
ent; and (2) the government agency or department were required to waive the screen.
Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 11.}
lawyer. Screening and waiver would fulfill the requirements of DR9-101(B) and not mandate an entire firm’s disqualification when one of its associates was disqualified.\textsuperscript{87}

In reaching this conclusion, the CEPR circumvented a literal reading of the MCPR.\textsuperscript{88} The authors did not explain why DR5-105(D) is inapplicable to disqualify a law firm whose member is disqualified by DR9-101(B). In a recent article,\textsuperscript{89} Professors Finman and Schneyer examined the CEPR’s interpretation of the MCPR and criticized the CEPR’s unexplained reading of the literal meaning of the disciplinary rules.\textsuperscript{90} They charged that Opinion 342 was an attempt to rewrite the MCPR, not to interpret it.\textsuperscript{41} In particular, the article discussed Opinion 342’s disregard of the “unambiguous command—the plain meaning—of DR5-105(D)”\textsuperscript{42} in disqualifying an entire law firm whose member is a disqualified former government lawyer. In attempting to justify Opinion 342’s failure to apply DR5-105(D), the authors speculate that the CEPR found that: “its gloss on the [Disciplinary Rules] is legitimate, because that gloss will decrease the undesirable consequences of disqualification without reducing the benefits that a literal reading would yield.”\textsuperscript{43}

Thus, one must conclude, as did Professors Finman and Schneyer, that “for several reasons not mentioned in Opinion 342, it is doubtful whether the values served by a literal reading [of the MCPR] would be as well protected by the CEPR’s gloss.”\textsuperscript{44}

A literal reading of Opinion 342 also leads one to the con-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{37} Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 11-12.
\item \textsuperscript{38} The CEPR’s conclusions on the enforcement of DR9-101(B) and DR5-105(D) are realistic and pragmatic, although not justified by reading the MCPR.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Finman & Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 29 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 67, 141-144 (1981).
\item \textsuperscript{40} Id. at 142. Addressing the question of DR5-105(D)’s applicability to the imputed disqualification of a law firm whose member is barred from participation by DR9-101(B), the authors stated: “The Code seems to allow only one answer: DR5-105(D) bars an entire firm if any member is disqualified under ‘a Disciplinary Rule’; a firm member barred by DR9-101(B) is disqualified by ‘a Disciplinary Rule’; ergo the entire firm is barred.” Id. at 141.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Id. at 141.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Id. at 142.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Id.
\end{itemize}
clusion that the ABA committee was unable to sustain DR9-101(B)'s inclusion in the MCPR under the maxim of Canon 9's avoidance of the appearance of impropriety. In fact, the committee affirmatively told the courts that the "appearance of professional impropriety" is not a standard embodied in DR9-101(B). At most, the committee stated, the appearance of impropriety is a policy consideration which should be construed favorably not to disqualify a revolving door lawyer.

Despite Opinion 342's narrow construction of DR9-101(B) and conclusion that the appearance of impropriety is no standard for its enforcement, the courts have relied on Canon 9 to disqualify former government lawyers and their law firms. The federal courts have enforced DR9-101(B) on a case by case basis. This has produced a broad, vague standard of the meaning of "appearance of professional impropriety," enforced with imprecise, subjective decisions. This subjective method of interpretation of the "appearance of impropriety" gives government lawyers, former government lawyers, and law firms wishing to hire government lawyers no reliable standard to guide post-government conduct.

A leading case, General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, demonstrates the dilemma of the revolving door lawyer. A former Department of Justice attorney who had prosecuted an antitrust suit against General Motors was hired by the City of New York and assigned to represent it in a similar suit against General Motors. The court acknowledged that the attorney had not

47. Kramer, supra note 46, at 244. Donald A. Farmer was formerly Director of the Bureau of International Aviation, United States Civil Aeronautics Board and prior to that Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, and Trial Attorney, Antitrust, United States Department of Justice. He entered private practice in 1979 after ten years of government service. When questioned about the present rules and restrictions on the private practice of revolving door lawyers Mr. Farmer wrote that he believed them to be out of touch with reality and becoming further detached rather than less. His opinion is that the unfortunate result of all this is that many lawyers going through the revolving door do not even know what the rules are, much less comply with them. Letter of Donald A. Farmer, Jr. to Barbara Mance (August 27, 1982).
48. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
changed sides, but still held that his representation in opposition to the defendant corporation violated the ethical precepts of Canon 9 and DR9-101(B). The court stated that the impropriety involved the "possibility that a lawyer might wield government power with a view toward subsequent private gain." As a result, the court disqualified the former justice department lawyer even though he had not switched sides or sought employment with the City of New York while working as a federal prosecutor. The standard which evolved from this case was the "possibility" of impropriety, one even more nebulous and ephemeral than "appearance of impropriety."

The Ninth Circuit, in In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, held that Canon 9 would be stripped of its meaning and significance if it were not separately enforced to disqualify former government attorneys in private practice. The court determined that since it is instructed to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process in the eyes of the public, Canon 9 must be a sufficient ground for disqualification. The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that its responsibility of controlling the conduct of attorneys who appeared before the court justified its ability to disqualify attorneys for actual conduct that impugns the integrity of the court or for conduct that appears to be improper.

49. Id. at 650 n. 20. The court believed that this violation of Canon 9 and DR9-101(B) was justified because "there lurks great potential for lucrative returns in following into private practice the course already charted with the aid of government resources." Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) where in a similar fact situation no appearance of evil was found.

50. 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981).
51. Id. at 1360.
52. See United Sewerage Agency, etc. v. Jelco, 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981).
53. 656 F.2d 1360-61. The Ninth Circuit's decision is in direct conflict with the bar's official position in Opinion 342. According to O'Toole, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62 Marq. L. Rev. 313 (1979), three basic issues are raised by Canon 9's application to disqualify former government attorneys:

First, is Canon 9 intended to be used within the context of litigation or is it only intended to serve as an axiomatic guideline to the practicing attorney? Second, from whose perspective is the propriety of appearances measured? Third, can improper appearances alone suffice to trigger disqualification of opposing counsel?

Id. at 318. The author terms the application of Canon 9 a murky subject of legal ethics and raises the example of a court's disqualifying an attorney even in an instance when Canon 9 had not been explored in briefs addressing the motion. Id. citing Richardson v.
A recent case from the Second Circuit, Armstrong v. McAlpin, demonstrates the state of confusion that exists when federal courts enforce DR9-101(B) of the present MCPR. In McAlpin, Theodore Altman, a former Assistant Director of the Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) became a partner in a private law firm, the Gordon Firm. At the SEC Altman had had supervisory and “direct, personal involvement” in the investigation of Clovis McAlpin. The SEC filed a complaint against McAlpin for securities violations. Subsequently, Altman left the SEC to join the Gordon firm. At that time the Gordon firm was not involved in the prosecution of McAlpin.

Armstrong was appointed receiver in the action, and the SEC made its investigatory files available to him. Armstrong was forced to seek new counsel in the action and consulted one of the partners of the Gordon firm about his retaining the firm. The court approved the appointment of the Gordon firm, provided that Altman, who was clearly disqualified, was properly screened. The SEC waived any objection. Armstrong filed an action against McAlpin for fraud and damages of $24,000,000. The defendant moved to disqualify the Gordon firm on the ground that Altman’s disqualification should be imputed to the entire Gordon firm. The district court denied the motion.

The Second Circuit Court reversed and found that disqualification of the firm necessary “as a prophylactic measure to guard against misuse of authority by government lawyers.” Upon rehearing, the court reversed because there had been no

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Hamilton International Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972).

A number of courts have held that Ethical Consideration 9:3 and DR9-101(B) apply even where a former government lawyer’s representation of a private client does not impugn the position she took in a particular matter while in public employment. This was the court’s belief in General Motors, supra note 50.

Ethical Consideration 9:3 states: “After a lawyer leaves judicial office or other public employment, he should not accept employment in connection with any matter in which he had substantial responsibility prior to his leaving, since to accept employment would give the appearance of impropriety even if none exists."

55. 606 F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
56. The trial court disqualified him under DR9-101(B). 625 F.2d at 442.
57. Id. at 443.
58. 606 F.2d at 34.
threat to the integrity of the trial process due to: (1) the screening of Altman; (2) the routine turnover of SEC files to Armstrong before he retained the Gordon firm; and, (3) the absence of any indication that the receiver came to the firm through or because of Altman's connection.

The circuit court concluded that disqualification of the firm could only be based on the appearance of impropriety stemming from Altman's association with the firm. The court balanced the appearance of impropriety against the plaintiffs' interest in proceeding and redress of the alleged frauds and concluded that the Gordon firm must not be barred from the action. The court followed a practical, narrow construction of the appearance of impropriety by finding that: "[u]nder the circumstances, the possible 'appearance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order ... particularly ... where ... the appearance of impropriety is not very clear.'

In Greitzer & Locks v. Johns-Manville, a case involving a former government lawyer who specialized in asbestosis litigation, a majority of the Fourth Circuit found the particular firm's shielding provisions to be adequate. These included prohibiting the former justice department lawyer "from working, advising or participating, indirectly, by discovery, analysis or otherwise [in the actions in dispute] . . . He was to be denied access to the files and prohibited from sharing profits derived from the . . . cases." The majority relied on Opinion 342, rejecting a literal

59. 625 F.2d at 445.
60. Id. The case, therefore, is entirely distinguishable from General Motors, 501 F.2d 639. The court did not scrutinize the screening provisions since the SEC had found them satisfactory.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 446.
63. Id. at 445, quoting Board of Education v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979). The court also said that absent a threat of taint to the trial, ethical conflicts are better addressed by the disciplinary machinery of the state and federal bar or by legislation such as 18 U.S.C. § 207. 625 F.2d at 441.
64. No. 81-1379, slip op. (4th Cir. March 5, 1982).
65. No. 81-1379, slip op. at 6-7 (4th Cir. March 5, 1982). The courts are more amenable to finding that a "Chinese Wall" was erected in the screening mechanism in Canon 9 cases than in situations where a possible violation of Canon 4 or Canon 5 has or will occur. Courts will consider policy arguments for not disqualifying a law firm that has hired a former government attorney. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (The court held that a former government lawyer would take on the status of Typhoid Mary and be reduced to sole practice under the most unfavorable condi-
interpretation of the MCPR. The majority opinion deferred to the justice department's approval of the disqualified former government lawyer's firm's screening measures and stated that the "affected client agencies of the government are the best judges of the suitability of screens erected to protect them from disclosures of confidences and secrets." More importantly, the majority cited Rule 1.11 of the ABA Proposed Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct which eliminates the "appearance of professional impropriety" standard governing the disqualification of former government lawyers.

III. FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

Congress has enacted legislation to regulate the private practice of former government lawyers. As stated in the legislative history, the purpose of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act was to enforce and reform the ethical standards governing the post-government employment of present and former federal officials in the executive branch of the government. Federal offic-
Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations section 737 prohibits a former government lawyer's representation of a private client involving a conflict of interest. Section 737.5(a) prohibits a former government attorney from ever representing a person in any informal or formal appearance before the United States courts in connection with any particular government matter involving a specific party in which matter he or she participated personally and substantially as a government employee. "Personal" participation means direct involvement and includes the participation of a subordinate when actually directed by the former government employee. "Substantial" means that the attor-
ney's involvement must be of significance to the matter, or form a basis for a reasonable appearance of such significance.\textsuperscript{71} While a series of peripheral involvements may be insubstantial, a single act of approval or participation in a critical step may be a substantial act.\textsuperscript{72}

Further, one's governmental (official) responsibility may contribute to the substantiality of an employee's participation. If an employee has responsibility for review of a matter "and action cannot be undertaken over his or her objection, the result may be different. If the employee reviews a matter and passes it on, his or her participation may be regarded as 'substantial' even if he or she claims merely to have engaged in inaction."\textsuperscript{73}

The rules of the Office of Government Ethics specifically define "the same particular matter" as one involving the "same basic facts, related issues, the same or related parties, time elapsed, the same confidential information, and the continued existence of an important Federal interest."\textsuperscript{74} The particular matter must be one in which the United States is a party or has an interest in, and the importance of the federal interest is a determining factor.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{71} Id. "Example 2: A Government lawyer is not in charge of, nor has official responsibility for a particular case, but is frequently consulted as to filings, discovery, and strategy. Such an individual has personally and substantially participated in the matter."

\textsuperscript{72} Id.

\textsuperscript{73} Id. at § 737.5(d)(3) (1982).

\textsuperscript{74} Id. at § 737.5(c)(4) (1982). One example illustrative of the "same particular matter" given here is:

A Government employee reviewed and approved certain wiretap applications. The prosecution of a person overheard during the wiretap, although not originally targeted, must be regarded as part of the same particular matter as the initial wiretap application. The reason is that the validity of the wiretap may be put in issue and many of the facts giving rise to the wiretap application would be involved.

\textsuperscript{75} Id. at § 737.5(c)(5) Example 1 (1982):

\textit{Example 1:} An attorney participated in preparing the Government's antitrust action against Z Company. After leaving the Government, she may not represent Z Company in a private antitrust action brought against it by X Company on the same facts involved in the Government action. Nor may she represent X Company in that matter. The interest of the United States in preventing both inconsistent results and the appearance of impropriety in the same factual matter involving the same party, Z Company, is direct and substantial. However, if
In addition to the life-time ban on a matter in which the government lawyer participated personally and substantially, section 737.7(a) imposes a two year prohibition on a former government lawyer's participation in a matter in private practice which was pending under his or her responsibility one year before leaving government service. For any possible violation of these regulations, the Office of Government Ethics may initiate disciplinary proceedings.

Title V of the Ethics in Government Act amended 18 U.S.C. section 207, the criminal statute proscribing unlawful appearances or conduct of former government lawyers representing private clients on a matter in which they participated as a government employee. Amended section 207 penalizes former government lawyers for participating in three specific conflict of interest contexts. Professor Mundheim has summarized the re-
vised statute as follows:

First, it bars a former Government employee from ever making an appearance before or a communication to a court or agency on behalf of a party in a particular matter in which he participated personally and substantially while in government service. Under the Act the former government employee can advise, counsel or assist in a matter on which he switched sides so long as he himself avoids appearing or communicating.

Second, the Act places a two-year ban on appearing before or communicating with a court or agency on behalf of a party in a particular matter which was pending under the employee's official responsibility in his last year of government service. Like the first ban, it does not ban advising,

(2) in connection with any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties in which the United States or the District of Columbia is a party or has a direct and substantial interest, and

(3) in which he participated personally and substantially as an officer or employee through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation or otherwise, while so employed; or

(b) Whoever, (i) having been so employed within two years after his employment has ceased, knowingly acts as agent or attorney for, or otherwise represents, any other person (except the United States), in any formal or informal appearance before, or, with the intent to influence, makes any oral or written communication on behalf of any other person (except the United States) to, or (ii) having been so employed and as specified in sub-section (d) of this section, within two years after his employment has ceased, knowingly represents or aids, counsels, advises, consults, or assists in representing any other person (except the United States) by personal presence at any formal or informal appearance before—

(1) any department, agency, court, court-martial, or any civil, military or naval commission of the United States or the District of Columbia, or any officer or employee thereof, and

(2) in connection with any judicial, rule-making, or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter, and

(3) which is pending before such department or agency or in which such department or agency has a direct and substantial interest—shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
assisting, counseling or consulting behind the scenes.

Third, the Act also imposes a one-year ban on senior government officials from appearing before their former agencies on any matter, including new matters . . . .

. . .

It does not preclude the senior officials from giving advice behind the scenes, because it is not his knowledge, but the possible undue influence associated with use of his name which is sought to be restricted. 80

The statute's effects are to eliminate official corruption, to ensure that former government lawyers will not exercise undue influence over former colleagues, and to encourage officials to scrutinize their subsequent activities as private citizens with a higher degree of caution. 81 Although section 207 is a criminal statute, it was passed to provide a general standard for proper ethical conduct for former government officials and as a model for agency and department regulations. 82

At the time of its enactment in 1978, the Senate Report conceded that public confidence in government had been weakened "by a wide-spread conviction that federal officials use federal office for personal gain, particularly after they leave government service." 83 The Senate committee stated that the public suspiciously viewed the revolving door between industry and government thereby eroding confidence in the integrity of the federal government. 84

On the other hand, the legislative history of the statute reveals that Congress recognized weighty public policy reasons mandating the government's ability to attract and hire qualified, talented individuals for executive service. In 1979, when section 207 was amended, 85 heads of various executive departments tes-

80. Mundheim, Rethinking the Revolving Door, supra note 12, at 714. Reference is made to §§ 207(a), 207(b)(3), 207(b)(i), 207(c). See 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4216, 4263ff, for a detailed explanation of 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(b) & (c).
82. Id. at 4248.
83. Id.
84. Id.
tified that: (1) movement back and forth from private industry to government is valuable to the individual and allows the government to recruit talented employees;\(^8^6\) (2) if such movement were restricted by an ambiguous and harsh statute, the civil service would become a stagnant bureaucracy isolated from the energy of outsiders and fresh competition;\(^8^7\) and, (3) the government must balance its interest with those of affected individuals whose career options upon leaving government service would be severely restricted.\(^8^8\)

IV. PROPOSED ABA REGULATION OF THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

The ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (the Kutak Commission)\(^8^9\) has recommended the bar's adoption for the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)\(^9^0\) including proposed Rule 1.11, entitled *Successive Government and Private Employment*.\(^9^1\) The Kutak Commis-

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86. *Id.* at 331. Testimony of former Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. Duncan, Jr.:

Moreover, a law which discourages movement between the private and public sector would further isolate dedicated career civil servants from other citizens at a time when alienation between Government and the tax-paying public is eroding faith in our national institutions. Our Government has long benefited from the mix of career and short-term employees in its service, and this committee believes that the interchange this provides with the private sector must be preserved.

*Id.* at 332.

87. *Id.* at 331. The House Committee noted the importance of attracting individuals from the private sector for limited periods of time who would challenge the conventional wisdom of their superiors, knowing that they can readily find private employment if necessary. *Id.* at 332.

88. *Id.*. Testimony of former chairman Charles Curtis of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

89. The ABA Commission of Evaluation of Professional Standards is chaired by Robert J. Kutak. It should be noted that Mr. Kutak chairs a commission, not a standing committee of the ABA, and the commission includes non-lawyers. The commission was appointed in 1977 by the then ABA President William B. Spann, Jr. It was charged with undertaking a comprehensive rethinking of ethics of the profession of law. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Proposed Final Draft 1981, Chairman's Introduction.


91. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.11 *Successive Government and Private Employment* (Final Draft 1982) reads:

(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter
sion's draft has eliminated Canon 9's ethical dominion over the private practice of former government lawyers and has streamlined the rules governing disqualification imputed to a law firm in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency consents after consultation. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:

(1) The disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.

(b) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer who has knowledge, acquired as a public officer or employee, of confidential government information about a person, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information is material. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:

(1) The disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(2) Written notice is promptly given to the adverse party to enable that person to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this rule.

(c) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer serving as a public officer or employee shall not:

(1) Participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's stead in the matter; or

(2) Negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as attorney for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially.

(d) As used in this rule, the term "matter" includes:

(1) Any judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; and

(2) Any other matter covered by the conflict of interest rules of the appropriate government agency.

(e) As used in this rule, the term "confidential government information" means information which, at the time this rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosure to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose.
where members are disqualified former government lawyers. Proposed Rule 1.11 is based substantially on the federal law of the Ethics in Government Act and recognizes the controlling regulations proscribing conflicts of interest.\textsuperscript{92}

Rule 1.11 is designed to integrate in organization and substance with other rules defining the duties of the client-lawyer relationship, specifically Rule 1.9, \textit{Conflict of Interest: Former Client}, and Rule 1.10, \textit{Imputed Disqualification: General Rule}.\textsuperscript{93} As stated by Chairman Robert Kutak: "The overriding objective of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards during these past five years has been to develop professional standards that are comprehensive, consistent, constitutional, and, most important, congruent with other law of which they are a part."\textsuperscript{94}

With no admonition of avoiding the appearance of professional impropriety, Rule 1.11(a) begins: "Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee . . . ."\textsuperscript{95}

This prohibition is similar to DR9-101(B)'s prohibition that a "lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee."\textsuperscript{96} Rule 1.11 specifically stated "personal" participation by the former government lawyer and offers a more concrete standard consistent with federal statute and regulation. The requirement of personal participation enables a former government lawyer to know when post-government representation

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{See} note 93 \textit{supra}, Kutak, \textit{The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A Report to the Bar} at 1023.
\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Model Rules of Professional Conduct} Rule 1.11 (Final Draft 1982).
\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Model Code of Professional Responsibility} DR9-101(b) (1981).
is barred.

The term "matter" is defined in subsection (d)(1) as a judicial proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific party or parties; or in (d)(2) any other conflict of interest matter covered by the appropriate government agency. Rule 1.11(a) is a comprehensive improvement of DR9-101(B) since the old rule never addresses the specifics of the term.

The proposed rule provides for a permanent ban on an individual lawyer's participation on a matter in which he was personally and substantially responsible unless the appropriate government agency consents to the participation. The rule also disqualifies firms if: (1) the disqualified former government lawyer is not screened from participation in the matter or from any part of the fees; and, (2) written notice is not given promptly to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the screening mechanism. The Rule adopts the screening device sanctioned by Opinion 342 to bar firm disqualification, but does not mandate agency waiver, rather agency "compliance." Thus, Rule 1.11 fulfills the Greitzer majority's belief that a government agency is the best judge of the suitability of screens erected to protect it from disclosure of confidential information.

These proposed provisions governing disqualification imputed to a law firm are important additions to the ABA ethical code. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) remedy the 1969 Code's failure to deal with the realities of modern law practice. It is essential that the ABA establish clear, workable rules for the re-

97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (Final Draft 1982).
98. Id. at (a)(1), (a)(2). The screening and agency approval provisions are in conformity with the recent order of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals of April 30, 1982, which also eliminated the waiver requirement of the federal agency but required filings by firm associates. (Memorandum of David B. Isbell to D.C. Bar Board of Governors: The Final Spin of the "Revolving Door": The D.C. Court of Appeals' Order of April 30, 1982, at 6.) (Letter of Philip A. Lacovara to Barbara Mance, (July 26, 1982)).
99. See notes 93-95, supra.
volving door lawyer and prospective law firms which hire revolving door lawyers. The legislative history of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act reveals that Congress refrained from addressing this issue of disqualification imputed to a law firm and implicitly left it to the legal profession to self-regulate.\textsuperscript{101}

The proposed rule will provide the courts with standards to measure the conflict of interest inherent in the revolving door situation, give agencies the opportunity to maintain confidentiality, and give private firms a way to determine when one of their attorneys who has been hired from the government will be able to operate without fear of disqualification. No longer will the federal courts have the "appearance of professional impropriety" as a standard to disqualify a law firm whose member is personally disqualified.\textsuperscript{103}

The comment to Rule 1.11 discusses the policy arguments in support of the screening and agency approval provisions of the proposed rule.\textsuperscript{103} Not only is the government's need to attract highly qualified lawyers legitimate, it is necessary to sustain a democratic government system which competes with private industry. For that reason, the comment determines that it would

\textsuperscript{101} S. Rep. No. 170, \textit{supra} note 68, at 149.

\textsuperscript{102} Letter from Philip A. Lacovara to Barbara Mance (August 16, 1982). Mr. Lacovara predicted that, even though the proposed Model Rules have eliminated the "appearance of impropriety" as a textual basis for disqualification of former government lawyers, that standard may yet survive in disqualification motions. The argument will be that the "appearance of impropriety" standard is a general principle of professional behavior which the courts have inherent power to administer. To support his contention, see \textit{Gas-a-tron v. Union Oil Co.}, 534 F.2d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1976) quoting \textit{Richardson v. Hamilton International Corp.}, 469 F.2d 1382, 1385-86, (3d Cir. 1972):

> Whenever an allegation is made that an attorney has violated his moral and ethical responsibility, an important question of professional ethics is raised. It is the duty of the district court to examine the charge, since it is that court which is authorized to supervise the conduct of the members of its bar. The courts, as well as the bar, have a responsibility to maintain public confidence in the legal profession. This means that a court may disqualify an attorney for not only acting impropriety but also for failing to avoid the appearance of impropriety.

> ... [T]he regulation of attorneys appearing before the district court in these matters will be disturbed only when, on review of the record, we can say that the district court abused its permissible discretion.

> 535 F.2d at 1324-25 (footnotes omitted).

be against public policy to restrict the private practice of former government lawyers, except in circumstances of actual conflicts of interest or potential breaches of the privilege of confidentiality.

Removing the “appearance of impropriety” from the ethical code governing the private practice of former government lawyers equates their duties with the ethical responsibilities of all lawyers.\textsuperscript{104} There is no legitimate reason why the ABA Code should stigmatize former government lawyers and essentially jeopardize their careers after leaving government service. The “appearance of impropriety” is an unjustifiable standard that creates the assumption that “government lawyers” cannot be trusted to discharge their public responsibilities faithfully while in office, or to abide fully by screening procedures afterwards.\textsuperscript{105} Subsection (a) of proposed Rule 1.11 permits lawyers who have served the government to practice in another capacity. The proposed rule allows the revolving door lawyer to pursue a post-government service career cognizant of his ethical and legal duties, rather than confused by the undefined standard of impropriety conceived by a court.

Subsection (b) of MRPC Rule 1.11 is an unique addition to the final draft which incorporates MCPR Canon 4’s protection of client-attorney confidences. The subsection prohibits a former government lawyer who has gained knowledge of confidential government information about a person from representing a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information is material.\textsuperscript{106}

Subsection (c) of the proposed rule incorporates MCPR Ca-

\textsuperscript{104} Letter from Donald A. Farmer to Barbara Mance (August 27, 1982). Mr. Farmer expressed his opinion that former government lawyers often are called upon to deal with ethical constraints arising out of conflict of interest principles because of their past involvement in important public responsibilities.


\textsuperscript{106} Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.11(b)(e) (Final Draft 1982). This ban on the use of confidential government information in private practice disqualifies an individual lawyer; likewise, a firm is disqualified unless the lawyer is screened and given no share of the fees generated. These measures must be approved by the adverse party. Confidential information is defined in subsection (e) as information which the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose.
non 5’s proscription of a former government lawyer “switching sides” or representing adverse interests in a matter. The rule is carefully drafted to prohibit a government lawyer’s: (1) participation in a matter in which he or she participated personally and substantially while in nongovernment employment unless under the law no one may act in the lawyer’s place; and, (2) negotiation for private employment with any person involved in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially.107

This study of proposed Rule 1.11(b) and (c) demonstrates that the Kutak Commission has preserved the Code’s Disciplinary Rules of Canon 4 and Canon 5 in the proposed regulation of the ethical restraints on the private practice of former government lawyers. First, the rule prohibits a former government lawyer from revealing or using, to his private client’s advantage, information he acquired while a government employee. The prohibition of subsection (b) is clear and focuses on the preservation of the client-attorney privilege which is the emphasis of the proposed Model Rules.108 A lawyer has a duty to a client or former client of utmost loyalty and confidentiality, now recognized in the ABA proposed regulation of the private practice of former government lawyers.109

Second, the prohibition of subsection (c) enforces MCPR Canon 5’s application when former government lawyers “switch sides” in passing through the revolving door. The proposed rule protects the public from former government lawyers’ “structuring their government service to advance their own careers in the private sector and . . . [incurring] the appearance of evil.”110 If approved by the ABA House of Delegates, this section will serve to protect the integrity of government decisionmaking,111 as a prophylactic measure to guard against misuse of authority by government lawyers.”112

107. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.11(c) (Final Draft 1982).
111. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 105, at 5.
112. 606 F.2d at 34.
V. CONCLUSION

In light of Congress' passage of the Ethics in Government Act and the ABA's failure to justify DR9-101(B) under the standard of avoiding "the appearance of impropriety," the bar needs to adopt a clear conflict-of-interest ethical precept to regulate the private practice of former government attorneys. The vague standard of "appearance of professional impropriety" should not govern the private practice of former government lawyers. Nor should that standard serve to impute the disqualification of a former government attorney to an entire law firm when there is no evidence of actual impropriety. The bar should articulate with precision conflicts of interest. Proposed Rule 1.11 clearly establishes for the individual lawyer what will constitute unethical activity relating to post-government employment. The entry of government attorneys into private practice has become an occurrence of significant magnitude to warrant the bar's and federal courts' recognition of its facility unfettered by an out-dated and unrealistic ethical standard incomprehensible to lawyers.

MRPC Rule 1.11 fulfills the Kutak Commission's goals to identify clearly the ABA's ethical objectives in the practice of law that guided the drafting of the Model Rules. Rule 1.11 is comprehensible, consistent with other rules in the proposed Model Rules, and compatible with current law. The rule is drafted clearly to prescribe the disqualification of an individual lawyer and a firm when the former government lawyer's disqualification is imputed to that firm. The rule extols the ethical principles of client confidentiality which are upheld consistently in the MRPC. Rule 1.11 is also consistent with the MCPR's disciplinary rules and Opinion 342's rejection of the appearance of impropriety as a standard, test or element embodied in the disqualification of revolving door lawyers. It parallels federal law and regulation and, therefore, is congruent with the federal system. Moreover, Rule 1.11 provides for a firm's disqualification, an issue Congress reserved for regulation by the bar itself.

The most compelling reason for adoption of Rule 1.11 is its elimination of the "appearance of professional impropriety" governing the practice of former government lawyers. Removal of this vague and arbitrary standard will allow lawyers to pass through the revolving door with reasonable certainty of proscribed conduct which could result in personal or firm disqualifi-
cation. The proposed Rule 1.11 preserves the highest ethical standards of confidentiality and loyalty to a client or former client. Its provisions embody the policy considerations of the government's need to employ qualified attorneys who are not penalized professionally and financially when they exit the revolving door to private practice. Adoption of Rule 1.11 will be an efficacious reform to the body of ethics governing the employment of former government lawyers.

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