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#### CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE

### CONFERENCE COMMITTEE HEARING ON SCA 32 (ROBERTI)

**VOLUME II** 



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1	APPEARANCES
2	MEMBERS PRESENT
3	SENATOR DAVID ROBERTI
4	SENATOR JOHN DOOLITTLE
5	SENATOR BARRY KEENE
6	ASSEMBLYMAN WILLIE BROWN
7	ASSEMBLYMAN ROSS JOHNSON
8	ASSEMBLYMAN JOHN VASCONCELLOS
9	STAFF
10	CLIFF BERG, Executive Officer
11	Senate Rules Committee
12	TIM HODSON, Consultant Senate Elections Committee
13	DEBORAH MITTEN, Secretary
14	Senate Elections Committee
15	ALVIN GRESS, Counsel Legislative Counsel's Office
16	ALSO PRESENT
17	WALTER ZELMAN, Legislative Advocate
18	California Common Cause
19	MIKE DORAIS, Legislative Advocate California Newspaper Publishers Association
20	SENATOR KEN MADDY
21	ASSEMBLYWOMAN MAXINE WATERS
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#### PROCEEDINGS

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SENATOR ROBERTI: The meeting will come to order. This is a meeting of the conference committee on SCA 32.

There is a draft proposal of amendments to the Constitutional Amendment, taking into consideration some of the testimony that was brought before us yesterday, as well as fine tuning and cleaning up other portions of the bill.

Copies of the proposed amendments have been passed out, and the Chair entertains comment from the Floor. Mr. Zelman, you're elected.

MR. ZELMAN: We have only a few suggestions on the latest draft as I read it now. For the most part, we feel that the improvements made on the Salary Commission yesterday or the day before are good. I think the Salary Commission proposal is in good shape.

On the statements of principle, we asked you to put in strong statements of principle. For the most part we think they're there.

I think we have differences on what to do with the conflict of interest. We think the conflict of interest proposals are just not what we would like. I don't know that there is need to go through that again. Basically, they're not much more than what's in the Political Reform Act now. We think the critical issue is the enforcement by the Political Reform Act, but I made that statement yesterday and need not go through it again.

The two or three specifics I noticed in this latest draft which I had hoped were going to be slightly different are the following.

On Section 5, on Page 1 of the draft, the honoraria ban, we believe, should include appearance before a group. I understand there was some concern about lawyers appearing, and what not, but clearly that's not honoraria. If you have to write that in, fine, but that's clearly not an honoraria for a lawyer to appear before a judge for a fee.

I don't think anybody reads that -- or, if you have to write that in, write that in, but some of the most egregious examples of payments last year that got in the press a lot were people showing up at dinners, or people showing up to receive awards and getting payments for it. They didn't speak or anything. In fact, the media made a great deal about the fact they didn't even speak and they got the money. So, I think the word "appearance" has to be placed in that section.

The gift language is very close to what we have advocated. We actually had submitted language that it might create the appearance of or the reality of conflict of interest. The term "appearance" has been dropped, at least from our amendment, maybe intentionally, maybe by mistake.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Give me that again? I'm sorry, I missed that.

MR. ZELMAN: We are arguing for Section (b) should include the term "appearance". Honoraria should include writing, appearance and speech.

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And on letter (c), we have:

"The Legislature shall enact laws

that ban or strictly ..."

et cetera. "The acceptance of a gift might create the appearance of," comma, "or conflict of interest." We thought the notion of "appearance" was important there.

Other than that, and the reservations I've expressed on the limitations of the conflict of interest and outside income section, we think it's pretty solid now.

SENATOR ROBERTI: I think basically on the gift section, you want to make a comment just for the record, because I think we incorporated a great deal of --

MR. ZELMAN: Yes, you incorporated our language virtually --

SENATOR ROBERTI: -- on the gift section.

MR. ZELMAN: -- word for word, except for the word "appearance", which was taken out.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Fine.

Assemblyman Vasconcellos.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: On the point Mr. Zelman mentioned in the honoraria section, I've tried to figure out some language that would address prohibiting the walk-in that has been appropriately criticized, and would not prohibit the carrying out of someone's professional duties as a lawyer, or a nurse, or whatever else he or she might be.

I've tried some language that said, "or appearance, other than appearance before a court or other adjudicatory body".

That still doesn't cover it as well as it probably 1 should. Or, "appearance other than appearance pursuant to 7 professional license". 3 MR. ZELMAN: Or line of business. 4 Clearly what we're talking about here, an honoraria is 5 not somebody doing their job. 6 SENATOR ROBERTI: What about "pursuant to professional 7 license or line of business"? 8 MR. ZELMAN: Well, as long as that doesn't imply 0 legislative line of business. 10 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: "Other than appearance 11 pursuant to Member's own profession". 12 SENATOR ROBERTI: Professional licensing. 13 MR. ZELMAN: I guess I don't consider it an honoraria, 14 so --15 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: I don't either, but it says 16 "honoraria or other compensation". 17 MR. ZELMAN: I don't know what you --18 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: The language is broad as to 19 "other compensation", so you couldn't go to court or couldn't --20 MR. ZELMAN: No, I think we're talking about the same 21 thing, I don't care what the language is. We're talking about 22 the same thing. 23 ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: I'm not following. Which language 24 are you objecting to? 25 MR. ZELMAN: I think that the notion of honoraria, of 26

banning an honoraria, should include not only giving a speech, or

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writing something, but you shouldn't be allowed to just appear in 1 some place. 2 Under this rule, you could go to an event, and you 3 couldn't be paid for speaking, but you could be paid for 4 appearing at the event. 5 SENATOR ROBERTI: That's a lot easier. 6 MR. ZELMAN: It may be. 7 8 to figure out a way of drafting it. 9 10 to gifts generally? 11 12 13 doesn't have that represent a gift. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: 21 pursuant to professional license". 22 Does that cover the ground? 23 24

SENATOR ROBERTI: We agree with you. We're just trying ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Where is the language with respect There's no definition by which that appearance is being paid to appear. There's no construction I can come up with that MR. ZELMAN: That's right. It would be a gift, but we don't know what the gift limit is ultimately going to be. ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Solve that by banning gifts. MR. ZELMAN: I don't think that's where we're headed. There's probably going to be some tolerance for gifts --ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: You've got one vote, Mr. Zelman. "Other than appearance SENATOR ROBERTI: As well as anybody can think of right Are you offering that as an amendment? ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Yes.

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now.

What it would be would be after the word "writing", second line, line (b), put "or appearance," parenthesis, "(other than an appearance pursuant to a professional license)" end of parenthesis.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Not to be difficult, Mr. Chairman, but I'm not sure I know what that means.

I mean, those of us who are Members of the Legislature are also attorneys? Does that mean we can speak before any group of attorneys, and somehow that comes within the scope of our professional licensing, is therefore an exception here? Or someone who is a certified life underwriter can speak before any group of life underwriters in the state, or insurance groups and so on?

SENATOR ROBERTI: What about going back to "other than appearance before a court or other adjudicatory body"?

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: That's even narrower. I'm not sure what works to your satisfaction.

SENATOR MADDY: Even if we've been talking about a limit of \$250, if you can get a gift for not going some place, why not the gift for going some place?

I mean, isn't it really controlled, the appearance situation, controlled by gifts?

MR. BERG: No, it's not.

SENATOR MADDY: Mr. Zelman, if in fact we all agree that would be a pure gift if you've done nothing, you've shown up, or you're at a place, isn't it a gift in that you'd have to declare it?

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MR. ZELMAN: I understand what you're saying. But it also seems absurd to me to say you can't get paid for actually doing something, giving a speech, but you can get paid just for showing up.

SENATOR MADDY: There's a degree of absurdity in all this.

But what I'm saying is, you would have the further absurdity if you show up and we can't give you anything, but you stay home, you get a gift.

MR. ZELMAN: That's right.

SENATOR MADDY: We can keep going in a big circle. think we're straining so hard to --

MR. ZELMAN: You can't receive an honoraria.

SENATOR MADDY: I know what you're trying to get at.

MR. ZELMAN: I guess the problem is, the notion of an honorarium is that theoretically you did something for it.

> SENATOR MADDY: That's correct.

MR. ZELMAN: You appeared, you went somewhere, you did something, and therefore they're paying you for that.

If somebody wants to take the responsibility of saying, "We gave you a gift, up-front gift," then call it a gift. Don't call it, "Well, we paid them for showing up," right?

Therefore, I think you shouldn't be allowed to pay somebody for showing up. If you want to lay \$250 on somebody, lay \$250 on them and say I gave them a gift.

SENATOR MADDY: I went to the AT&T. They gave me a gift bag, a golf cart bag. I declared it as a gift.

MR. ZELMAN: We presume that most of the statutes can allow for that kind of acceptance of that kind of stuff, yes. But they shouldn't pay you cash for showing up.

I realize there may be some problem with that. I think the problem you're trying to wrestle with is trying to allow someone to engage in their business, legitimately engage in their business, and I don't think anybody's going to call it an honoraria.

SENATOR KEENE: But it's compensation.

MR. ZELMAN: Then honestly I don't know what "other compensation" --

SENATOR ROBERTI: There's a problem, but it may not be.

Showing up for an appearance if there was an agreement that could be construed as a contract, probably, may not be construed as a gift. It could be construed as compensation.

MR. ZELMAN: You might want to take out "or other compensation".

I mean, we're talking about a principle here, right?

It's going to go under compensation, all of which is going to have to defined later on.

So maybe the simplest way is just maybe you want to take out the "compensation". What we're really saying is we don't want them to have honorarium, and we're defining honorarium as showing up, giving a speech, or writing something for an honorarium.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: So move.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Or doing nothing.

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SENATOR ROBERTI: "No Member of the Legislature may accept any honoraria."

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Strike out "or other compensation".

MR. ZELMAN: Maybe I'm missing something.

My thought would be that that might solve your problem.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Then deal with the other issue when we flesh out the gift.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: It would read "no honorarium for any speech, writing or appearance"?

MR. ZELMAN: Yes, that's what I -- yeah, and then take out the "other compensation".

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Okay.

MR. ZELMAN: And someone can receive compensation for something other than an honoraria, which would be a professional appearance or a line of business, something like that.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: So it would read: "shall accept any honorarium for any speech, comma, writing, comma, or appearance, comma, except copyright royalties," et cetera.

MR. ZELMAN: Again, unless I'm missing something, I'm not a lawyer. Maybe there's something I'm missing. I don't know why that phrase has to be there.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: I would move that, along with Senator Doolittle.

MR. ZELMAN: It's been suggested -- somebody said that they can give you payment.

SENATOR ROBERTI: The problem is the difference of interpretation as to what honoraria is. That has never been

adequately settled. Some people say honorarium covers anything where you may have had a payment for a speech. And then others say there's a strict gratuity.

We would probably be leaving it up to a court to have to decide.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Earlier statute?

SENATOR ROBERTI: Maybe, or a later statute.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: I think Mr. Zelman on this point is correct in the way in which he says strike "other compensation", because then you leave it to the individual Member.

If some Member wishes to foolishly accept any form of payment that could even be considered an honoraria, a compensation, or any other form of payment for speech making, under the circumstances as described herein, he or she is taking his or her own chance, and the risk is his or hers.

I think the common use of honoraria is wrong. Most people think of honoraria as an actual earned fee, when in fact the dictionary definition of honoraria is in the nature of a gratuity. It is, in fact, a gift of some sort.

I believe that any Member who would allow that narrow a definition to control his or her conduct would be equally foolish, because if they said, "I'm working for a contractual fee in making this speech rather than a gift," they would be running the risk of whatever kinds of punishment would be visited upon anyone for violation of these particular rules.

So, I think the language prepared and offered by Mr. Zelman is appropriate. Strike "or other compensation" and leave it as it is.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Who enforces this section? Do we have an enforcement authority?

MR. ZELMAN: I think with all of this, the reality is, none of this is really very enforceable until you pass the statutes.

Somebody could bring -- I asked somebody today about this -- somebody could bring an injunction against you, but all that could happen is maybe they could win and make you return the money. But there's no enforcement here. There's no penalty until you write a statute.

SENATOR ROBERTI: The statutes are a necessity, absolutely.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Well, in our own internal, as we develop, each House has its Ethics Committee, and that enforcement as well.

SENATOR ROBERTI: That's another enforcement, yes.

MR. ZELMAN: And we'll scream.

SENATOR ROBERTI: I guess probably we do have to recognize the Constitution as a guideline.

MR. ZELMAN: The other language that was given to me was, you might say, "other than in conjunction with a legitimate practice of a profession," something like that.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: This gets into Ross' concern.

I think it's simpler just to strike "or other compensation", but "no honoraria for any speech, writing or appearance," comma, "except copyright royalties," and so forth.

That's the simplest way to state the principle and make it clear.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Assemblyman Vasconcellos is offering as an amendment to strike "or other compensation", but to add "or appearance".

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: That's correct.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Any discussion or debate?

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Could somebody read the sentence?
SENATOR ROBERTI: It reads:

"No Member of the Legislature may accept any honorarium for any speech, writing, or appearance, except copyright royalties and reimbursement for actual travel expenses and necessary living expenses in connection therewith."

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Mr. Chairman, if I might, just to pick up on Senator Maddy's point, but even if we say that, then someone will argue that they got something because they didn't appear; they refrained from appearing.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: That's included in gift, John.

SENATOR ROBERTI: That has to be covered. There's no way we can avoid those conjectures until we have the statutes.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Okay.

MR. ZELMAN: Senator, let me raise -- at that point, we wanted "the appearance of conflict of interest" on the gift.

There's one other point which I just want some clarification on.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: I think you ought to let him complete the process.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: One thing at a time.

MR. ZELMAN: You're right.

SENATOR ROBERTI: We will get to that.

We have an amendment before us. Assemblyman Vasconcellos has moved. Secretary will call the roll.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Let me respond. I would oppose that amendment.

I still think the word "appearance" is so broad in terms of its application that that is, in fact, what lawyers do for a living before every single, solitary body before whom they appear for compensation purposes. And I do not believe the word "appearance" in the Constitution of this nature would not be subject to that kind of interpretation, and I will not be voting for that amendment.

SENATOR KEENE: On that point, Mr. Chairman.

It seems to me that if the argument is made that not showing up for something constitutes a gift, appearing and nothing more would certainly constitute a gift as well.

We could define it as such in the statutes, and it would be covered under the gift provisions.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: I'd agree, Mr. Chairman, with the two previous speakers.

I think if we take out "or other compensation", we've dealt with the issue.

SENATOR KEENE: You could take out "or appearance".

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: It's not in there. Mr. Vasconcellos is attempting to put it in.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Because if you think about it, a lawyer who goes to court, I mean, conceivably it could be argued that what he does is make a speech or some kind of communication, certainly.

SENATOR KEENE: Somebody who gets an honorarium for doing nothing is getting a gift.

SENATOR ROBERTI: What about adding a qualifying line, "and appearance shall not be construed as including an appearance of a lawyer before a court"?

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Well, Mr. Roberti, the language that's proposed is honorarium. A lawyer making an appearance before a board, or a commission, or in court, or whatever, is not doing that, unless it's a pro bono thing, and then this wouldn't apply in any event. But it's not for an honorarium; he's doing it for a fee, presumably based on an arrangement with his client.

So, I don't think that those situations are covered by the language that Mr. Vasconcellos is suggesting.

SENATOR KEENE: But what do the words "or appearance" add to the situation?

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: It relates back to accepting an honorarium for one of three things: an honorarium for a speech; an honorarium for a writing other than a copy --

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Why wouldn't you say an honorarium 1 for any purpose whatsoever? 2 ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: I'm sorry, how could you or why 3 don't you? 4 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Wouldn't that be more appropriate? 5 An honorarium for any purpose whatsoever. 6 SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Sounds okay to me. Let's do it. 7 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Do it. 8 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: And then you're not screwing around 9 with appearance and all that kind of stuff. Because let me tell 10 you, appearance before the NFL Players' Council, representing 11 somebody on -- a player who's about to be suspended on a drug 12 charge, that's not a judicial body; that's an organization; 13 that's a group. 14 SENATOR ROBERTI: So what is your proposal? "No Member 15 of the Legislature may accept any honoraria"? 16 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: For any purpose whatsoever, period. 17 SENATOR ROBERTI: "For any purpose." 18 ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: You'd strike that language. 19 assume it would read: 20 "No Member of the Legislature may 21 accept any honorarium except copy-22 right royalties and reimbursement 23 for actual travel expenses ..." 24 Copyright royalties clearly are not an honorarium. 25 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Thank you. That's why you ought to 26 just say: "No Member of the Legislature may accept an 27

honorarium."

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: "Except for reimbursement for actual travel expenses and necessary living expenses in connection therewith."

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: It's not an honorarium.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: I agree with you.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: That's not an honorarium. We're paying you for a \$99 flight down to Los Angeles to make a speech at the Chamber of Commerce on the L.A. First, or whatever they call themselves, as I have done. I don't consider that an honorarium. They paid my way to get me down there.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Put a period after "honoraria".

SENATOR ROBERTI: Well, I don't know about that.

I mean, that's our definition of what's not an honorarium. But whoever the enforcing power is might decide that that includes just about everything.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: That's why he's correct about the statute, Mr. Roberti, when he says that the statute ought to be written outlining exactly what you mean when you say "ban on honoraria". In the statute, you can make it very clear that every Member of the Legislature is entitled to be reimbursed for all necessary expenses incurred in any appearance, in any place where he has been invited to appear or to present any issue or paper, or what have you, where he's not reimbursed by the State or by his campaign account.

That can be a statute, or that can be a House rule, and that takes care of what Mr. Zelman is talking about.

In the Constitution, the word simply says "ban on honoraria": "No Member of the Legislature may accept an honoraria," period.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Let's ask Counsel. Do we have any definitions other than this of honoraria anywhere?

MR. GRESS: Well, I believe you have a definition in the Fair Political Practices Act.

SENATOR ROBERTI: What do they say?

MR. ZELMAN: You mean Prop. 73.

SENATOR ROBERTI: When we use the word "honoraria" subsequent to a formal definition, a court could take cognizance of the fact that we were taking cognizance of whatever existing definitions there were.

What is the existing political definition of honoraria?

MR. ZELMAN: The only thing that the FPPC dealt with, no

Member may receive more than \$1,000 for a gift or honorarium in

connection with a published work, or something like that; right?

I don't think honoraria was defined; was it?

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: No, based on the definition of gift, added gift or honoraria, published work on a subject related to the legislative process.

MR. ZELMAN: But what is the definition of honoraria previously defined? I think that's the question.

MR. GRESS: Then I think you look at the dictionary -SENATOR ROBERTI: Let me add this. What about language:
"no honoraria for speech, writing, or other purpose", and not use
the word "appearance"?

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If honorarium is to be construed broadly, then it's not going to be misconstrued. It will be only construed for those purposes for which honoraria are given.

MR. GRESS: I think one of the problems is that there's no precise definition for honorarium, and you have -- as Mr. Brown said, you have several different views.

And we're placing this in the Constitution, and the purpose of adding some other phrase, "or compensation", or something afterwards was if honorarium was given a limited interpretation, then a payment, which you can argue the term "payment" or compensation or something else, would cover the remaining part of the field.

Placing honorarium in the Constitution by itself without providing a definition subjects Members of the Legislature, in this case, and others to potential lawsuits for publicity value, or other purposes.

You're also taking a risk by leaving it -- being imprecise.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: How about this, Mr. Chairman. I think, obviously, if this were easy to do, it would have been done by now. It's not that easy to do.

Why don't we -- we've done it in other parts of this -say: "The Legislature shall prescribe the definition of
'honorarium'." We do that in the statute after it's been -- after
we've fought through all the intricacies of this.

It's clear that our intent is that Members are not to go and appear and get a fee for appearing, or for giving a speech,

or something. We know what the intent is, and then let's confer 1 the authority on the Legislature to actually --2 SENATOR ROBERTI: So are you offering as an amendment: 3 "No Member of the Legislature may 4 accept any honorarium as defined by 5 statute." 6 SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Or put a period after "honorarium", 7 and say: 8 "The Legislature shall enforce this 9 provision by appropriate legislation." 10 But that's the intent. 11 SENATOR ROBERTI: Then it's: 12 "No Member of the Legislature may 13 accept any honorarium defined by 14 statute." 15 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Read that. I think since we 16 can't define it, it doesn't really mean much. 17 SENATOR ROBERTI: Well, it does prevent -- it would 18 prevent -- if we just leave it: 19 "No Member of the Legislature may 20 accept any honorarium." 21 Our problem is, it opens every one of us up to a suit. 22 And you can flip a coin as to whether that suit would be 23 entertained in court based on things right now that we don't 24 think are honoraria, but somebody could come in and say a 25 reimbursement is an honorarium. It's a gift for something 26 enjoyable you got.

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SENATOR DOOLITTLE: I would think we could probably get 1 something moving. 7 SENATOR ROBERTI: "No Member of the Legislature may 3 accept any honorarium as defined by statute." ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: I would like to offer the 5 following. 6 SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes, please. 7 ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: "No Member of the Legislature may 8 accept any honorarium" period. "The Legislature shall enact 0 statutes to implement this section," period. 10 SENATOR DOOLITTLE: That sounds good. 11 SENATOR ROBERTI: Let's write that down: 12 "The Legislature shall enact statutes 13 to implement this section." 14 Assemblyman Johnson's offering that as an amendment. 15 Any discussion or debate on the amendment that's been offered? 16 SENATOR KEENE: What is the part immediately --17 SENATOR ROBERTI: "No Member of the Legislature may 18 accept any honorarium. The Legislature shall enact statutes to 10 implement this section." 2() Any comment? Secretary will call the roll. 21 MS. MITTEN: Roberti. 22 SENATOR ROBERTI: Aye. 23 MS. MITTEN: Keene. 24 SENATOR KEENE: Aye. 25 MS. MITTEN: Doolittle. 26 SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Aye. 27

MS. MITTEN: Brown.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Aye.

MS. MITTEN: Vasconcellos.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Aye.

MS. MITTEN: Johnson.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Aye.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Six to nothing; the amendment carries.

Mr. Zelman, were you concluded?

MR. ZELMAN: I had -- one other point I had mentioned was that I had hoped you would add on Section 5(c), the notion of creating an appearance of conflict as opposed to an actual conflict.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: What is the difference, do you think?

MR. ZELMAN: A stronger standard. Obviously, any of it's going to have to be defined.

SENATOR ROBERTI: What I'm afraid of by that standard is that anybody could castigate any adverse comment, even if it's not well founded, someone would say it's the appearance.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: It worries me. The realities ought to be strictly limited, but "appearance" becomes almost a subjective standard.

If somebody gives me a bag of apricots, someone could say, "That appears to be," and have a charge, which I really would think would be frivolous. I don't think I want to go through having to prove it.

And the reality, I think, is the issue here that it creates a conflict of interest or might create. Even "might" is considered subjective.

MR. ZELMAN: The other suggestion I had, and I think this may be fine, I just want a definition of what's meant here on 5(e).

Our objection to the previous language was the use of the term "revolving door", that a Legislator might become a lobbyist.

"Lobbyist" has a particular definition. And if you think about that, particularly as it might apply to not so much yourselves, but to lobbying the executive branch, one or two appearances in the right place --

SENATOR ROBERTI: In the draft proposal we have, we have taken your suggestion, I believe, and changed the word "lobbyist" to "lobbying".

That hasn't been moved in toto by everybody here.

MR. ZELMAN: It's my understand that what you mean by "lobbying" is not necessarily a registered lobbyist in that definition, but the more standard term of attempt to influence in some way the legislative process.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes.

MR. ZELMAN: If that's what that means, the --

SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Where is the language?

SENATOR ROBERTI: Page 2, Section (e).

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MR. ZELMAN: And that is clearly a strengthening of this provision if that's what -- is that the way you read it? From "lobbying for compensation" to "lobbying"?

MR. GRESS: Well, the language has expressly, as governed by the Political Reform Act of 1974, "lobbying for compensation". So, that whole body of law would apply.

MR. ZELMAN: My question is, does "lobbying" then get interpreted to mean you have to meet the threshold for which you register as a lobbyist under the Political Reform Act, which is much more than just occasional talking to Legislators.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Counsel, then staff would like to comment.

MR. GRESS: Well, in this case, (e) says: "The Legislature shall enact laws that prohibit", and I would think the statutes or law enacted by the Legislature would fill in the details of how it is to be interpreted, et cetera.

MR. HODSON: The Political Reform Act does not contain a definition of "lobbying"; therefore, we cannot use the phrase "as defined by the Political Reform Act." We had to use the phrase "as governed by the Political Reform Act", because the Act repeatedly refers to "lobbying", lobbying contacts, regulations of the FPPC referring to lobbying and definitions.

But by phrasing it "governed by", we are incorporating those. We simply couldn't say "defined by the Political Reform Act" because that would be referencing --

MR. ZELMAN: I'm not concerned about --

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: What I gather from what Mr. Hodson's saying is that the Reform Act talks about what it is to be a lobbyist, a registered lobbyist, and separately it uses the word "lobbying" in a much more generic sense.

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This is the word "lobbying", and therefore it would prohibit any kinds of activities that are lobbying, not just those of a registered lobbyist.

MR. ZELMAN: That's all I'm trying to clarify. Okay.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: While Prop. 9 does not contain a specific definition of "lobbying", there is a cumulative definition by inference.

MR. ZELMAN: We're all agreed that that's what it means.

Those are the only further suggestions I have.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Thank you very much, Mr. Zelman.

Would someone else like to come forward and make comment?

MR. DORAIS: Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, Mike Dorais, representing the California Newspaper Publishers Association.

Our comments today are confined to two areas. One is, we have the understanding that the injunctive relief, mandamus, declaratory relief, and the misdemeanor penalty will be following in the accompanying statute.

And we wanted to comment about the caucus language.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: I have an understanding of what?

MR. DORAIS: That the civil remedies to enforce the open meeting section of the proposed Constitutional Amendment will be included in an accompanying statute.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: I had no such understanding, Mr. 1 Chairman. I would actively oppose such provisions. 2 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Yes, I don't understand where you 3 got -- who did you have that understanding with, Mr. Dorais, so 4 we know who you're talking to and made the deal with you? 5 MR. DORAIS: Well, I've spoken to a member of your staff 6 and to other people who I understood were --7 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Namely? 8 MR. DORAIS: Well, I don't want to put that person in a 9 hard spot if that wasn't their understanding of the situation. 10 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Probably an ex-member of my staff. 11 MR. DORAIS: Well then I definitely won't mention who I 12 was speaking to. 13 And if it's an erroneous understanding, then that's why 14 I bring it out here today at this moment, because it's clear that 15 this proposed Constitutional Amendment --16 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: You want civil and criminal 17 penalties for violating the Open Meetings Act? 18 MR. DORAIS: That's correct, Mr. Speaker. 19 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: I wouldn't vote for that. 20 MR. DORAIS: I think you did back in 1974 on the 21 Grunsky-Burton Act. 22 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Didn't apply to me. 23 MR. DORAIS: Of course it didn't apply to you, because 24 you weren't going to participate in any illegal meetings. 25 But, this language that we're talking about is simply, 26 in effect, a recodification of existing law. Without it, the 27

proposed Constitutional Amendment's language with regard to open meetings would be kind of a toothless tiger. There wouldn't be any enforcement mechanisms.

What we're asking for at this point, I guess -SENATOR ROBERTI: Why don't we leave it at this point.

You discuss the Constitutional Amendment as it is, and methods of enforcement, we understand that you would like something stronger than --

SENATOR MADDY: Why couldn't you get injunctive relief if it's in the Constitution? You sure could. Absolutely you could get injunctive relief.

You don't need to -- you just want to get into the meetings; don't you? Do you want somebody in jail? Do your publishers want to put someone in jail?

MR. DORAIS: No, I don't think the misdemeanor penalty is particularly important or than as a symbol, because what you're -- well --

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: I'm very glad you're casual about misdemeanor penalties.

SENATOR MADDY: Yes. Well, the reason I'm suggesting -it's like us suggesting a statement of economic interest for your
editorial boards, and that's symbolic.

MR. DORAIS: The reason I don't think it's particularly more than a symbol is because on only one occasion in the years since 1953, when the Ralph M. Brown Act was enacted, has it become an issue. And presumably it wouldn't become an issue with regard to the Legislature.

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It exists right now, Mr. Speaker. It's in the Government Code in two different places. It's in Proposition 24; it's in the Grunsky-Burton Act, and it's never even been an issue.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: It is with me, Mr. Dorais. In the hands of an overzealous, enthusiastic, hateful prosecutor, it could be an awfully powerful tool.

Civil remedies for compliance with official functions and responsibilities have nothing to do with economic benefit coming personally to the person who's involved; ought to be all you would seek and would be entitled to.

Criminal penalties ought to be for some conduct that, in one manner or another, endangers the safety of some person or some person's property.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Criminal penalty, and of course, we're talking about something, as you're pointing out, applies to some others, but a criminal penalty for something where I'm not getting any remuneration, or not getting any personal benefit, is a little bit frightening.

Now, I personally tend to think you could get injunctive relief for being in the Constitution. And I personally am willing to -- and I'm only speaking for myself now -- negotiate that kind of remedy with you.

But the criminal penalty for Legislators who are highly visible, much more visible than a local -- than most local legislators --

MR. DORAIS: Say, a member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors or Los Angeles -SENATOR ROBERTI: That's why I said most.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: My friend, Mr. Johnson, comes from a county where they have an unusual, enthusiastic District Attorney. And there's a fellow -- I can't travel in one county in this state. A fellow named Bradbury, or something like that.

SENATOR ROBERTI: That one's Ventura.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: But that's the one I can't travel in.

In Orange, he's got an over-enthusiastic District Attorney as well.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Assemblyman Johnson.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Well, Mr. Speaker and Members, what this really points out is a more general question, and that is the need, as we move along with this SCA, that we address the statutory components that are going to be a part of it.

I don't necessarily have a problem at all. As you know, I was a strong supporter of Prop. 24, and I don't have a problem with that.

But we need to provide the details of what the statutory enactments that go along with this SCA --

SENATOR ROBERTI: I tend to agree with you. There has to be some kind of enforcement other than our good intentions.

MR. DORAIS: And we understand that -- we feel it's reasonable to consider that be accomplished in an accompanying statute --

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SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes.

MR. DORAIS: -- rather than necessarily included in the Constitution.

SENATOR ROBERTI: We at least know four accompanying statutes we need already, so there may be more.

MR. DORAIS: The other point we wanted to speak to today, Mr. Chairman, is with regard to the language on Page 3. I think I'm looking at the next-to-the-last most recent version.

I'm looking at the language dealing with:

"A caucus of Members of the Senate,

Members of the Assembly, or Members

of both houses, which is composed of

members of the same political party,"

and the provision is that they may meet in closed session.

SENATOR ROBERTI: I understand from talking to Counsel, Mr. Dorais, that the interpretation -- that this language only applies to partisan caucuses for all the members of that party, is the correct interpretation.

As soon as we get that counsel opinion, as I suspect it will corroborate that, we will print it in the Journal on the date of the vote.

MR. DORAIS: That would be requested by us, and we appreciate your doing that.

There has been a question that has arisen as to whether or not this language might permit closed committee caucuses. We understand that that's not the intent, but we want to make sure that it's clarified.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes, that's not the intent. As soon 1 as we get language to that effect, and I expect it before the vote, we'll clarify the language. MR. DORAIS: Thank you. .1 SENATOR ROBERTI: Thank you very much. Assemblyman Vasconcellos. 6 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Is that better clarified now 7 if we put the words "caucus of the Members of the Senate, the Members of the house", or "the Members of both houses", rather than just "Members"? 1() MR. DORAIS: I think that might help, Mr. Vasconcellos. 11 Also, another clarification could be --12 SENATOR ROBERTI: Put the word "the" in? 13 MR. DORAIS: -- a sentence that strictly prohibits a 14 closed committee caucus. 15 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Put the word "the" in. 16 SENATOR ROBERTI: "A caucus of the Members of the 17 Senate." 18 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: "-- the Members of the 19 Assembly, or the Members of both houses". 20 SENATOR ROBERTI: "-- the Members of the Assembly, or 21 the Members of both houses, which is composed of the members of 22 the same political party." 23 So, we add four "the's" on Page 3, (A)(2) [sic]. 24 Assemblyman Vasconcellos offers that as an amendment. 25 Any discussion or debate? Any opposition? 26 Without opposition, such will be the order. 27

MR. DORAIS: Mr. Chairman, might I ask if you will still be pursuing the question of a Legislative Counsel's opinion?

SENATOR ROBERTI: Oh, yes.

MR. DORAIS: Prior to the vote?

SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes.

MR. DORAIS: Thank you.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Leg. Counsel has indicated orally that the language we have on Page 3, Section (A)(2) [sic] applies only to caucuses that are called of the whole membership of the house, or both houses, of that party.

Mr. Dorais is concerned that that doesn't mean a committee caucus, and Counsel has indicated that's the case, and I have indicated on the day of the vote we will print Counsel's opinion in the Journal.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Mr. Roberti, so that we don't go without any response, what keeps, as Mr. Johnson said yesterday, the minority party -- whether they be Democrats or Republicans -- from strategizing with reference to every committee meeting in private? Nothing, correct? But you do keep the majority party on that same committee from doing the exact same thing.

So, for purposes of competitiveness, the majority party is at a disadvantage in that situation if their members have not programmed, as would be the case with the minority party.

How do we address that effectively?

SENATOR ROBERTI: Well, that is a disadvantage.

On the other hand, I guess the minority will say that the current situation is a disadvantage, because a program-making majority can caucus under the current roles privately.

I would say the way to handle that is that, frankly, that doesn't prevent meetings; it doesn't prevent strategy meetings. As long as they aren't what would amount to being the final meeting, you could have a meeting and exempt one or two people. But that still is not the final meeting. The final meeting would have to be of a committee majority, in formal session, publicly.

I don't think it's anybody's intent to exempt out strategy, and I don't think it does exempt out strategy. You can still withdraw a Member or two, and there's nothing anybody could do about that, because at that point you just have to eliminate private conversations.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: So at least one person from the majority would always have to be excluded from all strategy meetings.

SENATOR ROBERTI: I quess so.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Speaker, to the extent that that represents a burden or a disadvantage to the majority, it's one that we would welcome the opportunity to accept.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Well, those kind of strategy sessions is what has retarded your progress.

## (Laughter.)

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Therein lies the problem.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Yeah, but yours or ours?

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SENATOR ROBERTI: Or, you could have two meetings and shuttle a messenger back and forth. I guess that would be okay.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: On the open meeting question, I'm told that there was a trade union's opinion in response to in inquiry made by some local elected official wherein a city attorney had gone from one individual member to the next individual member over a period of several days, saying, "This is what is being considered. How would you vote on it?" Almost like a poll. And those individual members said, "I'd vote yes," or "nay."

Does anyone else wish to comment on the draft before us?

When the vote was finally taken at the organized, called, appropriately noticed meeting, that did in fact happen in the way in which the city attorney had appropriated noted in his own notes.

I'm told that the Attorney General has opined that that was an improper meeting.

I believe that the Members of the Legislature regularly seek votes from other Members of the Legislature, commitments. We have rollcall cards where we walk around and say, "Mr. Doolittle, how are you voting on my health bill?" "Mr. Maddy, how are you voting on my health bill?" "Mr. Keene, how are you voting on my health bill?"

And then, when I hand it to the Floor Manager, I say, "I have these Members who say they will vote for the bill when it is presented on the Floor."

Under that Attorney General's opinion, that provision may very well -- that conduct may very well be barred. More often than not in committees it happens regularly, where Mr. Keene will solicit the individual votes of the committee Members, or an indication of how they're voting, before the committee takes place, sometimes using staff, sometimes with a special interest organization -- League of Women Voters, or whomever -- that may be interested in the subject matter.

If that opinion held, then I you would be, I think, jeopardizing that time-honored and appropriate technique, and I don't know that's ever been criticized.

I think as we draft this, you ought to guard against it.

SENATOR ROBERTI: I agree. It's the first I had heard

of that. Any kind of rollcall shouldn't be prohibited.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: The rollcall card, with some regularity. So, I would suggest --

SENATOR ROBERTI: Otherwise, we would never pass a piece of legislation.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: -- doing the legal work, better be careful.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: It would be a surprise; wouldn't it?

## (Laughter.)

SENATOR ROBERTI: I think Assemblyman Johnson may like the opinion.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: It may be that in the statutory drafting, we get that opinion. We could very well take that

opinion, see which section that the Attorney General has used as 1 his base, and make the necessary alteration in that section. 2 Currently, local governments are operating on the theory 3 that that opinion is the law. And if they operate long enough, 4 and anybody ever finally seeks declaratory relief, many court --5 SENATOR ROBERTI: In other words --6 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: -- by estoppel you can't raise the 7 question; you've been doing it too many years. 8 SENATOR ROBERTI: In other words, if they're counting 9 votes --10 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Custom and usage. 11 SENATOR ROBERTI: -- you can't count votes. 12 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Right, exactly. 13 Believe me, I've not been successful --14 SENATOR ROBERTI: Put the world on notice, I agree with 15 you, that certainly isn't my idea of open meeting. I agree. 16 Yes, Assemblyman Vasconcellos. 17 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Does that conclude it for 18 now? 19 SENATOR ROBERTI: Right, but it's an important point, 20 however, that we have to address. 21 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: On Page 5, you've got the 22 same kind of honorarium language in Subsection (b). Do you want 23 to modify it the same way? 24 SENATOR ROBERTI: Assemblyman Vasconcellos moves that 25 the honorarium language in Section 14(b) be made to conform with 26 the language adopted on Page 3, Section (A)(2) [sic]. 27

Any discussion or debate? Name of Without objection, such will be the order. Any other observations? Are there any technical 3 amendments that we haven't gotten to, staff? .1 MR. GRESS: Tim has given us some technical amendments 5 to incorporate. 6 SENATOR ROBERTI: Have they been passed out to the Members? MR. GRESS: No, they have not. 0 SENATOR ROBERTI: I think we have to formally adopt 10 them. 11 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: I move the adoption of the 12 technical. 13 MR. HODSON: Let me explain. 14 There is one line where the word "and" was inadvertently 15 left out. 16 In addition, we have in the conflict of interest 17 language specified that a Member may vote on the budget bill. 18 That language was inadvertently left out in two of the places 10 where it should be. 20 Those are the technical amendments. 21 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Move the technical 22 corrections. 33 SENATOR ROBERTI: Assemblyman Vasconcellos moves the 24 technical amendments that are before you -- that have been 25 presented to you. 26 Is there any discussion or debate? Any opposition? 27

Hearing none, such will be the order.

Any other observations?

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: We've got the accountability section --

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Excuse me for a second, Mr. Vasconcellos.

Before you go there, Mr. Roberti, we ought to make sure that that open meeting language is drafted in such a way that personnel matters, matters of litigation, possible litigation, or that which Legislative Counsel's opine is subject to legislative privilege, be the subject matter of closed meetings. That includes the security questions, et cetera.

And I say advisedly that which is subject to attorneyclient privilege, because there are some items in preparation for litigation that technically there isn't litigation, but it is attorney-client privilege.

One example, if Senator Doolittle asked the question of whether or not there should be a lawsuit filed, and these are the reasons why he thinks that lawsuit ought to be filed, there isn't any pending litigation, but that's attorney-client privilege when we seeks the advise and counsel under those circumstances.

So, attorney-client privilege, as opined by the Legislative Counsel, ought to be the basis for such a closed meeting.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Most of those points, I think, are included in Page 3, Sections (A)(B)(C).

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Well, I looked for the attorney-client privilege, and I don't see it.

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SENATOR ROBERTI: The attorney-client privilege as such is not mentioned as such. However, that --

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Litigation is there.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes, litigation is in here, and that can be delineated in the statute, I would think. I don't think you have to mention --

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: I think you'd better put attorney-client privilege in there, because the Constitution is the originating document in this regard, and I believe it's important --

SENATOR ROBERTI: I understand, but I don't think the attorney-client privilege is in the Constitution. I think we would then be incorporation the statute in the Constitution.

Maybe I'm wrong.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: I think litigation isn't in the Constitution either, Mr. Roberti, and it could be defined. There is not a generic definition of litigation. Litigation is defined by whatever we make it.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Are we going to put "pending or potential litigation"?

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Well, that's pretty broad. I was trying to make it as restrictive as possible so these newspeople that want to get in your business don't go off the scale.

If it's attorney-client privilege, under the Canons of Ethics, and as interpreted on a regular basis by the court, that's a very narrow scope. Attorney-client privilege is narrow.

Potential litigation could be anything, and I don't think you want to say "potential litigation".

I think you want to say, if the Leg. Counsel says the subject matter of this dialogue is attorney-client privilege, you ought to be able to go into a meeting, and I think the news hawks of the world would agree with that.

If he says "possible litigation", that's anything.

Everything can possibly be litigated. All you'd have to do is announce, "Hey, we're holding a meeting to discuss possible litigation."

SENATOR DOCLITTLE: Now I'm confused, Mr. Chairman, because Mr. Brown I thought had used the term "possible litigation".

You just meant litigation, then, or matters subject to the attorney-client privilege as opined by Leg. Counsel?

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Correct, absolutely.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Mr. Dorais, I have to go vote on the Consent Calendar.

Five-minute recess.

(Thereupon a brief recess was taken.)

SENATOR ROBERTI: The committee will come to order.

Mr. Dorais, I think, approached the witness stand.

MR. DORAIS: Mr. Chairman, the language on Page 3 dealing with the specific question on when you may meet behind closed doors with counsel has been broadened beyond the approach taken in the Ralph M. Brown Act, which talks about meetings:

To confer with or receive advice from legal counsel regarding litigation when discussion in open session would not protect the interests of the house ..."

That's this language.

In the Local Government law, I think the word "prejudice" is used, and I think in the Bagley-Keene Act, it's "adversely impact."

Here, we've gotten, I think, as broad a swinging door as you would want. And think I think the understanding is that you would describe those meetings in the accompanying statute, along the lines of the language that's found in the law that you co-authored two years ago with Senator Keene for application of local government and to State boards and commissions.

SENATOR ROBERTI: That, if I'm not mistaken, was to protect against, I guess, abuses in the attorney-client privilege.

MR. DORAIS: Yeah. Conceivably, any time you met with your attorney, you would be exercising the attorney-client privilege.

So, to avoid that type of overreach of the closed door privilege, we've just restricted it -- I don't think it's very restrictive, frankly, but it's a legitimate concern -- to meetings where you've got this interest in protecting the interests of the house or the committee.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: There are two distinct nuances here. One is whether or not it protects the interests of the house, or adversely impacts, that standard of justification.

The other is the ambiance of what could be discussed. Only litigation? What about something that's not litigation?

They're really distinct pieces, that's all.

MR. DORAIS: Yes.

Beyond litigation is in the Ralph M. Brown Act now, and in the --

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Beyond?

MR. DORAIS: Yes, an action that is anticipated. I thinks the words of art are "under existing facts and circumstances", you've reached a point where it's likely that you will be involved in litigation.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: So, if this read, "permits counsel regarding pending or anticipated litigation"?

I mean, what I think Mr. Brown was about was not the standard of protection so much as the ambiance of what you could appropriate talk with counsel privately about. If you didn't have a lawsuit pending, could you not talk, you know, privately?

MR. DORAIS: It's not our intention to preclude those types of discussions.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: That's what I'm trying to find --

MR. DORAIS: And it may be that this language needs some slight modification to ensure that.

It's clear in the accompanying statute, but then if the statute is simply just interpreting a prohibition which is too narrow, then we have a problem.

So, yeah, I understand the point, Mr. Vasconcellos.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: If it says, "litigation pending or reasonably to be anticipated"?

MR. DORAIS: Yes, and the accompanying statute, which is framed like the Roberti-Keene law, addresses that with particularity.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: I'm trying to figure out some language around litigation that provides more than just a pending case, and suggest it: "regarding litigation, pending or reasonably to be anticipated." Or "reasonably anticipated".

Does that provide the breadth without being a wide open door and cover it?

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: I don't think so, Mr. Vasconcellos, because let me tell you, the dialogue that you need to protect would be the serious, intensive, ongoing discussions about whether or not you should litigate at all. And you may conclude you shouldn't litigate, period.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: But that's regarding litigation. That's covered, I think.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: No, it says litigation only. There's no litigation.

Litigation is, somebody has filed a lawsuit, and there is a complaint, and there is an official paper and document, period. You've got to do the developmental work, and if you do

the developmental work in a meeting where Mr. Dorais reports it every hour on the hour, you may very well have given away the totality of the evidence that supports your case.

MR. DORAIS: We're in agreement, Mr. Brown.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Litigation, I don't know what the word or art is, bringing litigation or reasonably pending litigation, or anticipated litigation.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: I don't know, but you've got to have -- you don't like the words "attorney-client privilege", because you believe that every time Mr. Vasconcellos talks to anybody, he could allege that it's attorney-client privilege and thereby keep you out of the room.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Mr. Dorais reminds me that I carried legislation at the local level --

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Sure, you've made a lot of mistakes in your time.

## (Laughter.)

SENATOR ROBERTI: -- to restrict the attorney-client relationship in those cases where they brought their attorney in, and that, per se, became the attorney-client relationship prior to the enactment of the legislation I carried about two or three years ago. The attorney-client privilege covered that situation without really color of litigation.

I think the words of art are: "litigation", "pending and reasonably anticipated litigation", and I don't know about "bringing litigation". There must be a more artful way of drafting it.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: "Potential".

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: That could be anything.

It would seem "regarding litigation" would include whether to litigate as well as the litigation itself. In a normal understanding of the words, it would for me.

MR. DORAIS: The important thing would be the accompanying statute in terms of making sure that it wasn't wide open.

SENATOR ROBERTI: The other important thing is just to make sure that the bringing in of the attorney just because you are asking for advice in a given area that is not related to any reasonable prospect of litigation should not give the legislative body color or protection.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: I think that that's important, and I supported your legislation relating to local government. I think that that is an important point, that we not be able to avoid, or that committees of this Legislature avoid, the open meeting requirement that we're attempting to put in here by inviting an attorney in.

I think an equally important element of that is the requirement for notice in advance of that meeting, so that the press and the public know that the meeting's going to be held, and they know that if a privilege of some kind is going to be invoked, what that privilege is.

I again raise the suggestion that I raised yesterday, that consideration be given to a requirement that those noticed meetings falling under one of these exceptions be tape recorded,

and that that recording be preserved so that if the issue arises as to whether or not the privilege was appropriately invoked, that that would be available for a judge to consider in camera and make a determination if, in fact, there was a violation of the stated privilege claimed.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Since we're dealing with the Constitution in this case, I would think that broader, more directive language is what's necessary.

I have copies of Bagley-Keene and the Ralph Brown Act, and they're full pages and very detailed.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, I don't necessarily quarrel with that approach. I think these questions need to be addressed, however, and in a broad statement objectives in the Constitution, we're placing in the Constitution -- or proposing to place in the Constitution a series of exceptions to the requirement for an open meeting. In doing that, I think, it's important that we put in a provision for adequate notice.

Leave the details and so on, but if the Legislature or committees of the Legislature can meet without the press or public being present, I think that a minimum level of protection is that that be publicly noticed so that folks are at least aware that the meeting's taking place, and what is the privilege that's being claimed.

SENATOR ROBERTI: I don't have a problem with that, but I'm speaking only for myself.

I think, Assemblyman Johnson, if I'm reading you right, you would like something to the effect that the Legislature shall

require -- shall enact statutes delineating the notice that would have to be given for the invocation of the exception.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Yeah. I mean, if we're going to create a series of exceptions in some instances with respect to the legal privilege that's only going to leave that to a statute, it just seems to me that we ought to, within the Constitutional provision here, at least require that the same kind of notice be available about that meeting.

I guess I would be satisfied with that within the Constitutional enactment, to say that notice requirement has to be there.

We're not going to accomplish much of anything if we say within these exceptions, you can meet in secret, and you don't even have to tell the people that you're meeting.

SENATOR ROBERTI: First let's get to Speaker Brown's point on the litigation.

What about language, "to confer with or receive advice from legal counsel regarding pending or reasonably anticipated litigation"?

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: You could go one step further without making it -- put it: "regarding litigation," parenthesis, "(pending, reasonably anticipated, or whether to litigate)", or "whether to initiate litigation".

In that case, I think, you have some fair parameters that seem okay.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Let's go over that one more time. It appears on Page 3, Subsection (C).

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: After "litigation", put in 1 parenthesis, "(pending, "comma, "reasonably anticipated, "comma, 2 "or whether to initiate.)" 3 SENATOR ROBERTI: "Pending," comma, "reasonably 4 anticipated, or --" 5 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: "Whether to initiate." 6 SENATOR ROBERTI: "Whether to initiate litigation." 7 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: End of parenthesis. 8 SENATOR ROBERTI: "Reasonably anticipated or whether to 9 initiate," close parenthesis. 10 Now, Assemblyman Vasconcellos offers that as an 11 amendment. Is there any discussion or debate? Is there any 12 opposition? 13 ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Ouestion. 14 That is an addition to the existing language? We're not 15 striking anything? 16 SENATOR ROBERTI: Nothing is stricken. 17 ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Fine, thank you. 18 SENATOR DOOLITTLE: May I just understand something? 19 SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes. 20 SENATOR DOOLITTLE: So after "litigation," in Subsection 21 (C), parenthesis, "(pending, comma, reasonably anticipated," 22 comma, "or whether to initiate)" close parenthesis. 23 SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes. 24 Any discussion or debate? 25 The motion is before us. Without objection, such will 26 be the order. 27

Now on the points that Assemblyman Johnson was offering. í I take it, Assemblyman, you would like something indicating that when one of the exceptions in (A) (B) (C) on Page 3 is invoked, notice should be given? ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Yes, that's my intention. Some 5 requirement of notice. 6 SENATOR ROBERTI: Something to the effect: "Whenever a 7 closed session shall be invoked, the --" 8 ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Adequate notice shall be given. 9 SENATOR ROBERTI: "Adequate notice shall be given --" 10 ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Delineating the exception --11 SENATOR ROBERTI: "Delineating the exception for which 12 the closed meeting is being called." 13 How shall give that notice? 14 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: The convening --15 SENATOR ROBERTI: The Chair of the convening -- of the 16 group being convened. Let's do that one more time then. 17 (Thereupon the record was read back.) 18 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Giving the reason for which 19 -- to justify the closed meeting. 20 SENATOR ROBERTI: Delineating the exception or the 21 reason? What do you want? 22 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Setting forth the purpose 23 which justifies the closed meeting. 24

SENATOR ROBERTI: That's okay: "setting forth the purpose for which the closed meeting is called. Such notice shall be given pursuant --"

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ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: You're putting this in the Constitution?

SENATOR ROBERTI: That's what -- Assemblyman Johnson would like something indicating that notice has to be given.

Here's another suggestion: "When a closed session is held for any of the above purposes, reasonable notice thereto shall be provided by the Chair."

Is that okay?

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Mr. Chairman, I think that the reference in the Constitution ought to be for requirement of adoption of statutory notification procedures. It may be the Chair; it may be the body; it may be the Speaker; it may be the President Pro Tem. It may be the head of the committee; it may be any of those kinds of things.

I think to put that specific reference in the Constitution is wrong.

SENATOR ROBERTI: How about "statutes shall be enacted"?

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Legislature shall enact a
statute providing for reasonable notice and justification.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Correct.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Any exception to the open meeting rules shall be --

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Legislature shall enact provisions --

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Requiring appropriate notice -- ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: And justification.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: -- for the exercising of any Ĭ exceptions to the open meeting ban. 2 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Public notice? 3 ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Any of the above, (A), (B), and 4 (C). I don't think we want to get into the business of --SENATOR ROBERTI: "The Legislature shall enact 6 provisions providing for appropriate notice when any of the above 7 exceptions are -- " or "when any of the exceptions in this Section are invoked." ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: But you need to put it right 10 after (C) and before (2) so you don't get into the caucus stuff, 11 as far as location. 12 SENATOR ROBERTI: You're right. 1.3 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: "Anything in this Section" 14 includes (2) also, so you don't want to use that. 15 SENATOR ROBERTI: "Any of the exceptions in Section --" 16 SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Mr. Chairman I think we have from 17 Counsel the appropriate solution. 18 (Thereupon a discussion was held off the record) 19 SENATOR ROBERTI: "The Legislature shall enact 20 provisions providing for appropriate notice for Section 5(A)(B) 21 and (C)," with the intent that the caucuses not be included. 22 Counsel, you are instructed to draft that in the 23 quickest time possible. 24 25 MR. GRESS: We'll incorporate that. 26

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1 opposition? 2 Assemblyman Vasconcellos has moved. Without objection, 3 such will be the order. We need that because we have to sign. 5 Any other --6 SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Technical correction, Page 3, 7 Subsection (A) it reads: "To consider the appointment, 9 employment, evaluation of performance, 10 or dismissal of a Member of the 11 Legislature or other public officer ..." 12 I don't think we do any of those things to Members of the 13 Legislature, and probably not to public officers. 14 Is there a need to have -- why don't we just strike that 15 out? We don't employ Members of appoint them. 16 I'll withdraw that, Mr. Chairman. 17 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: One point on Page 3, Number 18 (3), after the exceptions on the open meeting: 19 "The Legislature may implement this 20 subdivision ..." 21 Shouldn't it be "shall implement"? 22 SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes, I think so. 23 Can Counsel or staff indicate why we put "may" in there 24 instead of "shall? 25 MR. HODSON: I think it should have been "shall". 26 27

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SENATOR ROBERTI: Any discussion or debate? Any

SENATOR ROBERTI: Assemblyman Vasconcellos moves that on Page 3, (A)(3), "may" be changed to "shall" -- rather, (c)(3), "may" be changed to "shall".

Any discussion or debate? Any opposition? Hearing none, such will be the order.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, on that same point, could someone explain to me why the language is drafted that the Legislature now "shall implement this subdivision by concurrent resolution", rather than by statute or concurrent resolution?

Why is it limited to concurrent resolution? Is there a reason?

MR. GRESS: If you read on, the last order "or by statute" appears at the end of the sentence. There's a choice whether it's by concurrent resolution or by statute.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Okay.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Withdraw.

SENATOR ROBERTI: It just gives the methods whereby a concurrent resolution can be adopted.

MR. GRESS: And then it says "or by statute."

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Fine, thank you.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Anything else?

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: If everybody else is covered, we've got seven major sections: accountability at the beginning; honoraria; gifts; revolving door; conflict of interest; open meeting; and the Compensation Commission.

It seems to me that's pretty complete, and I'd move we adopt the report.

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SENATOR ROBERTI: Assemblyman Vasconcellos moves adoption of the report.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Mr. Chairman, there is an amendment.

May we strike out on Page 3, Subsection (A), the words "a Member of the Legislature or other public officer or", and insert in lieu thereof the word "an". It would then read:

"To consider the appointment, employment, evaluation of performance, or dismissal of an employee, to consider or hear complaints or charges brought against a Member or other public officer or employee, or to establish the classification or compensation of an employee of the Legislature."

All right, we need to leave in "public officer". Let's just strike out "Member of the Legislature".

SENATOR ROBERTI: All you do is strike out the words "Member of the Legislature"? Any other change?

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Well, "a Member of the Legislature or other". That would be the change.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Better leave the "a" in. SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Okay, leave the "a" in.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Okay, the words on Page 3, Subsection

(A), first subsection, strike out the words "Member of the

Legislature or other".

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Right. Beent ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Then down in Line 5, do you 2 want to put in the words "Member of the Legislature"? 3 SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Right, okav. 4 SENATOR ROBERTI: And on Line 5, incorporated also 5 within Senator Doolittle's motion, after the word "Member" insert 6 "of the Legislature". 7 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: What are you attempting to achieve 8 by that change, Senator Doolittle? SENATOR DOOLITTLE: We don't employ or really evaluate 10 the performance of Members of the Legislature. So it seems like 11 it was extraneous language. 12 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: How do we provide -- how do we in 13 any manner not impact adversely upon ethics committees, 14 committees on standards of conduct in the individual houses that 15 may very well address the issue in that fashion? 16 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Later on it says: 17 "to consider or hear complaints 18 or charges brought against a Member 19 of the Legislature ..." 20 SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Right, in the second phrase in this 21 section. 22 ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: All right. 23 ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: It's covered there, I think,

SENATOR ROBERTI: For the moment, Assemblyman Vasconcellos withdraws his motion, and Senator Doolittle's motion is before us.

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what you want.

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Assemblywoman Waters, do you want to wait until after we vote on this, or do you want to address this point?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: I've been going over any number of the items, and still, you know, wanting us to be very clear.

Nothing that I have seen so far gives us any direction on Members who sit on boards where there is pay for sitting on the board of a corporation.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Why don't we just close this issue and get the amendment down?

SENATOR ROBERTI: Senator Doolittle's motion is before Any discussion or debate? Any opposition?

Hearing none, such will be the order.

The Chair recognizes Assemblywoman Waters.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: The question was does the honoraria prohibition extend to the payment to members of boards who sit on either nonprofit or profit making corporations?

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: It means memberships on boards of directors, for an example of AT&T or PacTel.

SENATOR ROBERTI: I would assume if a Member of the Legislature is a member of the board, it wouldn't, and it could easily be remedied if they could indicate that that's part of the salary for sitting on the board.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: That certainly wasn't the intent.

SENATOR ROBERTI: It's not the intent and --

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: That might be dealt with under the conflict of interest, but not under honorarium.

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SENATOR ROBERTI: You may have a conflict of interest problem, right, but I don't see how you have an honorarium problem. That's income, and it falls under the income problems.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Mr. Chairman, you might further indicate that there is a need for a statutory definition of honoraria as indicated by Senator Doolittle, and contained therein would be a clear provision that payment for duties performed as a member of the board of directors of a profit or nonprofit corporation in which the individual Member participates on a regular basis in the decision making, et cetera, would not be considered honoraria nor banned income.

It may be subject to a conflict of interest if in fact there are occasions when that agency or that board or that organization would have matters pending before the Legislature.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes, clearly, and I think this gets back to the point which we started off with, and that is that it's incumbent upon us to define honorarium, and that has to be done in statute.

But clearly, just so nobody's misled, fee for services on a board, I think under everybody's interpretation, that is income. And where you would fall afoul of the law if that were the case would be under the conflict provisions and not under the prohibitions on honoraria.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Well, let me just reiterate that, as I have said before and as has been said today, we really need a definition. I am worried about this thing called honorarium being placed in the Constitution. I don't think it belongs in

the Constitution, but since, you know, you're set on going in that direction, I don't think that it is clear enough that people would know what you're talking about.

I would again suggest that it not be in the Constitution; rather, that it's in statute and rule, because I don't think you have a clear-cut definition of what an honorarium is.

SENATOR KEENE: For all practical purposes, that's what we've done under the Doolittle amendment. It says it will be defined in statute.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes, in effect we've compromised between your not wanting to mention it and some of us wanting to mention it, and that is the phrase: "The Legislature shall enact statutes to implement this section." That is the section on honoraria.

We do indicate we intend to ban honoraria. We also indicate what every reasonable person knows, and that is what honoraria is is subject to definition, and it has to be defined in statute.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: That is good.

I mean, that helps, because as I have again attempted to really understand and to be clear, it is clear to me that there's so many things that have not been considered relative to this question of honoraria. The one that I bring up today, which you call fees, has to be, you know, that has to be defined.

The other thing is, the idea of just as an attorney has an attorney's office, a consulting firm is another business

that's outside income. And part of what they do in consulting firms has to do with seminars and workshops that are, you know, are paid.

Is that outside income? Is it honorarium?

I mean, I'm being sticky about this, because I think we need to think it through very clearly. And whether someone receives honorarium under their business consulting firm, as lawyers receive outside income, I mean, those are the kinds of things that I think are real questions, and they really need to be dealt with very clearly.

SENATOR ROBERTI: I think that will have to be done with the statutes.

Speaker Brown.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Conducting a seminar, say, conducting a seminar on self-esteem with the consulting firm of John Vasconcellos Company in the State of Maryland, over a two or three day period, and there is a contractual relationship paying Mr. Vasconcellos and his firm for doing that, is that subject to the restrictions that Ms. Waters is concerned about?

SENATOR ROBERTI: Since we're going to define that by statute, I guess it depends on the statute.

If you want to know my opinion, a seminar on self-esteem, personally I feel, would be so inextricably connected with what we do around here that it would strike me as an honorarium, but that's the opinion of one.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: But see, I don't want law based on what strikes you or doesn't.

SENATOR ROBERTI: No, it's not. I'm saying it's not. I'm one vote. That's why we say we're going to enact statutes.

If you want to know what my inclination is, it strikes me clearly as an honorarium. I mean, I can be outvoted.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: But you see, that raises questions appropriately.

I notice our friend, Dr. Bill Filante, who is a medical physician, who doesn't do a self-esteem seminar but does a seminar on the new technologies involved in locating and determining individuals' cholesterol content, high blood pressure, and hypertension. And he does it in the seminar setting at the same conference where Mr. Vasconcellos is teaching techniques of self-esteem and individual survival and self worth. And he's teaching physical survival and physical worth, and lecturing under the same circumstances, under the same contractural arrangement.

Would your comment be equally as applicable?

SENATOR ROBERTI: No, because I would think that if we were going to enact the statute, then Dr. Filante's license would put him in the same category as an attorney, and therefore that license would put him in the category that this is a fee for service.

That would be my opinion, and frankly, I think that's a relatively reasonable interpretation.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: I really take exception to that kind of thinking because I think that the work that I do with women and civil rights organizations is just as important as what any lawyer or any doctor would do with their constituencies.

SENATOR ROBERTI: I didn't say it wasn't important.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Well, the implication -
SENATOR ROBERTI: No, I think what you do is very

important, so I would be the last one to want to say that.

But I think we're talking about a different line here, and that line is what are those things that fall either left or right of the line as to what is compensable?

I think the only thing that we can divide that on is if it's a business or a profession, and how do you define a profession? That's arbitrary, but I would say a license is a good indication.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: Why shouldn't we consider the possibility, Senator Roberti, of making it clear to the public that under the circumstances that I've described, an appropriate advisory body of either house who conducts the standard of conduct, the evaluations, could very well have submitted to it -- SENATOR ROBERTI: That's a good possibility.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: -- proposed employment plan. And that employment plan could seek an advisory opinion as to whether or not --

SENATOR ROBERTI: That may be an excellent way out of it, and I personally am willing to entertain that.

Most of these questions, the tough questions that Assemblywoman Waters raises, you know, she's asking me how I feel. I'm telling you how I feel. I'm not saying that reasonable people don't fall on the other side of that line.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: But for the purpose of the ultimate public acceptance of this measure, we've all got to be pretty clear and consistent, because if you and Doolittle appeared on the same program, and Doolittle's interpretation of Filante's conduct was different from yours, and your interpretation of Vasconcellos' conduct was different --

SENATOR ROBERTI: I understand, I understand.

ASSEMBLYMAN BROWN: -- we lose the votes for the SCA.

SENATOR ROBERTI: I understand the point you're trying to make, and certainly the delineation of borderline situations
-- and I don't think the point you earlier raised on a fee for a board is a borderline. I mean, I personally think --

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Well, see, and I would differ with you. I would differ with you because some people have learned that one way to earn a lot of money is to get appointed to boards who pay you for serving on those boards. As a matter of fact, if you look at some of the directorships, and you notice interlocking directorships where one or two, three, four people are sitting on five and six boards, and many of these boards pay very handsomely, very handsomely. And you know, so, you know, I would differ with you on that.

And again, not to over burden you with the point, licensure would not be acceptable.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Yes, but there is a way. If a person is abusing that, there's a way of getting at them, and the way of getting at them is through the conflict of interest.

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The same could be said of an attorney, of a person who puts on seminars. I mean, the way to get away for it is to put in a perfectly foolish seminar, make a perfectly foolish presentation.

At this point, then, we're trying to be qualitative as to the nature of the work. That's impossible for us to do.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: That's right.

SENATOR ROBERTI: It's impossible.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Because if you --

SENATOR ROBERTI: Who's an entertaining speaker and who's not, it depends not only on the speaker, but on the group they're talking to. I mean, it's impossible.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Absolutely, it is.

SENATOR ROBERTI: It's impossible to define.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: You can use licensure as some kind of degree -- not that you would. You're just thinking out loud now -- what you're telling me is, one of the Members of this Legislature with a real estate license somehow is empowered to use that license to talk about something having to do with real estate and be exempt from what we're thinking about.

SENATOR ROBERTI: On these licensure kinds of points,

I'm willing to defer to the suggestion that the Speaker made, and
that is in areas which are gray as to what is or is not an
honorarium -- and I think we clearly know those things that are
honorariums -- now there is a gray area, and maybe the ethics
committees of each house would be the appropriate standard
whereby we make those decisions. That committee has the

reputation of the house as well as the concern about the individual Member to worry about.

I personally would support that kind of language in statute. I'm inclined to do that in some other areas, such as the gift statute, as well, where you have certain areas like a gift from a charitable institution, or something of that nature.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, I would certainly resist any effort, either through statute or rules, to have a committee of the Legislature making decisions on a case-by-case basis.

I think it ought to be laid out very clearly. I don't see the problem Ms. Waters raises.

With the language that we have adopted here so far this afternoon with respect to honorariums, the striking of the language "other compensation", I think you clearly are left with the result where the test becomes a very simple and easy test: is there a legally enforceable right to the compensation?

If you're a member of that board, fulfilling your obligations of a member of that board, you're legally entitled to those funds. It clearly is not an honorarium.

If you have an interest in any other business operation, be it a farm, or a construction company, or whatever, you're legally entitled to those funds. You have a legally enforceable right in court. That's not an honorarium.

An honorarium doesn't leave you with that legally enforceable right to the funds.

It's just not that complicated an issue.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: Well, I disagree, and I won't go into it any further.

I think you have over simplified the interpretation of what you appear to be adopting, and I'm suggesting, as has already been said, that there will be some attempt to give better definition.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: That's in the provisions now.

SENATOR ROBERTI: I think we all understand that we have to define these terms better, and I will leave my position on that.

The gray areas have to be defined, and there's going to be, hopefully, a lot of equity; there's going to be a minimal amount of unfairness, which we're going to try to minimize, because it's impossible to draw that clear a line and not make somebody a little bit unhappy for what they think is a hardship case on their side.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: It's not so much unhappiness. It's about being clear, you know.

I think that I keep up with the Fair Political Campaign Practices Commission and other things, probably, as well or better than most, and I'm able to interpret. And as long as I'm able to understand what people do, then I have no problem, no matter how tough the rules may be.

But what I worry about is when we move to do this, if we don't give considered thought to it, that we find ourselves in all kinds of problems.

I guess as I look -- each time, you know, I look at this, I see those kinds of problems, even on your copyright stuff. That's an improvement, but does that mean that you cannot be reimbursed for an article to the <u>Wall Street Journal</u>, or the L.A. Times, as they do?

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Mr. Chairman, Ms. Waters wasn't here when we did this.

We've taken all of that out. All this simple prohibition is on accepting an honorarium, and "the Legislature," it says, "shall enact statutes to implement this section."

Obviously, that is going to take some discussion, some careful delineation.

SENATOR ROBERTI: There is a motion before us by
Assemblyman Vasconcellos. He reiterates his motion to adopt the
draft report as amended as the conference report.

Secretary will call the roll.

MS. MITTEN: Roberti.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Aye.

MS. MITTEN: Keene.

SENATOR KEENE: Aye.

MS. MITTEN: Doolittle.

SENATOR DOOLITTLE: Aye.

MS. MITTEN: Brown. Vasconcellos.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Aye.

MS. MITTEN: Johnson.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Aye.

SENATOR ROBERTI: The vote is five-zero; the measure is adopted.

We will sign the conference committee report as soon as it's prepared.

How long will that be? How long will it take Counsel to prepare that?

MR. GRESS: We're in the process. I can check with Mr. Gregory.

I would anticipate it may take us 45 minutes.

SENATOR ROBERTI: In one hour and 15 minutes we will reconvene in this room. That means we will reconvene at 8:00 in this room.

(Thereupon a recess was taken.)

SENATOR ROBERTI: The committee will reconvene.

We have before us, I believe, copies of the conference report which was the draft report with amendments. Everybody has a copy.

The motion already was adopted. Now all we have to do is sign.

Does anyone wish to make a comment?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: On behalf of the Speaker, the Speaker is not here; he had to leave.

He asked me to be sure and come back, take a look to see if basically that which had been discussed was such in the conference committee report, and I think it is.

 $_{26}$  He supports it and would like to be the Floor jockey for it.

SENATOR ROBERTI: Thank you, and certainly he'll be so designated by the author of the bill; be happy to have him.

Counsel.

MR. GRESS: I might just ask at this time if there are any Assembly co-authors or Senate co-authors that wish to be added?

CHAIRMAN ROBERTI: As a principal co-author, Assemblyman Vasconcellos.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Put Willie on, too, as a principal co-author also?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WATERS: I suppose so, since he's going to Floor jockey.

SENATOR ROBERTI: And Speaker Brown.

ASSEMBLYMAN VASCONCELLOS: Put Mr. Katz on as a co-author.

SENATOR ROBERTI: And as a co-author, Mr. Katz.

Okay, now, why don't you pass the little pink sheets

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Chairman, while that's going on, if I may.

Mr. Chairman, I supported the motion and will sign the report, but I want to note for the record, if I may, that some Members, in fact a number of members of my caucus, are concerned about the concept of an independent Salary Commission, and I want that noted that those objections are going to be raised.

I don't personally share those objections, but many of our Members do and would have preferred that the language in the

conference report allow for some opportunity for either legislative review or a referendum; opportunity for the recommendations of the Salary Commission.

I also want to note for the record, or to reemphasize a point I made earlier, and that is that we would like to see the final draft of the statutory language that will implement this proposal before we go to a final vote on the Floor. And I hope that staff would agree that that is possible for us to look at it.

SENATOR ROBERTI: We'll do our very best to have before a vote proposed statutory language. It's impossible to say that it'll be the final draft, because that wouldn't be voted on until January, and we're going to probably be changing it.

ASSEMBLYMAN JOHNSON: I understand that, Mr. Chairman, and frankly, I think that it's appropriate for us to attempt to seize the moment in terms of these potential reforms.

It's not in every respect what I would like to see us do. In some respects it doesn't go far enough. But I'm willing and, indeed, eager to support this proposal, but I don't think that the Members should be asked, nor the people of California, to entirely buy into it.

So, I would like every effort bent to be able to provide the statutory language that's going to go with this proposal.

SENATOR ROBERTI: I agree, and I think that's a reasonable request.

I want to thank staff that has worked on this tome. It's been an enormous effort.

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Mr. Gress, I want to thank you for working all hours of the evening on a very difficult proposal, and my own staff, and Assemblyman Vasconcellos' staff, the Speaker's staff, the Republican staff. Much of this was accomplished by them.

With that, the committee stands adjourned.

(Thereupon this hearing of the Conference Committee on SCA 32 was adjourned at approximately 8:35 P.M.)

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## CERTIFICATE OF SHORTHAND REPORTER

I, EVELYN MIZAK, a Shorthand Reporter of the State of California, do hereby certify:

That I am a disinterested person herein; that the foregoing State Legislature Conference Committee hearing on SCA 32 was reported verbatim in shorthand by me, Evelyn Mizak, and thereafter transcribed into typewriting.

I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for any of the parties to said hearing, nor in any way interested in the outcome of said hearing.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this day of September, 1989.

EVELYN MIZAK

Shorthand Reporter