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Models of Decision Making That Challenge Historical Power Bases and Professional Biases in Cities: Public Administration Must Embrace Change and Recognize That the Desires of Residents Need to Outweigh Not Only Political Patronage but Also Their Own Professional Biases in Order to Avoid a Further Degradation of the Public's Perception of Government

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MODELS OF DECISION MAKING THAT CHALLENGE HISTORICAL POWER
BASES AND PROFESSIONAL BIASES IN CITIES:

Public Administrators must embrace change and recognize that the desires of residents need to outweigh not only political patronage but also their own professional biases in order to avoid a further degradation of the public's perception of government.

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MODELS OF DECISION MAKING THAT CHALLENGE HISTORICAL POWER BASES AND PROFESSIONAL BIASES IN CITIES: Public Administrators must embrace change and recognize that the desires of residents need to outweigh not only political patronage but also their own professional biases in order to avoid a further degradation of the public's perception of government.

Introduction

Denhardt and Denhardt (2000) argue that the better model than reinventing is what they call "New Public Service," (NPS) a movement built on work in democratic citizenship, community and civil society, organizational humanism and discourse theory. They claim that by abandoning the idea of rowing and accepting responsibility for steering, public administrators have simply traded one "adminicentric" view for another. They ask, "In our rush to steer, are we forgetting who owns the boat?" They argue that in a democratic society, a concern for democratic values should be paramount in the way administrators think about systems of governance. Values such as efficiency and productivity should not be lost, but should be placed in the larger context of democracy, community, and the public interest.

Public Administration as a profession since its inception has focused on being a counterbalance to the political patronage of elected officials. This research argues here

that those same public administration professionals must recognize that the desires of voters, residents and businesses must not only outweigh historic systems of political patronage but also their own professional biases in order to avoid a further degradation of the public's perception of government. Public administrators must understand that while outcomes ultimately matter, *the means is as important as the ends*. Resistance to change can be viewed as ignoring the need to change both government service delivery and product lines.

Three consecutive City Managers and two consecutive Mayors have led the culture of change in San José. All five were supportive of changing the way the City does business to serve residents and businesses. City Manager Les White was a pioneer of systemic changes through a myriad of reinventing processes. Later Mayor Susan Hammer initiated the New Realities Task Force, which was tasked with looking at internal processes, competition, revenue sources, etc. in a wide-ranging review of how San José could do better. The ground was fertile for Mayor Ron Gonzales to initiate multiple individual changes ranging from altering library hours to meet customer desires merging virtually all customer service call centers into one entity to enhance productivity. On a grander scale Gonzales brought forward several models of governing that shifted power away from the traditional "players" in town that included the Old San José elite (often times simply defined as graduates of Bellarmine College Preparatory a local all boys private high school), special interest groups and in some instances elected officials and public administrators.

This research explores four models of shifting power in San José to a more complete democratic citizenship and evaluates the success of each model in the face of resistant factors within and outside of the organization. The first three models of NPS have been implemented and can be evaluated based upon actual results. The final model Voter Owned Campaigns (VoiCes) is new to San José and will be evaluated in the context of the successes it has had elsewhere and the research will conclude with a proposed model for San José's consideration. The research focuses on seeking answers to the following questions:

1. *Can a classic Redevelopment Agency (RDA) that dedicates its resources to traditional economic development projects in a downtown and industrial areas have a redistributive model applied to focus more attention on aggressive affordable housing programs and residential neighborhood projects where the residents (not the politicians nor the public administrators) set the priorities for expenditure?*
2. *Can competitive Requests for Qualification (RFQ) processes to select private development partners do away with a good old boys network and lead to increased production and an expanded base of development partners?*
3. *Will voters approve large tax measures if their expenditure plans are driven by community-based master plans and/or polling?*
4. *Can the Arizona model for full public financing of campaigns help remove the perception of special interest money influencing elected officials in San José?*

This research will examine several methods of changing the way government operates in San José to determine what impact if any the new methods have on outcomes of programs as well as residents' perceptions of their government. It is hypothesized here that moving to a more participatory or openly competitive process will lead to not only changing the locus of power but will result in better outcomes for programs and increased resident support for government activities via their opinions and voting tendencies. While both internal and external resistance to these changes had to be overcome data is provided showing measurable production outcomes as well as increased resident opinions to substantiate this hypothesis for the first three questions. A model of full public financing for San José is suggested related to the fourth question.

Before continuing it is important that readers understand an assumption that is inherent to this researcher's bias simply stated as, "change is good." Cities that stop evolving die and as with any organization change is inherent to healthy growth. To be alive is to be in conflict. To be effective is to be in conflict. Organizations cannot function without conflict, and members of an organization cannot interact without conflict (Tjosvold and Johnson, 1983).

Literature Review

The general premise of this research is that local government must search for ways to increase democratic citizenship and make sure that government's priorities are the priorities of residents. This premise requires change to a deeply entrenched culture. The literature review begins with a discussion of the inherent tension between the desire for change in humans and the need for stability in organizations.

For change to exist there must be a significant change agent causing the organization to move forward. Next the research discusses the issue of leadership styles that are needed for change as well as those that exist in City management. Local government has two different areas in which public involvement and public confidence are critical: day-to-day governing and the campaigns that elect our leaders. The first three questions that this research attempts to answer relate to day-to-day governing so the literature review continues in this arena, beginning with a review of the debate between the reinventing /New Public Management school and the notion of New Public Service where a more participatory democratic approach is applied to governing. The review will then take a look at the notions of Direct Democracy and Representative Bureaucracy to search for other academic thought on how to involve residents in the decision-making process in local government.

Thereafter the research will focus on the public perceptions of political campaigns and explore the concept of full public financing of campaigns, which is beginning to sweep across America. This review will focus on the historical concept of public versus private funding of campaigns and the evolution of public financing over the past century. The research will pay particular attention to the model of full public financing which has been implemented in Arizona for a number of election cycles and is now being implemented in Portland, Oregon.

Historical Note on the City of San José

While in 2005 San José became the 10th largest city in the country it has not always been that way. San José has experienced unparalleled growth over the past half century growing from a semi-rural, agriculturally based economy to the center of high technology and innovation for the entire planet. The municipal government has experienced many growth spurts over this half century in size, scope of services, as well as governmental forms. Fifty years ago the City Council had seven members who were all part-time and elected citywide and the position of Mayor was more ceremonial than functional. In the 1980's San José changed to a system with ten council members each elected by district, a citywide election for Mayor and full time salaried positions for all. In the late 1980's San Joséans also expanded the role of the Mayor to include more specific authority in the areas of the city budget and policy setting. During this time San José's city administration also evolved from an organization that was led by hometown boys who did well to national searches that landed the first female City Manager in the post and

City Managers who were seasoned professionals with experiences in multiple organizations prior to their arrival.

While San José is a hybrid Council/Manager form of government it is often described as a collaboration between electeds and professional administrators and consequently is sometimes criticized for too cozy of a relationship between these two entities. With that said, it is incumbent upon elected officials and public administrators to recognize the need for change. The constant battering of "government bureaucracy" by some elected officials and the media, coupled with the historic significance of the national tax revolt should make it painfully obvious that focusing on the status quo is a recipe for extinction. Every organization needs to change no matter how long it has been in a continuous improvement mode. Simply stated rapidly changing demands of the workplace and the need for responsiveness, and continuous improvement (Popovich, 1998) require organizations to change almost daily or face extinction or at the very least downsizing.

The Need for Change and the Forces that resist it

While no one knows what the world will really be like tomorrow, we do know that it will be different, more complex, more fast-paced and more culturally diverse (Schein, 2004). Maslow (1943) recognized that not only were classical thinkers in the scientific management school following an overly simplistic mechanical view (Safritz, Ott and Suk Jang, 2005) but importantly man is a perpetually wanting animal. This recognition of the

constant evolution of man as a specie within a society of norms created the space necessary to develop a more complex view of man's (and organizations') needs. Maslow's notion of perpetually wanting animal is another basis for understanding how an organization must constantly evolve. In essence this relates very closely to the systems theorists notion that organizations are not static, but rather are in a constant state of dynamic equilibrium (Safritz, Ott and Suk Jang, 2005).

Schein's concepts of learning culture and learning leader are intellectually informative to those who would choose to lead any organization. Schein points out that the concept of perpetual learner creates a paradox related to the concept of culture. Culture is a conservative force that makes things meaningful and predictable. The creation of culture by definition stabilizes things. While Schein's concept of the perpetual learning leader is new, this paradox is reminiscent of an old quote from Machiavelli's the Prince, "There is nothing more difficult and dangerous, or more doubtful of success, than an attempt to introduce a new order of things in any state. For the innovator has for enemies all those who derived advantages from the old order of things while those who expect to be benefited by the new institutions will be but lukewarm defenders." While change may be hard and particularly so for those who initiate it, it is a critical component of any organization's successful lifespan.

Precision in applying theoretical constructs to real world organizations is difficult especially when organizational evolution moves forward at a rapid pace in society. This has tremendous implications when attempting to identify paths that will lead to success in today's public administration environment. Complex organizations tend to not fit into tidy boxes that conform to one theoretical construct and all too often misinterpretation of external environmental cues lead to flawed implementation strategies.

Gone are the days when local governments could proclaim their uniqueness and comfortably declare their immunity from comparison to other units. It is unclear whether citizens, the media, or aspirants to public office ever really accepted this argument, but any credibility it may have possessed faded in the 1980's and 1990's (Ammons, Coe and Lombardo, 2001). One interesting result of the proliferation of technology is that collaboration and cooperation between governments in developing, implementing, and reporting benchmarking performance has become much easier. Now, learning from other cities is as simple as downloading a file.

Leadership Styles and Power

Veblen talks about skills, which have been successfully applied in the past that may result in inappropriate responses under changed conditions. (Merton – Shafritz, Ott and Suk Jang, 2005). The trained response to do things “the way we always have” can and will lead to public administrators professional decapitation if they are not careful. Only by

being flexible can public administrators be responsive to residents. Johnson (2005) posits that a perennial challenge for leaders in all governing systems is to organize sufficient power to accomplish their public mission and that it is imperative that mayors learn how to control the existing legal and political structures and if necessary build new ones that they can use for their purposes. Schein describes the role of learning leader, in culture creation, as someone who must exhibit the role of anxiety- and risk-absorber to insulate other members of the organization from the traumas of growth and change. This description exemplifies that role that Mayor Gonzales has played the past few years in San José. While Gonzales has pushed for major changes in the organization, his office has also served as a lightning rod for criticism of civic activities.

At the same time a good leader should possess and infuse into those around him courage to accept responsibility (Fayol, 1916). It is only through this acceptance of responsibility that an organization can reach its full potential. Schein provides sound advice that any leader must take to heart. First, leaders must simultaneously have clear and strong articulation of their vision and be open to change as that very vision becomes maladaptive in a turbulent environment. Secondly, he clarifies that leaders must allow for transformations which require what amounts to a conscious and deliberate destruction of cultural elements, which in turn requires the ability to surmount one's own taken-for-granted assumptions, to see what is needed to ensure the health and survival of the group and to make things happen that enable the group to evolve toward new cultural assumptions. Thirdly, Schein points out that, leaders need emotional strength. He posits

that the leader must have the emotional strength to absorb the anxiety that change brings when group members become angry, as the leader is likely to be the target of the anger and criticism. Finally and very importantly he points out that these leaders must be able to not only lead but also to listen, to involve the group in achieving its own insights into its cultural dilemmas, and to be genuinely participative in his or her approach to learning and change.

As stated earlier, in San José there is a hybrid Council/Manager form of government such that the Mayor performs some key roles that traditionally would be performed by the City Manager. This being the case it is relevant to review some research on successful City Managers to inform our view of leadership in the Mayor's Office. This however will lead to realization that there is an inherent conflict due to the contrary traits required to be elected Mayor and those required to succeed long-term with a legislative body. However, awareness of those conflicts would be helpful to those wishing to fill the role in the future.

Hanbury (2004) recommends the use of the Myers-Briggs type tests to measure the traits associated with a successful City Manager. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator contains four separate indices which are designed to determine the respondent's status on four dichotomies: extroversion versus introversion (E/I); sensation versus intuition (S/N); thinking versus feeling (T/F); and judging versus perceiving (J/P). Each dichotomy,

according to the Myers-Briggs theory, produces two categories of people, and the four sets of dichotomies produce 16 possible combinations. An individual belongs to one or the other category based on his or her makeup and inclination.

These combinations of personality dimensions may play a significant role in determining the fit of a city manager. Supporters of the New Public Management movement argue that outgoing, entrepreneurial, and extroverted public managers who are perceptive to changes in their environment are likely to be better managers. Hanbury's research suggests that the existence of introverted and perceptive personality types can have a positive impact on City Manager tenure, while higher leadership effectiveness scores are related to shorter tenures. A conclusion drawn from these findings is that, although it is perceived that a goal-oriented, high-achieving, action-oriented, vision-driven chief executive may be described as the preferred "transformational" leader, it is the introverted personality type-the inwardly driven, perceptive leader or city manager who is adaptable to change who experiences the longer tenure. This conclusion points out the inherent dilemma in trying to run an organization from the Mayor's chair. While Mayors likely will need to be action oriented and vision driven, to be elected, success in dealing with a City Council is more likely achieved by inwardly driven persons who are introverted.

After winning a close election to office in 1998 Mayor Gonzales came into office with an ambitious agenda. French and Raven's definitions of the basis of power (1959) are

helpful in analyzing organizational behavior. By using French and Raven's work one can identify which basis of power is being used in any organizational unit and look for ways to move to power bases, which have less resistance and more staying power. As they point out coercive power will lead to higher resistance than say expert power. By moving to a lower resistance power base one can improve an organization's environment. By broadening one's bases of power a manager can have the tools necessary for an ever-changing environment. Mayor Gonzales' base of power was not only legitimate or legal but he also sought a reward mechanism to distribute resources to priorities residents directly identified. Gonzales' office also used coercive power to make changes both internal and external to the city organization. While the base of the coercive power often was the power of circumventing legislative processes via the ballot box and appealing directly to residents it was none-the-less offensive to those who were envious of the power that he wielded.

French and Raven also hypothesize that any attempt to utilize power outside the range of power will tend to reduce the power. This hypothesis points out a common failure of individuals in organizations. People will tend to try and extend their "power" beyond that which is delegated or that which is inherent (particular area of expertise) and fail to realize how much that stretch will undermine their original power source.

New Public Service and Reinventing

In the 1980's following the tax revolts and the changing nature of the economy many public managers around the world, using slogans like continuous improvement and do more with less; had embarked on a journey to restructure bureaucratic agencies (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000). Accustomed to growth and expansion of services during previous decades, public organizations became hard pressed to cope with the new climate of decline and retrenchment (Jreisat, 1997).

Many reinventing government and New Public Management theorists believed that the national tax revolt (which led to government resource decline) was about how much people are willing to pay for government: they went into their fox holes to come up with ways to "do more with less" which assumed that what they were "doing" to begin with was what the people wanted. The discussion turned to inefficiencies; accountability and running government like a business as if the only change that was needed, was to make the process more efficient. No one questioned the product that was being produced. Often concerns about government productivity center on issues of efficiency and accountability.

Daly (2002) states that, "for the past two decades, increasing demands have been placed on government to 'do more with less.' These pressures have resulted in innovative searches by officials to 'find' practical solutions that enhance organizational productivity within stable to declining operational resource environments." He cites a concern that

governments at all levels are being pressured to reexamine their operations; and that local governments are searching for the means to secure increased levels of service efficiencies within resource environments. This approach however, continues to assume that one needs to be more efficient at what one is already doing, rather than questioning what one should be doing in the first place. To use a business analogy, if Steve Jobs was a true follower of reinventing and "do more with less" mentality he would have spent all his time trying to figure out how to build better Macintosh computers less expensively. Fortunately for Apple shareholders Jobs followed a NPS model and sought out a new product line. The Denhardtts further argue that the better model than reinventing is what they call the "New Public Service," (NPS). They suggest seven principles of NPS:

1. Serve, rather than steer.
2. The public interest is the aim, not the by-product.
3. Think strategically, act democratically.
4. Serve citizens, not customers.
5. Accountability isn't simple.
6. Value people, not just productivity.
7. Value citizenship and public service above entrepreneurship.

The Denhardtts provide a course correction that is a methodology for "staying current" which can utilize the benefits of reinventing and NPM, and couple them with a better understanding of core democratic principles, (participatory input or staying current) to help government evolve into a more responsive and less loathed entity in society.

Rivera, Streib and Willoughby (2000) did an analysis of an ICMA survey of its membership related to a variety of reinventing concepts. In their introduction they applaud Osborne and Gaebler for acknowledging the contributions of public managers and convincing a broad segment of the nation that government performance could really be improved. They do however note, that some authors, argue that reinvention philosophy marginalizes citizenship, turning citizens into consumers rather than active participants in the governing process. It is most notable that of the 10 different budget items ICMA tested to determine how much reinventing was occurring, the lowest score (only 22%) related to funding, was found to be training neighborhood organizations in decision-making. Participants' claim that this notion was harder to get approved and implemented compared to other reinventing ideas such as contracting out.

Williams (2000) completely rejects the notion of "reinventing" in public administration. He states, "If the reinventing government movement were merely inconsistent and inaccurate in its claim to be innovative, it might be enough to ignore it. However, this movement dispenses advice that is antithetical to effective and democratically controlled government and information that is so misleading as to be deceptive." He references the lack of incentive to stay current in public administration because of elective cycles, short voter memory and heavy interest group influence. He claims that the reinventing government movement represented by these texts is yet another overreaching effort to solve society's ills through an overly simplistic panacea- promoted by charismatic

advocates. Williams is willing to toss the entire reinventing movement off a cliff. While William's is very focused on discrediting everything reinventing stands for, his reference to the lack of incentive to stay current is a good wake up call for public administrators.

It is difficult to paint the entire NPM and reinventing movements with one broad brush. However, there are very consistent themes that run through most theorists of this ilk that focus on making government more efficient, rather than changing what government does. Daly (2002) falls into this category by focusing his attention on challenging long-held, traditional approaches to work design, such as specialization of tasks delivered within functional departments, thus continuing the focus on the process not the product.

Osborne (2005) provides an intriguing overlay to the "process not product" debacle, by claiming that there is voter price sensitivity to government's current product line. In a speech to the Commonwealth Club on June 24, 2004 Osborne discussed a theory that claims that there is price sensitivity for government activities. "State and local prices of government are pretty steady. At the state level it tends to be about 7.3-8.3 cents on the dollar; the local level, about 6-6.6 cents on the dollar." He continued, "At the local level, the tax revolt meant the price of government went down in late '70s and early '80s, but services declined, and pretty soon the public began demanding that they be improved, and it went right back up to the historic level. The citizens have been telling us for years how much they're willing to spend. And when the elected officials spend more, there's a

reaction; when they spend *less*, there's a reaction" (Osborne, 2005). This research will show that David Osborne who grew up in San José needs only to return home to find that his theory may be flawed.

Participatory Governance and Representative Bureaucracy

Critics can argue that this nation was founded on the principles of representative democracy, which by its very nature should move us away from any participatory models. However, over the centuries there have been many times when the nation's residents raised up to put representatives back in their place. Recognizing this historical fact would provide good insight for public administrators who would like to avoid the next revolt (tax or otherwise).

In the late nineteenth century, railroads and large trust corporations controlled state and federal legislation through graft and party-machine politics. Tired of the representative democracy status quo, progressives looked to Switzerland, where a recently enacted system of direct democracy allowed citizens to vote directly on legislative matters. The progressives teamed with women's suffragists and other backers of "good government," to form a "motley band of reformers and radicals" under the banner "equal rights to all, special privileges to none" (Hoesly, 2005). They believed that if they could bypass a corrupt legislature, they could achieve better government. By 1898, they had convinced South Dakota to become the first state to allow for direct democracy. By 1918, twenty-

one other states had followed South Dakota's lead. Not only did direct democracy spread throughout the country, especially in the West, it also led to many substantive reforms. Originally, backers of direct democracy believed that it would be administered occasionally; not the regular and frequent occurrence it has become today. Today, however, professional direct democracy firms gather signatures and shop ballot titles while interest groups spend millions on advertising and political efforts (Hoeslyf, 2005).

Some interesting models of participatory governance can be found in Brazil. Baiocchi (2003) addressed the question of whether and how participation in government promotes the conditions for participants to engage in the open-ended and public-minded discussion heralded by democratic theorists. He reviewed how participants in assemblies of the "participatory budget" in the city of Porto Alegre, created open-ended and public-minded discussion in two of the city's poor districts. His comparison with a prior period shows that before the budgeting assemblies were created it was difficult to sustain any kind of regular meeting place beyond individual neighborhoods to carry out these discussions.

A traditional public administration answer to direct democracy is representative bureaucracy. The theory of representative bureaucracy calls for the inclusion of two types of people in decision making processes: (1) direct representatives, persons belonging to special groups like females, minorities or targeted populations and (2) indirect representation, persons not belonging to special groups but who are dedicated to

assisting these groups by implementing public policies in efficient, responsive, and compassionate ways (Mosher, 1982). Representative bureaucracy can provide an avenue to avoid adminicentric thinking when allocating resources or setting service delivery priorities.

When discussing resources in local government all activity is a zero-sum game where people compete for scarce resources in a way that envisions and produces clear-cut winners and losers. Politics and budget constraints during the past two decades have caused many distributive arenas to be viewed increasingly from the perspective of winners and losers. Slack (2001) refers to the normative theory of representative bureaucracy which states that an organization is much more effective, both in formulation of delivery strategies and in the actual delivery of public goods and services when members see the world through the eyes of all relevant groups as well as through the eyes of the general citizenry.

Again in Brazil they appear to be taking the notion of representative bureaucracy a step farther. Charles Leadbeater (2006) reviewed the city of Curitiba where they stepped beyond mass dialogue to mass participation of service delivery. Through a collaborative process, the City sends around their recycling trucks after 4pm to allow individuals to go around and pick up recyclable materials and get money or food at recycling centers, which are decentralized and privatized. Not only does Curitiba recycle more than most

European and U. S. cities but they have very few "city" recycling trucks or recycling centers. Leadbeater calls this process a collaborative co-creation with residents where value is not only the service but also the interaction. In asking whether the notion is feasible in the West he points out that computer games are more and more designed by the players and wonders why the same model could not be applied for high school curriculum delivery. He calls for new roles of citizenship where residents are participants and actors not just consumers and cities may be able to redistribute risk as well.

Public Financing of Campaigns

In addition to perceived or real lack of influence by residents in the governing process, more and more individuals feel that they are left out of the election process. Well-heeled corporations and special interest groups are able to provide a huge amount of the money needed to run the political campaigns that elect our leaders. This is strikingly similar to the situations which spawned initiatives when railroad and trust corporations controlled state legislatures. The effect of campaign contributions on policy outcomes including inefficiencies, result from politicians pandering to lobbies with preferences different from the median in the population (Sahuguet and Persico, 2003).

The public financing of campaigns is not a new issue in the United States. In his 1907 State of the Union address, Theodore Roosevelt said "The need for collecting large campaign funds would vanish if Congress provided an appropriation for the proper and

legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties, an appropriation ample enough to meet the necessity for thorough organization and machinery, which requires a large expenditure of money."

The first serious attempts to legislate limits on campaign funding in the United States were in the early years of the twentieth century, the heyday of the Progressive movement, which attacked the power of big money and corporate wealth. In 1907 Congress outlawed donations to federal elections by banks or corporations; a ban on direct corporate campaign contributions that remains to this day. Legislation also required disclosure of campaign contributions and limited candidates' expenditure in congressional elections. In 1940 an upper limit was placed for the first time on individual contributions, while the ban on corporate donations extended to trade unions during World War II. However, generally the rules were ineffective, as they were easily evaded, and there was little systematic attempt at enforcement. In 1967 Lyndon Johnson derided legislation existing at that time as "more loophole than law" (Grant, 1998).

The Watergate scandal revealed a range of abuses of executive and political power. Investigations also lifted the curtain on a number of illegal campaign finance activities, including contributions laundered to hide their illegal corporate or foreign origins, secret and undisclosed funds, and the exchange of money for political favors. As public outrage increased the clamor for reform, Congress passed a number of major amendments to the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act in 1974.

The 1996 United States elections were easily the most expensive ever in the nation's history, with over \$2 billion being raised and spent by presidential and congressional candidates and the political parties (Grant, 1998). Allegations of illegal contributions by foreign donors to the Democratic Party and of improper fund-raising practices in the 1996 elections brought the issue of campaign finance back to the top of the political agenda. During 1997, Congress investigated the abuses of the current system and debated possible reforms of the legislative framework established during the 1970s in the post-Watergate era.

Most recently, to support arguments, lawyers have offered and judges have accepted public opinion polls demonstrating that Americans perceive a great deal of corruption arising from large contributions to candidates or from certain types of expenditures on behalf of those candidates. Campaign finance is one area in constitutional law where reality and appearances stand on an equal footing. The prevention of actual *or* apparent corruption exists as a compelling state interest, indeed the only state interest, which can justify regulation of campaign contributions (Persily and Lammie, 2004).

There is lively public debate about the impact of different kinds of money in elections. However, there is surprisingly little examination of the practical impact that funding sources have on election outcomes. Even if it is assumed that voters do not care directly

about campaign finance, there may still be incentives built into the system to discourage fundraising from some sources and encourage it from others. Alexander (2005) examined the actual impact of out-of-state donations, PAC donations, and self-financing on election outcomes in open seat House elections in the 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 cycles. He found that some kinds of fundraising are correlated with success, while others are correlated with failure, although at a lesser level than district partisanship or total campaign spending. However perception may be a more important guide to the public's feeling of disengagement. To the extent that disparities exist in campaign participation, people may feel less able to shape the decisions that affect their lives and question the legitimacy of the laws that get enacted. For others, however, such exclusion may tap into a reservoir of suspicion that they do not count as full citizens within the political community because they are not large campaign donors and thus possess inadequate control over their own lives. The indifference of anti-reformers who either rationalize or idly tolerate such exclusion only compounds the anger, resentment, and frustration felt by those who are excluded. As a result of disparities in resources, a small, wealthy, and homogenous donor class makes large contributions that fund the bulk of American politics (Overton, 2004).

The public's perception of campaign fundraising may have some relationship to media hyperbole on the subject. Ansolabehere, Snowberg and Snyder Jr. (2005) examined evidence of sampling or statistical bias in newspaper reporting on campaign finance. They compiled all stories from the five largest circulation newspapers in the United

States that mention a dollar amount for campaign expenditures, contributions, or receipts from 1996 to 2000, and then compared those figures to those recorded by the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The average figures reported in newspapers exceed the figures from the FEC by as much as eightfold. They also concluded that press reports focused excessively on corporate contributions and soft money, rather than on the more common types of donors - individual - and types of contributions - hard money. They found that these biases are reflected in public perceptions of money in elections. Survey respondents overstate the amount of money raised and the share from different groups by roughly the amount found in newspapers.

Public financing programs are currently administered in federal presidential elections, more than two-dozen states and at least 13 local jurisdictions. Most of these programs provide for partial public funding with varying degrees of matching funds provided to candidates based upon funds they raise on their own. A new model has caught on in Maine, Arizona and Portland where 100% public financing is provided to qualified candidates. Advocates argue that full public financing would do away with any real or perceived influence donors have, as well as allow candidates more time to actually interact with voters.

Even the media is jumping on the bandwagon. In 2002 *USA Today* stated, "Four states—Arizona, Maine, Massachusetts and Vermont—are experimenting with offering qualified

candidates for office the option of public financing: In exchange for refusing to pander to contributions from donors who may want political favors, they get a reasonable taxpayer stipend for their campaigns...The simple truth is that campaigning is expensive, and candidates will get the money someplace. Far better that the public, not special interests, put up the bucks" (Public Campaigns.org).

Methodology

The research methodology focused initially on a review of relevant literature and government documents. Additional perspectives came from the researcher's experience as a participant observer in his role as the Mayor's Budget and Policy Director for the City of San José. The researcher has held that position for over seven years and was Chief of Staff to a member of the City Council for six years prior to his current position. Based on information gathered from the literature review, a research design was devised. Using a case-study approach the research employed key informant interviews, data mining and results from a community survey that was conducted in December of 2005. A summary of the questions asked to key informants can be found in Attachment I.

The City of San José has conducted a Community Survey in 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2005. The researcher helped to draft the original survey in 2000. Professional expertise was used to finalize design and conduct the survey. The firm of Fairbank, Maslin, Maullin & Associates (FMM&A) has assisted the City with the survey from its inception using the firm's expertise, and experience with surveys in other municipalities. From December 15 to December 21, 2005, FMM&A conducted telephone interviews with 1,000 San José residents whose phone numbers were randomly selected. The survey was administered in English, Spanish and Vietnamese. Given the City's population, the survey results as a whole have a margin of error of +/- 3.1 percent. Any smaller subgroups of the sample (e.g., by age, income level, etc.) have higher margins of error, and are thus somewhat less reliable.

As in the 2003 Survey, responses from residents of Strong Neighborhood Initiative (SNI) areas have been tabulated to compare SNI residents' perceptions of conditions and satisfaction with service delivery to citywide responses. The 2005 survey top-line results are included as Attachment II.

The specific methodologies for each of the four sub questions of this research are reviewed here:

1. *Can a classic Redevelopment Agency (RDA) that dedicates its resources to traditional economic development projects in a downtown and industrial areas have a redistributive model applied to focus more attention on aggressive affordable housing programs and residential neighborhood projects where the residents (not the politicians nor the public administrators) set the priorities for expenditure?*

In the area of affordable housing production the research consisted entirely of data mining from public documents and through information requests to City officials to compare affordable housing unit production pre and post January 1, 1999 as well as comparing San José's production with that of the other large cities in California. In the area of residential neighborhood projects the research also consisted of data mining from public documents and through information requests to City officials of expenditure levels pre and post January 1, 1999 as well as key informant interviews from a Project Area Committee and Neighborhood Action Committee participant and the results from the

community survey. In some key areas the survey separated out SNI v. non-SNI resident responses, which was also a valuable data tool.

2. *Can competitive Requests for Qualification (RFQ) processes to select private development partners do away with a good old boys network and lead to increased production and an expanded base of development partners?*

In the area of downtown development projects the research consisted of data mining from public documents and information requests to City officials to compare development production pre and post January 1, 1999. The research attempted to determine overall production levels, the need for government subsidies and the number of new development partners that entered the process since the RFQ program started. The research also conducted a key informant interview with John Weis, Deputy Executive Director of the San José Redevelopment Agency. Mr. Weis is the lead executive overseeing private development activities in downtown San José for a number of years.

3. *Will voters approve large tax measures if their expenditure plans are driven by community-based master plans and/or polling?*

In the area of ballot initiatives the research consisted entirely of data mining from public documents, key informant interviews with campaign participants and information requests to City officials to show the success of a number of ballot initiatives during this window. This included a review of five successful tax measures, two of which were

master plan driven, three of which were poll driven and one unsuccessful measure, which was driven by neither.

- Poll driven: Library Parcel Tax, ½ cent sales tax for transportation and public safety bond
- Master plan driven: park and library bonds
- Unsuccessful: Convention Center Expansion Measure

4. *Can the Arizona model for full public financing of campaigns help remove the perception of special interest money influencing elected officials in for San José?*

The methodology utilized for the review of this concept was to do key informant interviews with officials in Arizona and Portland (where the concept has already taken hold) and an advocate in the effort to apply the model to state legislative and statewide office in California. Data mining was also done from several data sources to evaluate the success of the Arizona program and data was extrapolated to develop a model for San José.

Variables

Anything one measures related to local government can be affected by outside factors.

The growth or lack thereof in the local economy, consumer confidence levels, unemployment rates, distrust of government in general, etc. could all play a role in voter

opinions about their government. Likewise when measuring City programs, success can have many fathers. While many variables could have contributed to the results gleaned from the survey and data mining, it is argued that all data observed was so strong and key informant input was so favorably related to the supposed causality that while other variables may have had some impact the original hypothesis is viable. This is the case especially when data related to opinions and outcomes can be compared before and after specific changes are instituted as well as benchmarked against outcomes in other jurisdictions.

Findings

As was the case in earlier sections, this research is divided into two sections as local government has two different areas in which public involvement and public confidence are critical: the day-to day governing and the campaigns that elect our leaders. The review of the theory of NPS and its applicability to the City of San José is more a review of actual events rather than the application to a future hypothetical. NPS has been in practice in San José for several years now, even if the City's leadership did not know about the theoretical construct when they began several initiatives reviewed herein.

As in any organizational change there is a need for bold leadership to advocate for a new model of operations. Gonzales was the leader in the organization who most boldly embraced the notion of a participatory citizenship driving the funding priorities in his Strong Neighborhood Initiative (SNI) and various master planning efforts. He was willing to delegate both responsibility and authority over the plans and was supportive of the results that came from the bottom up. He was a transformational leader who looked for potential motives in followers, sought to satisfy higher needs and engaged the followers (Jreisat, 1997). His base of power was not only legitimate or legal but he also sought a reward mechanism to distribute resources to the areas residents identified.

Gonzales understood that reinvention is about nothing less than the future of democratic societies (Osborne and Plastrik, 2000). While it is suggested that change should come

from elected officials or the judiciary it is imperative to not ignore that change can also be dictated by the initiative process. If public administrators sit idly by, those outside the bureaucracy will initiate change and it could lead to the bureaucracy itself becoming obsolete. The increase in the number of big cities, which have converted from a Council/Manager form of government to a Strong Mayor model in the recent history of the United States, is a case in point. Ideas that were considered new and foreign to many in government six years ago are now commonplace (Popovich, 1998). San José has been ahead of that learning curve with efforts at measuring performance, listening to customers, empowering front-line employees, flattening hierarchies, community oriented policing and public versus private competition. While many of these tools have been used, change is not yet fully part of the culture.

San José has also faced a difficult nexus of events. Multiple years of budget cutbacks have decimated executive and management levels in the organization. At the same time the heightened scrutiny from the media and the public that comes with being a big city has escalated. This has created a culture where crisis management consumes a tremendous amount of time the managers (who are left) have to try and run the organization and that makes it difficult for them to focus on change. San José however, had the leadership necessary to implement change. Both the Mayor and City Manager were true believers in an organizational culture that fosters change. Unfortunately as mentioned above they often became mired in the crisis of the day so the ability to fully change the organization's culture has been hampered.


A year before Denhardt and Denhardt's article on NPS was published the City of San José was embarking upon two parallel paths which led to dramatic shifts from the historical power bases of decision making to one of democratic citizenship. The first path was the Mayor's Strong Neighborhood Initiative and the second was an extensive use of participatory master planning/polling to determine in a precise fashion what voters wanted and were willing to pay for. A third shift in power was also underway related to the economic development activities in San José's Downtown whereby the Mayor not only required competitive RFQ's for developer selection but also said the days of public subsidies beyond land assemblage were over in the downtown.

Shifting Funds to Neighborhoods, Where Neighbors Set the Priorities

In June of 1999 Mayor Gonzales introduced what he called Neighborhood Investment Districts. His June 1999 Redevelopment Agency Budget Message recommended that the city increase efforts to focus RDA resources on neighborhoods. He called for the expansion of the City's Redevelopment Project Areas to encompass blighted residential areas and community facilities (schools, community centers, libraries, parks, etc.). By 2000, this effort had evolved into the Strong Neighborhoods Initiative (SNI), which focused RDA and City resources and created a new service delivery model based upon the priorities of residents rather than the priorities of elected officials or professional public administrators. Table 1 shows the RDA project areas, which were expanded to

allow RDA financial resources to be expended in residential neighborhoods. The light blue areas are those that predate 1998, the yellow areas are those that were added to allow for SNI implementation.

Table 1
RDA project areas in San José



Twenty distinct neighborhoods were identified to receive funding for revitalization; however the resource allocation was to follow a new model of priority setting. Utilizing a community-driven process, which used a consensus-building model (Jreisat, 1997), SNI helped residents to set their own priorities and communicate their needs to the City. The Mayor took funding “priority setting” authority away from the City Council and the Public Administrators (and even himself) and gave it to Neighborhood Action Councils

(NAC). Although the priority setting process is very important to SNI, the partnership for service delivery built with neighborhood residents may be even more important (SNI website). Rather than City Hall telling neighborhoods what the City will be doing, people who lived there were organized to tell the City what they wanted. These neighborhood groups developed their priorities for building stronger neighborhoods and the Mayor and City Council allocated the funding based strictly upon the priority order provided by the NAC.

This shift of power faced resistance not only from the elected City Council who were used to bringing forward their own personal priorities for neighborhood improvement projects but also from City staff who had their own professional opinions about which neighborhood projects should be the top priorities. While this resistance did exist, San José was able to maintain a budget discipline where funding was allocated based up on the ranking that NAC's had set for individual projects.

It is one thing to designate 20 neighborhoods and train the residents on how to participate in the decision making process, it is another to actually provide significant funding to this process. As Table 2 shows there has been an exponential increase of RDA funding invested in neighborhoods during the Gonzales administration. During the administration of Mayor Tom McEnery (1982-1989) the RDA invested \$694,684 in Neighborhoods. Mayor Susan Hammer then served from 1990 to 1998 and invested \$55.6 million in

neighborhoods. During the first seven years of the Gonzales administration the Agency has invested \$272.5 million in neighborhoods.

Table 2

Redevelopment Agency Neighborhood Investment History

	Total Neighborhood Investment	Average Annual Investment
Tom McEnery	\$694,684	\$86,836
Susan Hammer	\$55,618,960	\$6,952,370
Ron Gonzales	\$272,565,404	\$38,937,915

While it may be good to set up 20 SNI neighborhoods and another to provide significant funding for their priority projects, the real test would be do residents actually believe their neighborhoods have improved. The 2005 San José Community Survey included a sub sample of residents who self identified as living in a SNI area. The survey showed that in SNI neighborhoods, residents were less likely to rate the physical condition of their neighborhood as "excellent" (14% vs. 31% non-SNI areas) but were more likely to say that its condition had improved over the last two years (57% vs. 47%). Additionally residents in SNI neighborhoods who had contact with City staff offered consistently more positive evaluations than did those who lived in other parts of San José. Both of these results show that the SNI model has significant impact upon SNI residents' perceptions of how their neighborhoods have been improving and how the City staff dealt with residents.

In addition to this unprecedented escalation of investment in San José's neighborhoods Gonzales recently recommended to the City Council that the City, "Renew our commitment to Strong Neighborhoods Initiative areas by developing a plan to invest an additional \$100 million over the next five years to complete SNI area top ten priorities" (Mayor's March Budget Message, 2006). If this recommendation is approved it would lead to a plan to invest \$372 million in San José neighborhoods over a 12 year period compared with the \$56 Million which was invested in the previous 21 years combined. Attachment III provides the Redevelopment Agency's annual investment information from 1977 through 2006.

View From the Driveway

One of Gonzales' favorite lines to explain the SNI is that the City responds to neighbors needs as they see it from their driveway. This led to a dynamic process where neighborhoods not only went through an official election process to vote for representatives on the legally mandated Project Area Committee (PAC) which would oversee the entire 20 neighborhood SNI endeavor but each of the 20 neighborhoods would also form NAC's to oversee their specific project priority lists. To search for the view from the driveway a phone interview was done with Kathy Sutherland a key informant and participant in the SNI process. Kathy is an elected member of the SNI PAC and has served as President of the Delmas Park NAC. Sutherland relayed that the

initial reaction to the concept of neighborhoods setting budget priorities was both empowering and overwhelming. It was viewed as a huge opportunity but the participants were not sure if they had the skills to take full advantage of the process. She admits that staff helped the NAC create the top ten lists through information that was provided. The NAC worked with outside consultants that led them through the priority setting process. At the PAC level there were workshops about legal issues and the budget process and members got the feeling that this was a very unusual process.

According to Sutherland the Delmas Park NAC participants were not skeptical at the items on their top ten lists getting funded, partly because so many of their top ten did not have huge dollar amounts attached to them. However, some individuals on the PAC had more experience with the city and they were extremely cynical about the City letting the neighborhood priorities drive the process. Sutherland herself knew people at the RDA and the City Council and felt like she could trust them and thought the program would be great for her neighborhood, which was an area in need. She described some of her PAC colleagues as the most stubborn people in the world but notes that today, all agree the SNI process is good and the skepticism is gone.

Sutherland would describe the biggest obstacles to overcome as being a general lack of knowledge of participants on the technical City processes like how to respond to an Environmental Impact Report, understanding high density housing and figuring out how

to maintain open space. When looking to the future Sutherland would identify the Mayor and Council's political will to maintain the program and provide funding as the largest obstacle to the continued success of the program. Most significant is selecting the next Mayor in 2006. The next Mayor will ultimately drive whether the program will continue or not. That concern is followed closely by a need to continually infuse the process with new volunteer participants to avoid burnout of the original NAC members. The Mayor and Council have recently discussed taking the SNI model of civic engagement citywide. In looking to that future Sutherland felt that the City needs a citywide Neighborhoods Commission that would focus on how neighborhoods have access to city departments. She agrees with the Mayor's view that it is not about the money invested but about how the City does business.

Accelerating Affordable Housing Production

Before Gonzales was elected Mayor, he worked with former Mayor Susan Hammer and Councilman Frank Fiscalini to call for a more aggressive affordable housing production program for the City's Department of Housing which receives 20% of RDA's tax increment funding. Gonzales' claim was that the Housing Department was acting like a banker waiting around for developers to bring in projects that needed financing. The challenge was to convert the department to the mindset of a developer, which has production targets and unit goals that are annual and stretch over a five-year window. Gonzales called for a five year 6,000 housing production goal for the City.

Table 3 demonstrates an increase in not only unit production during the Gonzales years but also an increase in private investment dollars into the San José economy due to this more aggressive approach when compared with the previous 11 years. This 11-year window coincides with the creation of the City's Housing Department when affordable housing production was moved out of the RDA. Annual unit production has increased by 73.4% and annual private investment has increased by 49% when comparing the Gonzales administration years to the previous 11 years.

Table 3
San José Affordable Housing Production History

	# of completed affordable units	Units/year	City Investment	Private Investment ¹	Private Investment/Year
1988-1998	6,279	571	\$216,488,339	\$699,257,335	\$63,568,849
1999-present	9,439	1,348	\$435,239,627	\$1,348,557,240	\$192,651,034

As one can imagine there was much internal resistance to the 6,000 new homes over five years goal when Gonzales originally made the challenge. City staff suggested that the goal was unrealistic and infeasible and some questioned if the goal was nothing more than an election year gimmick. Gonzales stuck to his guns and required Housing and Planning department heads to meet with him monthly to review their progress to achieving the goal. Once the goal of 6,000 new units was in sight, Gonzales called for a goal of 10,000 new affordable homes during his eight years in office. A groundbreaking

¹ Private investment numbers are approximate amounts provided by the City's Department of Housing.

occurred on May 18, 2006 to begin construction on the project, which put the City over the 10,000 new homes goal.

Comparing output to prior years is one method of evaluating performance and it is clear that Gonzales was able to push the City to increase its production of affordable housing. Another means of evaluation is to gauge performance against other organizations. San José's Housing Department completed a study comparing San José's affordable housing program to the ten largest cities in California. This analysis compiled totals from each city from the period of 1998 through 2005 and shows that San José was second in total unit production during this period of time trailing only Los Angeles. However, it is important to note that San José and Los Angeles far in a way exceed the other cities' production totals. These two cities make up 64% of the state's total production. While San José makes up only 10% of the total population of the top ten cities, San José's affordable housing new unit construction made up 30% of the total units produced by all ten cities combined.

Again a very important measure of success is the opinion of residents. The 2005 Community Survey shows a decline in residents' perceptions of housing costs as being government's top priority, arguing for a conclusion that residents believe the City has had an impact on the affordability or lack thereof for local housing choices. In the 2000 survey housing costs were cited by 25% of San José residents as government's top

priority whereas only 8% of respondents in the 2005 survey listed housing costs as the top priority. This follows a steady decline exhibited over each of the four different surveys conducted in the past six years. When residents were asked an open-ended question about suggestions for improving City services a similar decline related to affordable housing was noted. Only 5% of respondents suggested that housing prices, rent control, or assistance for the poor or homeless as the most important thing for the City to address to improve services. This compares with 14% in 2000.

RFQ's: More Unit Production and New Development Partners

Gonzales is also a huge proponent of the value of competitive processes. He believes that through competition amongst developers or vendors, the public sector can find the best value and best products. This general philosophical bent led to his calling for competitive RFQ's any time that the Redevelopment Agency was seeking a development partner in the downtown. His argument was that by opening up the process to other developers not only might the City receive new investment partners, but also the competition amongst developers would lead to better financial deals for the City.

Prior to Gonzales' call for RFQ's there had been a mere 6 developers who had been responsible for every housing project the RDA had participated in for the 20 preceding years. These housing projects were partnerships where RDA staff negotiated directly with only one developer to determine the amount of public subsidy that would be

required to build a project. Gonzales' call for changing the process faced opposition from internal and external sources. Internally staff that had controlled the process argued that there was no market for this product and no one would submit proposals in a competitive process. Developers who had been involved previously argued that they had been pioneers in the downtown and should be rewarded with future development deals.

Attachment V provides a listing of all housing built in the greater downtown from 1977 through 2006 giving an overview of the past 30 years whether the units were deed-restricted affordable or sold/rented at market rate. During the entire 30-year period some form of subsidy has been needed to achieve deed-restricted affordable units. However, a great variance can be seen when looking at market rate unit construction. In the 21 years prior to the Gonzales administration 1,201 units of market rate housing were built primarily in 12 projects with only six different developers. During the first seven years of the Gonzales administration 3,732 market rate units have been built or are under construction in 36 different projects with 20 different developers.

Table 4 confirms that housing unit production increased tenfold (units/year) in the downtown after the call for RFQ's and the cessation of negotiated subsidies. While general housing growth in the San José area could account for some of this increase in production, the increase in the downtown far in a way exceeds any growth patterns in the rest of the city.

Table 4
Redevelopment Agency Housing Units Completed in the Downtown

	# of units	Units/year	# of projects	# of developers	Private Investment/Year
Pre Gonzales	1,172	56	11	6	\$63,568,849
Gonzales years	4,062	580	36	20	\$192,651,034

Today, there are an additional 2,731 units in the planning and permitting process being proposed by 15 different developers, nine of which are completely new developers who had not built in downtown previously. It should also be pointed out that of the six developers who had built projects in San José prior to the call for RFQ's all but one built at least one project during Gonzales' tenure. During the past seven years a total of 23 new development partners have come forward and invested in downtown housing in San José often times in completely private transactions which involved no City or RDA involvement other than regulatory oversight.

To provide additional perspective from inside the RDA an interview was conducted with John Weis, Deputy Executive Director. Mr. Weis has oversight of downtown housing development and has been involved with this aspect of the Agency for a number of years. Weis stated that the RFQ process did expand participants, yet not as much as hoped for in the early stages. Weis feels that the Agency did not do enough outreach and therefore the development community was unaware of the new process. He also opined that word may have been out that San José only does deals with local guys in what was less than an open process.

He believes that as the market matured and outside developers became more accustomed to working in San José, the RFQ process has brought people in who the RDA would have difficulty getting involved had they just approached the developer directly. He cites as an example the Mesa Company of Chicago who was selected to build on a downtown parcel and brought a new level of sophistication to the development process. Weis also points out that the RFQ process was a learning process for RDA staff as well and that developers taught staff much in the early efforts.

There have been adjustments made to improve the program including the addition of city planning and economic development staff as well as neighborhood representatives to the RFQ panels, which has given more credibility to process. Today, the developer works with RDA as co-developer, going to the community to get input on design and product types. Weis concluded that they have not just opened up the process to new developers but also opened the process to community input as well.

On the subject of increased competition Weis opines that some developers have submitted stronger proposals because they thought they had competition and that people who were not in the "in group" became more aggressive with their bids. In one instance that Weis cited a developer actually increased their original land offer by \$15 million on one project due to competition from a second developer. Weis points out that there has

also been tremendous spin off value to the competitive process because developers who do not get selected still want into the downtown market and seek private parcels to acquire. In fact, private property owners are now asking the RDA for technical advice and substantive review of the bids they receive from developers.

Weis thinks the likely evolution of the program will be to increase the role of the community in the process. He feels that the more community involvement the better because the neighbors get behind the project because they are part of the process. Weis points out that in his estimation as important as the Mayor's proposal to have RFQ's was the Mayor saying "No More Deals Downtown" indicating that the days of subsidies were over. While that may have limited early response it has had a long-term impact on the amount the RDA is being offered for land versus the historic need for the RDA to subsidize projects. This helped to bring in outside developers who could show local developers that you can do more dense development and make money because they have done it elsewhere.

In a review of housing projects in the downtown listed in Attachment IV the research indicates that nine of the 11 pre-Gonzales projects received subsidies from the Redevelopment Agency. Since that time not only did subsidies quickly disappear but today developers pay the Agency in excess of \$4 to \$5 million an acre to have the right to develop on downtown parcels.

Again the research turns to residents' perceptions to provide a final data point to evaluate the performance of a new program. In reviewing the San José Community Survey (2005) one can quickly see the positive perceptions San José residents have toward the downtown's redevelopment. When asked if the City was succeeding in redeveloping downtown as an attractive and economically viable city center respondents in 2005 gave the city a rating of good or excellent 61% of the time showing a 17% improvement over 2003 results for the same question.

Community-Based Master Plans/Polling Guiding the Way to Success

Most Reinventing or New Public Management theories have missed the point behind the resource decline that followed the national tax revolt. While it is true that downsizing is the result of the public demand to reduce resources, NPM and reinventing theorists have wrongly assumed that voters are unwilling to pay for anything government does, or that there is some sort of spending cap that voters are unwilling to exceed. Voters are happy to pay *if* they are included in the decision-making/problem identification process, and public administrators do *not* substitute their own "professional expertise" for public desires.

While California is the acknowledged leader in the tax revolution, San José has proven during the past eight years that voters will happily pay more taxes if the money is going to items the voters told the government they wanted. Parallel to SNI's evolution the City was also embarking upon an additional example of one of the Mayor's favorite lines, "listening before we lead". Through participatory master planning/intensive polling San José determined what residents wanted and received 2/3-voter approval for almost \$600 million worth of bonds for parks, libraries and public safety programs and an additional \$25 per household via a parcel tax for library operations.

Both the Park and Library departments went through very broad based master plans of service delivery and facility need identification. These strategic plans helped the organization to match capabilities with anticipated demands (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2006). These two master plans along with a public safety master plan developed by the public safety departments were brought forward to the policy makers as potential measures for voter approval. The election related participants and campaigners (Kingdon, 2003) then took over and did extensive polling to evaluate what segments of the master plans were actually supportable by 2/3 of the voters of San José. No "new" ideas were substituted for the list, which came from, the broad based master plan process. However the sizing of the measures (total bond amount or amount per household) was driven entirely by polling data and not the estimates that were done by professional staff to fully implement the plans. Additionally extensive work was done to evaluate if

measures should be combined (Parks and Libraries) or if separate measures had higher voter appeal.

Attachment V provides the top line results from a poll conducted in November of 2001 related to a general obligation bond measure for public safety that was later added to the March 2002 ballot. A total of 500 telephone interviews of likely City of San José primary election voters were completed by Lindholm Research November 6-8, 2001. The margin of error is +/- 4.5 percent. The public safety needs assessment developed by the Police and Fire Departments with oversight from the City Manager's Office had identified \$252 million worth of improvements. The polling indicated that fully funding the need of \$252 million only had support of 52% of the voters and in California a two-thirds vote is needed to raise any new revenues. Polling identified that a funding level of \$143 million received 70% support and the measure was sized to fit more closely with that level of funding.

Specific elements of the public safety master plan were then tested to see which had more or less voter support. These items ranged from building new fire and police stations to adding a new training center and a second police helicopter. Based upon poll results, upgrades to 911 facilities and existing fire stations quickly moved to the top of the funding list, which was now very competitive since the total amount available had been

reduced dramatically. The second police helicopter was scratched from the plan and minimal funds were provided to rehabilitate the existing fire training facility.

Much resistance was generated from public safety administrators over the funding level and the reduced funding for the fire training facility. Eventually Measure O (\$159 million bond) was placed on the ballot in March of 2002 and received 72% of the vote with limited campaign expenditures on behalf of proponents. While many public administrators may quiver at the notion of political pollsters being this deeply involved with service delivery and facility need identification, San José has proven that by listening to scientific polling data government can hear loud and clear what constituents want. Two-thirds voter approval was received on all three bond measures and the library parcel tax measure. A countywide sales tax transportation measure (led by the Mayor and following the same methodology for determining what residents wanted) also passed garnering 70% approval. These four San José specific measures cost the average homeowner between \$100 and \$200 annually but in each instance voters (in anti-tax California) rushed to the polls and support frequently exceeded 70% approval. Attachment VI provides an overview of the results of these ballot measures.

Dustin DeRollo, former Deputy Chief of Staff to Mayor Gonzales was interviewed for the purposes of this research as he was most closely affiliated with the many of these measures as they were being crafted for voter approval. DeRollo indicated that often

they did not test specific components (Park and Library Master plans) but they did test "types" of measures ranging from culture and arts to parks and libraries. They also tested to see if the measures should be filed jointly or separately for voter consideration. DeRollo also indicated that often the polling would change the way the projects were marketed to voters.

Unlike all other efforts under the Gonzales administration, 2002's Measure F Campaign (Convention Center Expansion) failed to receive two-thirds vote, receiving 65% voter approval. Gonzales' own polling had indicated that this measure was a few points below the 66.7% required given the sizing of the measure, but advocates for the expansion won out and the measure was brought forward anyway. Not only did this effort ignore the predictions of early polling, but there had not been any broad based community outreach during the master plan of the center's expansion plan to involve the community in the decision making process. While 65% voter approval is admittedly high, it is not enough to succeed in California when seeking new revenue sources.

The final review contained herein relates to the second area in which public involvement and public confidence is critical to cities, the campaigns that elect our leaders. Unfortunately more and more residents feel that they are left out of the election process due to the prevalence of big campaign donors.

Full Public Financing of Campaigns

Public financing of campaigns has historically provided partial public funding to candidates. This methodology only reduces fundraising and makes it easier for those with the ability to raise money, to have more money to spend. The notion of full public financing has begun to take hold in a number of jurisdictions from Maine to Arizona to Portland, Oregon. The reasons for full public financing are many. In addition to allowing more time for candidates to speak with voters rather than donors, public financing would remove the real or perceived donor and special interest power and thus create a system, which is more fair and honest. According to Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano, public financing is the difference between being able to go out and spend your time talking with voters, meeting with groups, traveling to communities that have been underrepresented in the past, as opposed to being on the phone selling tickets to a \$250 a plate fundraiser. (Ryan, 2003)

Full public financing systems provide qualified candidates with 100% of the funding necessary to run a campaign. Candidates usually begin by collecting a specified number of small (\$5) "qualifying" contributions. Once a candidate meets the fundraising qualification threshold, the candidate then receives public funds in an amount equal to the spending limit or a specified amount if no limits exist. The candidate is restricted from accepting private contributions and may not use his or her own money to finance the campaign. Most public financing programs also have high spending opponent or independent expenditure trigger provisions, and often carry debate requirements.

Arizona Model

According to Michael Becker, Voter Education Manager for the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission, Arizona's program started as a voter initiative in 1998. Arizona has a \$5 qualified contributions threshold (from registered voters only) of 210 for state legislators and 4,200 for governor. Matching funds are provided if someone in the race is spending more than the limit and participating candidates can get matching funds to even out the imbalance of up to three times the funding limit.

Arizona's funding comes from a number of sources including a 10% surcharge on fees, donations to the fund (of which up to \$580 are tax deductible), a \$5 box on income tax returns and from penalties on candidates for violations. They have \$26.7 million set aside for the current election cycle for all seats. The Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission oversees the program. The Commission mission is to improve the integrity of Arizona state government and promote public confidence in the Arizona political process. Commissioners are appointed by the Governor and Secretary of State (or next highest officeholder from Governor's opposing party). The commission sets expenditure amounts annually. In the 2000 election only 20 to 25% of candidates participated compared with 50% this year.

Portland Model

Portland implemented a fully public financed campaign effort after increased expenditures from mainly business interests dominated the attention of candidates.

According to Susan Francois, Portland's City Elections Officer one of the City Commissioners (City Council equivalent) approached the elected City Auditor regarding the Arizona and Maine model. It also became a campaign issue in the race for Mayor. One candidate was said to be "addicted to money raising" and was running against former police Chief Tom Potter. Potter said he would take no more than \$25 from any individual and the chief won resoundingly.

The City Auditor convened a discussion group to gather input and a member of the City Commission brought an ordinance forward. The ordinance calls for limits of \$150,000 in the primary and \$200,000 for general election for Commissioners and the elected Auditor and \$200,000 in the primary and \$250,000 in the general election for Mayor. It is important to note that in Portland the four City Commissioners are all elected at large.

Portland requires qualified candidates to reach a threshold of \$5 contributions from 1,000 residents (not voters) for City Commission and 1,500 for Mayor. Residency is validated by address on a contribution form that contributors sign. Additional matching funds are triggered by the existence of a non-participating candidate or independent expenditure or a combination of the two. Portland requires independent expenditures of \$1000 or more to be report within 1 business day. If the matching fund trigger is met then each office has the possibility of another \$150,000 to be split by all qualified candidates.

Portland's funding source is their general fund (overhead from all city funds). There is a cap of two-tenths of a percent of all funds and a requirement that no new taxes or fees be imposed to fund the program. There currently is a \$1.3 million annual appropriation to fund the program. According to Gary Blackmer, Portland City Auditor, Portland made a conscious decision to allow future flexibility of implementation and did not put the program in the City Charter.

According to Blackmer, the seven member Portland Citizen Campaign Commission oversees the process and suggests improvements and changes (i.e. increase limits) if necessary. Changes currently being contemplated include allowing internet contributions and a requirement that the candidate personally raise the \$5 contribution thus prohibiting fundraising agents. Portland has experienced resistance from the business community to the full public financing effort. Recently an effort was made to place an initiative on the ballot to repeal the public financing of campaigns. The signature gathering was funded by several business interests, however not enough signatures were verified to qualify for this year's ballot.

Pending California Legislation (AB 583)

AB 583 authored by Assembly member Loni Hancock is pending in the California State Assembly. This legislation would provide full public financing to legislative and statewide candidates who qualify by showing a broad base of support. Hancock has

support from the League of Women Voters, the California Clean Money Campaign, California Common Cause and the Greenlining Institute on this approach to campaign finance reform (League of Women Voters California).

According to Eric Tang Communications Coordinator, California Clean Money Campaign the funding level in AB 583 was drafted in recognition of the cost of campaigning in California for recent elections. The bill also provides for matching funds if a qualified candidate is outspent by a privately funded opponent or is the subject of a negative independent expenditure. Tang suggests that they have found is that the baseline amount of funding (such as the \$100,000 primary figure) would cover around half of all campaigns. The maximum matching figures built into the system would cover over 90% of races. Tang believes that, as the bill is currently written, the Clean Money system should provide adequate funding for the vast majority of races. Data has also shown that more incumbents are challenged since the implementation of full financing and that more women and minority candidates run (and win) than prior to full financing's enactment.

Resistance to Change

There are two major problems and one minor obstacle identified with the paradigm shifts of power studied herein. First, was a perceived loss of control by elected and appointed officials. The traditional leadership was use to deciding what City projects got funded.

Turning to community based priority setting and poll driven data analysis took the decision making out of the hands of electeds and public administrators. This often led to some segment of the traditional power brokers sniping at the efforts or attempting to end run the new budget methodology. Some electeds have evolved into being policy entrepreneurs (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2006) and have found themselves actively lobbying their NAC to help move a program up the priority ladder.

Second, there was opposition by the professional public administrators to the politicization of the process when the campaigners took over and massaged the proposals based upon polling data. Often time's voter opinions do not necessarily follow logical or rational lines of reasoning. Voters are much less likely to focus on things like deferred maintenance even though any good public administrator will tell you deferred maintenance should be a funding priority.

A third smaller obstacle was experienced when the Library master plan was completed a year before the Parks master plan was to be completed. This led to a turf war and a struggle over control of the public agenda (Gerston, 1997). The Library department and their advocacy groups wanted to move forward on the next ballot. Polling and campaign strategy eventually convinced those involved that there would be stronger political support and lower fundraising requirements if the two measures could be coupled together.

Recommendations and Area for Further Research

This research suggests that many of San José's innovations should continue and in several instances opportunities to expand these models to other city efforts are identified. The implementation of full public financing of campaigns is also recommended for San José. All of these recommendations could be applied to other cities for implementation.

Expansion of SNI

As discussed earlier San José has begun a review of taking the SNI decision-making model and applying it to the remainder of the city. This is a tremendous challenge especially as it comes at a time when leadership changes will take place after the mayoral elections. Results show that this expansion should have an impact of increasing residents' pride of their community as well as their opinion of city staff interactions. These reasons would argue for the expansion to continue. Caution must be taken to not attempt to move more rapidly than staff resources will allow so that early failure is avoided.

Continuation and Expansion of RFQ's

The use of RFQ's in the downtown has demonstrable success in not only increasing the number of developers who are building housing, but it has also increased unit production

while reducing the need for public subsidy. The new mayoral administration will certainly face pressure to directly negotiate with entities that have creative ideas for the use of City/RDA lands in the downtown. It is recommended that if the goal of increased production at lower subsidy levels is desired that RFQ's must continue to be the model of developer selection. The RFQ process needs to continue to evolve as well. The recent addition of community representative to RFQ review panels has proved beneficial when project design and community interaction commence. These benefits outweigh any concern about the dilution of the control that staff have had on the RFQ review process and should be explored more fully.

The inclusion of RFQ's in the selection of development partners should also be explored by the City's Housing Department for their production efforts. Affordable housing production is becoming more and more difficult due to escalating land values and the bidding up of land prices by developers. Were the City to focus on buying and assembling land and then identifying private development partners through RFQ's it is posited that the competition amongst developers could lead to better financial terms for the City as was experienced by the RDA when RFQ's were instituted in their development processes.

Polling and Master Planning

As has been noted the City now conducts its own community survey biannually. The careful consideration of the results of this instrument should be a priority for public administrators. By paying attention to statistically valid polling data administrators can avoid the pitfalls of listening to a vocal minority or special interest groups who would chose to lead the city down paths which may be counter to residents' desires.

The continuation of participatory master planning is already underway in the City and should be expanded. A review of the park master plan, which led to previous bond campaigns, is being called for and the administrators need to evaluate where other master plans could be developed in areas that residents' show interest.

VOiCes: A Proposed Model for San José

The City should aggressively pursue a proposal for full public financing. While the City Council recently approved a request for \$50,000 from the Elections Commission to research and do outreach on public financing, opposition still lingers. San José has seen a dramatic escalation of campaign expenditures in recent elections. In the 1980's candidates could spend less than \$20,000 to \$30,000 on successful campaigns. In the last few election cycles few if any candidates have been elected without raising close to the maximum amount allowable. Today City Council candidates are allowed to raise from \$90,000 to \$98,000 in contributions of up to \$250 per individual or corporation per election or almost \$200,000 for a primary and general campaign cycle combined.

Simultaneously to this increase in spending there has been ongoing media exposure to the influence of money in campaigns and the potential for conflict when contributors appear in front of candidates when they are governing. This intense media scrutiny has led City Councilmembers, many of whom are running for higher office to propose increased disclosure related to campaign contributions and fundraising. This led to another turf war and a struggle over control of the public agenda (Gerston, 1997) as candidates attempted to one up each other on the subject of transparency of fundraising.

Amidst the Council proposing ever-brighter sunshine ideas for campaign fundraising, Gonzales proposed what he calls Voter Owned Campaigns for San José that would eliminate the need to raise private funds. This would not only provide all of the benefits discussed above for this type of system but would eliminate the gotcha factor that the media and political opponents so enjoy when finding the most miniscule error in fundraising reports. Gonzales' draft proposal would take effect in time for the 2008 primary elections.

Gonzales points out that constant media scrutiny and political opportunists continue to give the perception that campaign donors get special treatment at City Hall. Gonzales further contends that the only way to do away with this perception is to have candidates not raise money and then the only way to make sure that candidates have adequate resources to communicate with voters is to provide public funding. Gonzales believes

that the amount of time a candidate needs to spend raising money takes away from the valuable time that could be spent talking to voters. Table 5 represents an analysis to determine the amount of funding that could be required to fully fund elections in San José. The current fundraising limits are based upon population within a Council District. The model assumes that in elections where there is an incumbent, there will be two participating qualified candidates in the primary election and two in the general election. In non-incumbent races the model assumes four participating qualified candidates in the primary and two in the general.

While this may be overly ambitious for estimating the number of participating qualifying candidates based upon other jurisdictions' experience, it does provide for a more conservative scenario to insure adequate funds will be available. The model also assumes that incumbents will run for reelection the one time they can legally under San José's term limits.

Table 5
San José Full Public Financing Cost Analysis

District	Current Expenditure Limit	2008	2010	2012	2014
1	\$90,172		\$360,688	\$0	\$541,032
2	\$94,405	\$566,430		\$377,620	
3	\$96,434		\$385,736		\$578,604
4	\$98,686	\$592,116		\$394,744	
5	\$97,252		\$583,512		\$389,008
6	\$91,928	\$551,568		\$367,712	
7	\$96,883		\$387,532		\$581,298
8	\$97,211	\$583,266		\$388,844	
9	\$90,610		\$543,660		\$362,440
10	\$91,276	\$365,104		\$547,656	
Mayor	\$708,643		\$2,834,572		\$4,251,858
Total expenditures		\$2,658,484	\$5,095,700	\$2,076,576	\$6,704,240
70% funding level		\$1,860,939	\$3,566,990	\$1,453,603	\$4,692,968
Two-year contribution		\$2,000,000	\$3,500,000	\$2,000,000	\$4,100,000
Running Balance		\$139,061	\$72,071	\$618,468	\$25,500

Additionally, an analysis was done to determine the number of qualifying \$5 contributions which could be required for candidates in San José if the current thresholds in Arizona, Maine and Portland, OR were utilized. Table 6 shows how many qualifying contributions San José may want to consider. This analysis ran two different comparative scenarios. The first utilized the average ratio of \$5 contribution per constituent count for all three jurisdictions. The second removed the Arizona Governor ratio, as it was dramatically different from all other ratios considered. An argument could be made that the Arizona Governor race could be considered not comparable to San José given the difference in the size of the constituency served.

Table 6
\$5 Campaign Contributions Analysis for San José



	Constituent count	\$5 contributions required	Ratio
Ariz Gov	5,130,162	4,200	1,221
Ariz Senate	171,021	210	814
Ariz House	85,511	210	407
Maine Gov	1,274,923	2,500	510
Maine Senate	36,426	150	243
Maine House	8,443	50	169
Portland Mayor	545,140	1,500	363
Portland Council	545,140	1,000	545
Scenario One (average)			534
Scenario Two (average minus AZ Gov)			436
San José potential using Scenario One			
Mayor	920,000	1,722	
Council	95,000	178	
San José potential using Scenario Two			
Mayor	920,000	2,110	
Council	95,000	218	

Overcoming Objections

Historically resistance to full public financing has come from those who currently fund campaigns as well as incumbents and insiders who don't necessarily benefit from leveling the playing field. As this proposal began to be review by the San José City Council, some members raised objections. The first concern raised was that in San José's poorer neighborhoods \$5 could be too high of an amount for local residents to contribute. Table 7 provides U. S. Census familial income data in the State of Arizona and compares

them to income levels in San José. The demographic mapping shows that the income levels in the State of Arizona are frequently lower than the income levels in even San José's poorest neighborhoods. As Arizona has had a \$5 contribution at the heart of their qualifying process for three election cycles it could be argued that \$5 should not be a problem in San José.

Table 7
Comparing San José income levels to Arizona




The public financing of campaigns is not a new issue to the United States. The last century has seen ongoing attempts to limit the influence of money in political campaigns. These efforts have historically focused upon providing partial public funding to candidates. This methodology only reduces fundraising and makes it easier for those with the ability to raise money in the first place to have more money to spend. The notion of full public financing has begun to take hold in a number of jurisdictions from Maine to Arizona to Portland, Oregon. The reasons for full public financing are many. In addition to allowing more time for candidates to speak with voters rather than donors, public financing would remove the real or perceived donor and special interests power and create a system, which is more fair and honest. If San José adopts Gonzales' Voter Owned Campaign proposal it would become the third largest jurisdiction in the country to implement full public financing of campaigns right behind the State of Maine.

Conclusion

San José has shown a tremendous ability to deliver substantive outcomes both in products delivered (housing units, bond election victories, etc.) as well as in the perceptions that San José residents have of new initiatives. As noted earlier affordable housing unit production, RDA investment in San José's neighborhoods and downtown housing production all soared under Gonzales' leadership. His open and competitive process opened up downtown housing and brought in dozens of new development partners who in turn invested hundreds of millions into San José's economy. Additionally, voters took to the polls to provide overwhelming victories four out of five times for new taxes.

Finally, Gonzales this past month won unanimous support to initiate a full public financing effort for San José candidate elections. These quantifiable outcomes suggest that his more open and distributive empowerment models were wildly successful. Importantly, San Jose residents have also embraced them. The 2005 Community Survey shows residents' ratings of City services are high. Table 8 provides survey results that show that 79% of San José residents say their city is a good or excellent place to live in 2005, which is a 14% increase over 2000 results. Also the percentage that rate San José as an excellent place to live has increased from 16% to 28% over that five year window experiencing a 75% increase in the number of residents who say their city is an excellent place to live.

Table 8
Residents' Evaluation of San José as a Place to Live




3. Generally speaking, how would you rate San José as a place to live: is it an excellent place to live, a good place to live, just average, poor, or an extremely poor place to live?

Again simply showing progress over time may not completely validate the research's conclusions. Providing comparative data with other jurisdictions can give further

validation to assumptions. Table 9 shows that when asked about satisfaction with City services, San José scores higher than all California cities included except San Diego and has a satisfaction rating over double those in Oakland and San Francisco the other two large cities in the Bay Area.

Table 9
Satisfaction With City Services Compared to other Cities



Skyrocketing production outcomes, improved resident satisfaction ratings and outstanding voter support are tremendous cornerstones to a successful City. Gonzales has implemented multiple redistributive empowerment and open competition processes to set the stage for the City of San José to not only maintain the moniker of the Capital of Silicon Valley but to move to the next level as a world leader in innovation where residents are full partners in governing, fully embodying the “best” leadership style according to the philosopher Lao-Tzu.

The Best Rulers

Of the best rulers;

The people only know that they exist;

The next best they love and praise

The next they fear;

And the next they revile.

When they do not command the people's faith,

Some will lose faith in them,

And then they resort to oaths!

But of the best when their task is accomplished,

Their work done,

The people all remark, "We have done it ourselves."

Lao-Tzu (Civic Strategies)

Public Administrators must embrace change and recognize that the desires of residents need to outweigh not only political patronage but also their own professional biases, in order to avoid a further degradation of the public's perception of government.

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Blackmer, Gary. Portland City Auditor

DeRollo, Dustin. Partner Saggau and DeRollo (former Deputy Chief of Staff, Mayor Ron Gonzales)

Francois, Susan. Portland City Elections Officer

Sutherland, Kathy. SNI Project Area Committee member and President of the Delmas Park Neighborhood Action Committee

Tang, Eric. Communications Coordinator, California Clean Money Campaign

Weis, John. Deputy Executive Director San José Redevelopment Agency

Attachment I

Key Informant Interview Questions

John Weis

1. Did San José see an expansion of development participants when the RFQ process began?
2. What do you believe the cause was for a slow early response to the new program?
3. What course adjustments were made to improve the program?
4. Did the sense of competition generated by the RFQ process lead to stronger proposals being brought forward?
5. Has there been a spin-off value for private parcels in the downtown?
6. What do you think the next steps are for the evolution of this program?
7. Were there any "foot in the door proposals" where the developer just tried to tie up the property to work things out to their advantage later?
8. Were there other crucial factors, which had an impact on the expansion of development partner pool and the proposals, which the City has seen in the past seven years?

SNI NAC/PAC Member

1. What was the initial reaction to the concept of neighborhoods setting budget priorities?
2. Was there skepticism that it would be carried out?
3. What type of training was provided to community participants prior to the start of priority setting?

4. How do participants today feel about their level of involvement in the process and the likelihood that the City Council and Mayor will follow their priority lists?
5. What were the biggest obstacles to overcome?
6. Are there still obstacles to overcome?
7. How to take model outside of RDA project areas and apply the model citywide?

Portland and Arizona Officials

1. What was the impetus for your jurisdiction undertaking a full public funding of campaigns initiative?
2. How many election cycles has it been in existence for?
3. What are your thresholds for the number of \$5 qualifying contributions in your jurisdiction?
4. What are your funding levels that qualifying candidates receive?
5. How do you deal with independent expenditures or wealthy non-participating candidates?
6. What is your funding source?
7. Is it viewed as successful?
8. What changes are being contemplated?
9. What body oversees the program?

Attachment II
San José Community Survey 2005

FAIRBANK, MASLIN, MAULLIN & ASSOCIATES

December 15-21, 2005

Interviewer _____ Station _____
Time Began _____ Time Finished _____ Total Time _____

2005 CITY OF SAN JOSÉ COMMUNITY SURVEY
320-271WT
N = 1,000

Hello, I'm _____ from FMA, a public opinion research company. We're conducting a public opinion survey about issues that interest residents of the City of San José. **(IF RESPONDENT REPLIES IN SPANISH OR VIETNAMESE, OR DESIRES TO SPEAK ONE OF THESE LANGUAGES, FOLLOW THE ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE FOR HANDING OFF TO AN INTERVIEWER WHO SPEAKS THE APPROPRIATE LANGUAGE.)** We are definitely not trying to sell anything, and we are only interested in your opinions. May I speak with the youngest adult in the household who is 18 years of age or older? **(IF NOT AVAILABLE, ASK:)** "May I speak to another adult in the household?"

1. I will not need to know your exact address, but in order to help me verify that you live within the boundaries of our interviewing area, could you please tell me what the ZIP code is for your current residence? **(TERMINATE ALL WHOSE ZIP CODE IS NOT ON THE LIST OF SAN JOSE ZIPS)**
- (T) (RECORD ZIP CODE) _____

2. Do you live in the City of San José or in some other city?
- (T) San José ----- 100%
All other responses ----- **TERMINATE**
(DON'T KNOW/NA) ----- TERMINATE

3. Generally speaking, how would you rate San José as a place to live: is it an excellent place to live, a good place to live, just average, poor, or an extremely poor place to live?
- (T) Excellent ----- 28%
Good ----- 51%
Just average ----- 17%
Poor ----- 3%
Extremely poor ----- 1%
(DON'T KNOW/NA) ----- 0%

4. Next, what do you think is the most serious issue facing the residents of San José that you would like to see City government do something about? **(DO NOT READ OPTIONS-- OPEN-END)**

(T)

Traffic congestion -----	11%
Education/public schools -----	9%
Housing costs/affordable housing -----	8%
Cost of living -----	7%
Crime -----	7%
Street maintenance -----	5%
Jobs/keeping businesses -----	5%
Gangs/violence -----	4%
Nothing -----	3%
Homelessness -----	3%
Public transportation/buses/rail -----	3%
Mayor -----	3%
Immigration issues -----	2%
Drugs -----	2%
Government waste/inefficiency -----	2%
Taxes -----	2%
Growth and development -----	1%
Environment/pollution -----	1%

Garbage pick-up 1%

Overcrowding/overpopulation -----	1%
Public recreation -----	1%
Revitalizing downtown -----	1%
Revitalizing neighborhoods -----	1%
Speeding/unsafe traffic conditions -----	1%
Police Issues -----	1%
Elected officials/politicians -----	1%
Youth/Culture Issues -----	1%
(DK/NA) -----	9%
(OTHER) (SPECIFY) -----	2%

5. Next, I would like you to picture in your mind the neighborhood in San José where you live. Would you say that the overall physical condition of your neighborhood – that is, the physical condition of the houses and/or apartment buildings, front and back yards, shops, streets and sidewalks – is generally **(READ RESPONSES)**

(T)

Excellent -----	24%
Good -----	48%
Just average -----	23%
Poor, or -----	5%
Extremely poor -----	1%
(DON'T KNOW) -----	0%
(NO ANSWER) -----	0%

6. Thinking again about your neighborhood, would you say the physical condition of your neighborhood has gotten better or worse over the two years? (IF BETTER/WORSE, ASK: Is that much BETTER / WORSE or just somewhat?)

(T)

Much better-----	17%
Somewhat better-----	31%
(ABOUT THE SAME)-----	35%
Somewhat worse-----	8%
Much worse-----	3%
(DON'T KNOW)-----	4%
(NO ANSWER)-----	1%

7. Next, would you say that most people in the neighborhood in which you live share a sense of local community pride, or would you say most people in your neighborhood do not care much about the local community? (IF HAVE PRIDE/NOT CARE, ASK: "Is that definitely or just probably?")

(T)

Definitely have pride-----	35%
Probably have pride-----	29%
Probably do not care-----	19%
Definitely do not care-----	9%
(DON'T KNOW/NA)-----	8%

8. Still keeping the focus on the San José neighborhood where you live, I am going to mention some items that have an effect on a neighborhood's overall quality of life. After I read each one, please tell me whether you would rate that particular item in your neighborhood as excellent, good, just average, poor, or extremely poor. Here is the first one...(ROTATE START)

	<u>EXCELL.</u>	<u>GOOD</u>	<u>JUST AVERAGE</u>	<u>POOR</u>	<u>EXT. POOR</u>	<u>DK/ NO OP.</u>
(SPLIT SAMPLE A ONLY)						
[]a.(T) The appearance of local parks in or near your neighborhood-----	19%	49%	22%	5%	1%	4%
[]b.(T) The condition of your neighborhood's streets-----	13%	46%	28%	10%	2%	0%
[]c.(T) The adequacy of street lighting-----	12%	47%	23%	14%	3%	2%
[]d.(T) The physical condition of trees along your neighborhood's streets-----	16%	49%	23%	8%	3%	3%
[]e.(T) The availability and variety of arts and cultural offerings in or near your neighborhood-----	10%	33%	24%	16%	6%	11%

	<u>EXCELL.</u>	<u>GOOD</u>	<u>JUST AVERAGE</u>	<u>POOR</u>	<u>EXT. POOR</u>	<u>DK/ NO OP.</u>
(SPLIT SAMPLE B ONLY)						
[]f.(T) The condition of City sidewalks-----	12%	50%	26%	9%	2%	1%
[]g. The physical condition of landscaping on city streets other than trees, like on median islands-----	13%	46%	27%	10%	1%	4%
[]h.(T) The physical attractiveness of commercial buildings-----	10%	46%	30%	7%	1%	6%
[]i.(T) The physical attractiveness of residences and residential property	13%	52%	28%	5%		
1% 1%						

(RESUME ASKING ALL RESPONDENTS)
Q9 DELETED

10. Next, let me ask you about another subject. During the past year, have you volunteered your time to any type of community or government organization in San Jose?

(T) Yes----- (ASK Q11)--33%
 No----- (SKIP TO Q12)--66%
 (DON'T KNOW) ---- (SKIP TO Q12)--1%

(ASK Q11 ONLY IF "YES" IN Q10)

11. During the past year, did you volunteer your time to any of the following types of organizations: **(READ LIST AND ACCEPT MULTIPLE RESPONSES)**

(T) The City of San Jose;----- 14%
 A religious organization; ----- 27%
 A non-profit community organization; ----- 38%
 A school;----- 24%
 Athletic leagues for young people, such
 as A-Y-S-O or Little League Baseball----- 10%
 Another civic or community organization **(SPECIFY)** ----- 11%
 (DON'T KNOW) ----- 4%

(RESUME ASKING ALL RESPONDENTS)

12. Now I am going to mention different types of traffic in and around the City of San José. After I read each one, please tell me whether you consider that type of traffic to be moving at an acceptable or unacceptable pace. **(IF ACCEPTABLE/UNACCEPTABLE, ASK: Is that completely ACCEPTABLE/UNACCEPTABLE or just somewhat?)**

	<u>COMP.</u> <u>ACCEPT.</u> <u>OPIN.</u>	<u>SMWHT</u> <u>ACCEPT.</u>	<u>(DON'T</u> <u>READ)</u> <u>NEITHER</u>	<u>SMWHT</u> <u>UNACCEPT.</u>	<u>COMP.</u> <u>UNACCEPT.</u>	<u>DK/</u> <u>NO</u>
[]a. (T) Traffic impacts in your neighborhood -----	39%	34%	3%	14%	8%	1%
[]b. (T) Traffic flow on city streets during your commute-----	27%	33%	5%	18%	11%	5%
[]c. (T) Traffic flow on local freeways and expressways during your commute -----	16%	29%	4%	21%	25%	6%

NOW I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT SOME OF THE SERVICES SAN JOSÉ'S CITY GOVERNMENT PROVIDES TO ITS RESIDENTS.

13. First, thinking about the overall quality of the services provided by the City of San José, would you say that you are..? **(READ LIST)**

(T) Very satisfied----- 20%
 Somewhat satisfied ----- 56%
 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied----- 8%
 Somewhat dissatisfied, or ----- 8%
 Very dissatisfied ----- 4%
 (DON'T KNOW/NA) ----- 3%

14. Now let me ask you about some specific services provided by San José's City government. After I mention each one, please tell me how you would rate the job being done by the City in providing that service. Is it excellent, good, just average, poor, or extremely poor? If you have no opinion or don't know about a service I mention to you, you can tell me that too. Here is the first one... (ROTATE START)

	<u>EXCELL.</u>	<u>GOOD</u>	<u>JUST AVG.</u>	<u>POOR</u>	<u>EXT. POOR</u>	<u>DK/ NO OP.</u>
[]a. (T) Providing recreation opportunities and programs at city parks and recreation centers-----	10%	40%	23%	10%	2%	15%
[]b. (T) Maintaining public parks in good physical condition-----	13%	52%	23%	7%	1%	4%
[]c. (T) Providing police protection in your neighborhood-----	19%	48%	22%	6%	2%	4%
[]d. (T) Providing public library services-----	22%	50%	14%	6%	1%	7%
[]e. (T) Providing an adequate number and variety of outdoor special events-----	10%	38%	26%	9%	2%	15%
[]f. (T) Protecting open space in San José-----	7%	37%	25%	12%	5%	14%
[]g. (T) Providing programs to help seniors that live on their own-----	8%	31%	18%	6%	2%	35%
[]h. (T) Supporting a diverse range of arts and cultural activities-----	12%	42%	22%	8%	2%	14%
[]i. (T) Providing bicycle lanes and paths-----	13%	49%	20%	7%	3%	8%
[]j. (T) Enforcing building and safety codes to protect public health and safety-----	10%	47%	20%	4%	1%	18%
[]k. (T) Providing fire prevention and protection-----	17%	55%	16%	3%	0%	9%
[]l. (T) Redeveloping downtown San José as an attractive and economically viable city center-----	16%	45%	21%	8%	3%	6%
[]m. (T) Planning for San Jose's future growth-----	10%	40%	22%	9%	3%	16%
[]n. (T) Enforcing traffic laws to protect the safety of drivers, bikers, and pedestrians-----	10%	49%	26%	8%	2%	5%
[]o. (T) Enhancing public spaces with public art-----	7%	37%	27%	12%	2%	15%
[]p. (T) Encouraging the development of child care programs-----	7%	36%	17%	9%	2%	28%
[]q. (T) Providing after-school programs for young people-----	9%	32%	18%	10%	4%	28%
[]r. (T) Removing graffiti from buildings-----	13%	47%	21%	7%	3%	9%

15. Now let me ask you to rate the physical condition of some of San José's public facilities. After I mention a particular facility, please tell me whether you would rate its condition as excellent, good, just average, poor, or extremely poor? If you have no opinion or don't know about a facility I mention to you, you can tell me that too. Here is the first one... (ROTATE START)

	<u>EXCELL.</u>	<u>GOOD</u>	<u>JUST AVERAGE</u>	<u>POOR</u>	<u>EXT. POOR</u>	<u>DK/ NO OP.</u>
[]a. (T) Public library buildings-----	30%	48%	14%	2%	0%	5%
[]b. (T) Community centers-----	15%	44%	20%	3%	0%	18%
[]c. (T) Government offices-----	18%	46%	16%	3%	1%	17%

- []d. (T) Cultural facilities such as public theaters
and museums-----19%----- 51% -----16%----- 4%-----0% ----- 10%
- []e. (T) City parks -----15%----- 56% -----19%----- 5%-----1% ----- 4%

16. Now I would like to return your attention to your own particular San José neighborhood. Please tell me whether each of the following public or private facilities or services is easily accessible or not to people living in your neighborhood. (IF EASILY ACCESSIBLE, ASK: "Is that very accessible or just somewhat?") (IF NOT ACCESSIBLE, ASK: "Is that not too or not at all accessible?") If you have no opinion or don't know about the accessibility of the facility or service I mention, you can tell me that too. Here is the first one... (ROTATE START)

	<u>VERY</u> <u>EASILY</u> <u>ACCESS.</u>	<u>SMWHT.</u> <u>EASILY</u> <u>ACCESS.</u>	<u>(DON'T</u> <u>READ)</u> <u>NEITHER</u>	<u>NOT TOO</u> <u>EASILY</u> <u>ACCESS.</u>	<u>NOT AT</u> <u>ALL</u> <u>ACCESS.</u>	<u>DK/</u> <u>NO</u> <u>OPIN.</u>
--	--	--	---	---	---	---

(SPLIT SAMPLE A ONLY)

- | | | | | | | |
|---|-----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|
| []a. (T) The City's public library system----- | 55% | 33% | 2% | 5% | 2% | 3% |
| []b. (T) City parks----- | 55% | 35% | 2% | 4% | 2% | 2% |
| []c. (T) Local trails and natural areas----- | 37% | 36% | 6% | 8% | 5% | 8% |
| []d. (T) Public transit ----- | 41% | 34% | 4% | 9% | 5% | 8% |
| []e. (T) San José International Airport----- | 34% | 39% | 6% | 12% | 5% | 5% |
| []f. (T) City recreation services ----- | 26% | 41% | 4% | 6% | 2% | 21% |

(SPLIT SAMPLE B ONLY)

- | | | | | | | |
|--|-----|-----|----|-----|----|-----|
| []g. (T) Basic consumer services like
restaurants, retail stores, groceries,
dry cleaning, and drug stores----- | 66% | 27% | 3% | 4% | 1% | 0% |
| []h. (T) Downtown San José----- | 38% | 35% | 5% | 13% | 3% | 6% |
| []i. Parking in lots and garages in
Downtown San José----- | 26% | 33% | 7% | 16% | 7% | 10% |
| []j. (T) Major shopping centers and malls----- | 47% | 35% | 6% | 8% | 2% | 1% |
| []k. (T) The H-P Pavilion Arena----- | 36% | 35% | 7% | 7% | 2% | 13% |

(RESUME ASKING ALL RESPONDENTS)

17. How often would you say that you visit downtown San José; frequently, occasionally, rarely, or never?

- | | | |
|-----|-------------------------|-----|
| (T) | Frequently ----- | 31% |
| | Occasionally----- | 41% |
| | Rarely ----- | 24% |
| | Never ----- | 3% |
| | (DON'T READ) DK/NA----- | 0% |

MY NEXT QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT SAN JOSÉ'S CITY PUBLIC LIBRARY SYSTEM.

18. First, I am going to mention different aspects of the City of San José's Public Library system. After I read each one, please tell me whether you would rate that aspect of the Library System's operations as excellent, good, just average, poor or extremely poor. If you have no opinion or don't know, you can tell me that too. Here is the first one... (ROTATE START)

	<u>EXCELL.</u>	<u>GOOD</u>	<u>JUST</u> <u>AVERAGE</u>	<u>POOR</u>	<u>EXT.</u> <u>POOR</u>	<u>DK/</u> <u>NO OP.</u>
--	----------------	-------------	-------------------------------	-------------	----------------------------	-----------------------------

- []a. (T) The hours local branch libraries are open-----17%-----45% -----17%----- 5%-----1% ----- 15%
- []b. (T) The availability of books and materials in
the library's collection-----21%-----44% -----17%----- 4%-----1% ----- 14%
- []c. (T) The variety of books and materials in the
library's collection -----21%-----46% -----16%----- 3%-----0% ----- 14%

19. In the past year, how many times have you or your family gone to a San Jose Library or used its services online? (READ LIST)

- (T)
- Not at all, ----- 18%
- One to six times, ----- 33%
- Seven to twelve times, or ----- 15%
- More than twelve times ----- 32%
- (DON'T READ) DK/NA----- 3%

**NOW I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT
PUBLIC SAFETY IN SAN JOSÉ.**

20. First, can you tell me how safe you feel during the day when walking _____ ? Do you feel safe, unsafe, or neither safe nor unsafe? (IF SAFE/UNSAFE, ASK: Is that very SAFE/UNSAFE or just somewhat?) (READ LIST)

				(NEITHER VERYSAFE SAFE	SOMEWHAT SAFE SAFE	(NEITHER SAFE UNSAFE)	SOMEWHAT UNSAFE	VERY UNSAFE	(DK/ NO OPIN.)			
				<u>SAFE</u>	<u>SAFE</u>	<u>NOR UNSAFE</u>	<u>UNSAFE</u>	<u>UNSAFE</u>	<u>OPIN.</u>			
[]a. (T)	In your neighborhood-----	63%	----	27%	-----	4%	-----	4%	-----	1%	-----	0%
[]b. (T)	In the city park closest to your residence -----	52%	-----	32%	-----	4%	-----	4%	-----	2%	-----	6%
[]c. (T)	In the Downtown area -----	31%	-----	40%	-----	8%	-----	7%	-----	4%	-----	10%

(ASK Q21 IF "UNSAFE" - CODES 4 OR 5 - IN Q20c)

21. (T) In a few words of your own, why do you feel unsafe walking around downtown during the day?
(OPEN END, RECORD VERBATIM RESPONSE BELOW)

Unstable / Unsafe People-----	23%
Transients / Vagrants / Homeless-----	22%
Crime (general) -----	19%
Feel Unsafe (general) -----	10%
Gangs -----	10%
Traffic / Speeding -----	8%
Muggings / Robbery -----	7%
Drugs / Drinking -----	7%
Lack Of Lighting -----	4%
Lack Of Law Enforcement / Police Presence-----	2%
Sex Offenders -----	2%
Crimes Against Children-----	1%
Gun Incidents / Shootings-----	1%
Daytime Is Fine-----	1%

Juvenile Criminals-----1%

Police Corruption / Profiling-----1%

Too Much Going On-----2%

Misc. Other Mentions-----6%

DK/NA/RF-----

(RESUME ASKING ALL RESPONDENTS)

22. What about at night? How safe do you feel at night walking _____? Do you feel safe, unsafe, or neither safe nor unsafe? **(IF SAFE/UNSAFE, ASK: Is that very SAFE/UNSAFE or just somewhat?)**
(READ LIST)

	<u>VERY SAFE</u>	<u>SOMEWHAT SAFE</u>	<u>(NEITHER NOR UNSAFE)</u>	<u>SOMEWHAT UNSAFE</u>	<u>VERY UNSAFE</u>	<u>(DK/ NO OPIN.)</u>
[]a. (T) In your neighborhood-----	40%	32%	5%	12%	8%	3%
[]b. (T) In the city park closest to your residence -----	20%	31%	6%	17%	14%	13%
[]c. (T) In the Downtown area -----	12%	31%	9%	16%	18%	14%

23. How safe do you feel traffic conditions are when you travel in San Jose using the following methods? Do you feel safe, unsafe, or neither safe nor unsafe? **(IF SAFE/UNSAFE, ASK: Is that very SAFE/UNSAFE or just somewhat?)** **(READ LIST)**

	<u>VERY SAFE</u>	<u>SOMEWHAT SAFE</u>	<u>(NEITHER NOR UNSAFE)</u>	<u>SOMEWHAT UNSAFE</u>	<u>VERY UNSAFE</u>	<u>(DK/ NO OPIN.)</u>
[]a. (T) Driving on San José streets-----	35%	48%	6%	7%	2%	2%
[]b. (T) Bicycling in San José-----	16%	32%	7%	13%	7%	24%
[]c. (T) Walking in San José-----	34%	45%	6%	8%	3%	5%

24. Next, the Office of the Independent Police Auditor oversees citizen complaints filed against San Jose Police officers. Have you heard anything about this office? **(IF YES, ASK: Is that a lot or just a little?)**

(T)

Yes, a lot-----10%

Yes, a little -----19%

No-----70%

(DON'T READ) DK/NA-----2%

25. The Office of Independent Police Auditor provides civilian oversight of the San José Police Department. How confident are you that the Office of Independent Auditor can be effective in providing civilian oversight of the San José Police Department. Would you say you are...? **(READ RESPONSE CATEGORIES)**

(T)

Very confident ----- 15%

Somewhat confident 34%

(NEITHER CONFIDENT NOR NOT CONFIDENT)----- 9%

Not too confident ----- 11%

Not at all confident ----- 5%

(DON'T READ) Don't know ----- 26%

26. Changing subjects somewhat, I am going to read you a list of the items that you and your family may need in the event of an emergency or natural disaster. Please tell me whether you currently have each of the following supplies available at your home:

	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>(DK/NA)</u>
[]a. (T) Three gallons of bottled drinking water for each family member -----	59%	41%	0%
[]b. (T) A three-day supply of prescription medications for each person who needs them-----	68%	26%	6%
[]c. (T) The name and phone number of a contact person outside of the San Jose area, whom you have designated in advance as a contact person in case of emergency -----	70%	28%	2%

27. How well-informed are you about what things you should do during and after an emergency or disaster: very well-informed, somewhat well-informed, or not well-informed?

(T)

Very well-informed----- 37%

Somewhat well-informed ----- 46%

Not well-informed ----- 15%

(DON'T READ) DK/NA----- 1%

NOW I'D LIKE TO ASK ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCES WITH CITY OF SAN JOSÉ DEPARTMENTS AND EMPLOYEES.

28. Have you had any direct contact, either in person or by telephone, with an employee or employees of a San José City government department over the past two years?

(T)

Yes----- **(ASK Q29)**--32%

No----- **(SKIP TO Q30)**--66%

(DON'T READ) DK/NA----- **(SKIP TO Q30)**--3%

(IF "YES" ON QUESTION 28, ASK QUESTION 29)

29. Were you satisfied or dissatisfied with the **(INSERT FIRST ITEM ON LIST BELOW)** by the San José City employee or employees with whom you had contact? What about...? **(INSERT NEXT ITEM ON LIST BELOW)**. **(IF SATISFIED/DISSATISFIED, ASK: "Was that very or just somewhat?")**
(ROTATE START)

	NEITHER				(DK/
	VERY	SOMEWHAT	SAT. NOR	SOMEWHAT	NO
	<u>SATIS.</u>	<u>SATIS.</u>	<u>DISSAT.</u>	<u>DISSAT.</u>	<u>OPIN.</u>

[]a. (T)	Timeliness of the response-----	50%-----	31%-----	3%-----	6%-----	9%-----	2%
[]b. (T)	Courtesy shown to you -----	53%-----	30%-----	5%-----	6%-----	5%-----	1%
[]c. (T)	Competence displayed in handling your issue -----	48%-----	29%-----	5%-----	10%-----	5%-----	2%

(RESUME ASKING ALL RESPONDENTS)

30. Which of the following sources of information do you use most often to get news and information about San José City government? **(READ AND ROTATE)** Which do you use next-most often?

	<u>FIRST CHOICE</u>	<u>SECOND CHOICE</u>
<input type="checkbox"/> Television news -----	47%	23%
<input type="checkbox"/> The San Jose Mercury News newspaper -----	29%	27%
<input type="checkbox"/> Radio news -----	8%	15%
<input type="checkbox"/> The City's website, www.sanjoseca.gov -----	6%	6%
<input type="checkbox"/> A City newsletter -----	1%	3%
<input type="checkbox"/> A community website or e-mail newsgroup -----	2%	4%
<input type="checkbox"/> Word of mouth -----	3%	6%
<input type="checkbox"/> The City's cable television station, called Civic Center TV, which is on channel 27 -----	2%	4%
<input type="checkbox"/> A newspaper other than the San Jose Mercury News (SPECIFY) -----	0%	1%
(OTHER- SPECIFY) -----	0%	1%
(DON'T KNOW/NA) -----	1%	10%

31. In non-emergency situations, if you needed to request services or information from the City of San José, which of the following methods would you prefer to use to contact the City? **(ROTATE)**

<input type="checkbox"/> Visiting a City office in person -----	13%
<input type="checkbox"/> Making a phone call to a specific City department -----	44%
<input type="checkbox"/> Making a phone call to the City's Customer Service Call Center, 535-3500 -----	14%
<input type="checkbox"/> Sending an e-mail -----	7%
<input type="checkbox"/> Sending a letter -----	2%
<input type="checkbox"/> Visiting the City's website, www.sanjoseca.gov -----	15%
(OTHER-SPECIFY) -----	1%
(DON'T READ) DK/NA -----	4%

32. Using words of your own, in your opinion, what is the most important thing the City of San José can do to improve city services for the people who live and/or work in San José? **(OPEN-END; RECORD VERBATIM ANSWER BELOW AND THEN CODE AFTERWARDS)**

(T)		Mass transit/BART/light rail/ improve bus system -----	5%
Traffic flow/reduce traffic congestion/improve traffic flow -----	13%	Nothing/no problems -----	5%
Roads (repair/expand) -----	6%	Housing prices/rent control -----	4%
Police patrol more frequently/ instead of making new ones -----	6%	Schools (improve, build more) -----	4%

Jobs/better wages ----- 4%
 Beautification/city/neighborhood
 renovation/cleanup ----- 3%
 Improve information resources/
 accessibility ----- 3%

Youth issues (control gangs, youth

activities, day care for children ----- 3%
 Town hall meetings/let us know
 what they're doing/personal
 interaction with neighborhoods ----- 3%
 Hire more help/better employee
 training/friendlier employees ----- 2%
 Improve city services (general) ----- 2%
 Take care of the people/
 listen to the people ----- 2%
 Eliminate government corruption/
 special interest influence ----- 2%
 Parking improvements ----- 1%
 Better allocation of City funds ----- 1%
 Get rid of Mayor ----- 1%

Faster emergency service response ----- 1%

Plan for growth (housing, traffic

patterns, population, etc.) ----- 1%
 Assistance for poor/homeless ----- 1%
 Infrastructure improvements/
 street lighting improvements ----- 1%
 Environment/air quality
 improvement/water control
 improvement ----- 1%
 Senior support activities ----- 1%
 Neighborhood watch ----- 1%
 Recreation areas/more parks ----- 1%
 Better trash collecting ----- 1%
 Eliminate automated phone systems ----- 1%
 Cultural/arts funding/events/
 Activities ----- 1%
 Taxes/lower taxes ----- 1%
 Other ----- 2%
 DK/NA/Refused ----- 14%

HERE ARE MY FINAL QUESTIONS. THEY ARE JUST FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES.

33. About how long have you lived in San José? (READ LIST)

Less than two years ----- 9%
 Three to four years ----- 7%
 Five to six years ----- 8%
 Seven to ten years ----- 10%
 11 to 15 years ----- 10%
 16 to 20 years ----- 12%
 21 years or more ----- 42%
 (DON'T READ) Don't know/Refused -- 2%

34. Do you live in a single-residence detached home, or do you live in a multi-family apartment, mobile home park, or condo building?

Single family detached house ----- 71%
 Multi-family apt/condo ----- 26%
 Mobile home park ----- 2%
 (DON'T READ) Don't know/Refused -- 1%

35. Do you own or rent the house or apartment where you live?

Own ----- 65%
 Rent ----- 32%
 (DON'T READ) Don't know/Refused -- 2%

36. Are there any children under the age of 18 living in your household?

----- **Yes**
42%
 No----- **57%**
 (DK/NA)----- **2%**

37. What is your current employment status? Are you.. **(READ LIST)**

Employed full-time ----- **(ASK Q38)--55%**

----- **Employed part-time**
(ASK Q38)--10%

A homemaker who does not
 work outside the home ----- **(SKIP TO Q39)--6%**

----- **Retired**
(SKIP TO Q39)--15%

A student ----- **(SKIP TO Q39)--6%**

Unemployed ----- **(SKIP TO Q39)--7%**

(DON'T READ) Refused ----- (SKIP TO Q39)--1%

(IF "EMPLOYED FULL-TIME" OR "PART-TIME" IN QUESTION 37, ASK:)

38. Is your work located in the City of San José or not? **(IF "NOT IN SAN JOSE," ASK: Do you telecommute to your job from your residence in San José?)**

In San José ----- **62%**
 Not in San José ----- **33%**
 Not in San José, telecommute ----- **3%**
(DON'T READ) Don't know/Refused -- 1%

(RESUME ASKING ALL RESPONDENTS)

39. What was the last level of school you completed?

Grades 1-8 ----- **3%**
 Grades 9-11 ----- **6%**
 High School Graduate (12) ----- **22%**
 Some College ----- **24%**
 Business/Vocational School ----- **3%**
 College Graduate (4) ----- **28%**
 Post-Graduate Work/Professional
 School ----- **14%**
(DON'T READ) DK/Refused ----- 1%

40. Please stop me when I come to the category that best describes the ethnic or racial group with which you identify yourself. Is it....?

Hispanic/Latino ----- **26%**
 African-American ----- **4%**
 Asian ----- **21%**

Caucasian/White **40%**

Native American/Indian ----- **1%**
 Some other group or identification ----- **5%**

(DON'T READ) Refused ----- 3%

41. In what year were you born?

1987-1981 (18-24) ----- 11%
1980-1976 (25-29) ----- 10%
1975-1971 (30-34) ----- 11%
1970-1966 (35-39) ----- 11%
1965-1961 (40-44) ----- 10%
1960-1956 (45-49) ----- 10%
1955-1951 (50-54) ----- 8%
1950-1946 (55-59) ----- 6%
1945-1941 (60-64) ----- 5%
1940 or earlier (65 & over) ----- 11%
Refused ----- 7%

42. I don't need to know the exact amount but I'm going to read you some categories for household income. Would you please stop me when I have read the category indicating the total combined income for all the people in your household before taxes in 2004?

\$10,000 and under ----- 5%
\$10,001 - \$20,000 ----- 6%
\$20,001 - \$30,000 ----- 9%
\$30,001 - \$60,000 ----- 18%
\$60,001 - \$75,000 ----- 10%
\$75,001 - \$100,000 ----- 7%
More than \$100,000 ----- 16%
(DON'T READ) Refused ----- 29%

43. Are you a registered voter in the City of San José?

Yes ----- 75%
No ----- 22%
(DON'T READ) Refused ----- 2%

44. Here is my final question. Could you tell me the cross streets of the main intersection near where you live? (WRITE-IN STREET NAMES)

Street

with

Street

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND ATTENTION TO MY QUESTIONS.

Gender by observation:

Male ----- 49%
Female ----- 51%

Language by observation:

English ----- 94%
Spanish ----- 6%

Vietnamese ----- 0%

Phone # _____

Date _____

City _____

Interviewer _____

Verified by _____

ZIP _____

County _____

Cluster # _____

Page # _____

Attachment III

Redevelopment Agency of The City of San Jose
Neighborhood Project Areas Expenditures FY1977-1999
Prepared 4-19-2006

1977-1978	0
1978-1979	0
1979-1980	0
1980-1981	0
1981-1982	0
1982-1983	0
1983-1984	0
1984-1985	0
1985-1986	0
1986-1987	0
1987-1988	83,424
1988-1989	251,355
1989-1990	379,905
1990-1991	731,290
1991-1992	1,028,746
1992-1993	2,494,897
1993-1994	2,030,628
1994-1995	12,681,589
1995-1996	2,279,748
1996-1997	10,928,463
1997-1998	23,423,599
	<u>56,313,644</u>

Redevelopment Agency of The City of San Jose
Neighborhood and SNI Project Areas
Prepared 4-19-2006

	FY95-99	FY99-00	FY00-01	FY01-02	FY02-03	FY03-04	FY04-05	FY05-06	Total
Neighborhood Investment									
District	33,527,487	19,419,313	17,168,845	52,616,548	65,222,567	9,720,303	14,504,190	12,028,783	224,208,036
SNI		156,202	1,755,962	3,009,329	4,246,530	14,482,761	13,766,889	10,938,375	48,357,368
	<u>33,527,487</u>	<u>19,575,515</u>	<u>18,925,827</u>	<u>55,625,877</u>	<u>69,469,397</u>	<u>24,203,064</u>	<u>28,271,079</u>	<u>22,967,158</u>	<u>272,565,404</u>

Attachment IV
Redevelopment Agency Greater Downtown Housing

1977 through 1998

Project Name	Type of Agency Involvement	Ex Low	Very Low	Low	Mod	Market	Total
Avalon at the Alameda	Unassisted					305	305
Boggini Plaza (9th Street)	20% funds				7		7
Casa Feliz (foreclosed by City in 2004 will demo)	20% funds		54				54
Colonnade	DDA; \$3,270,000; Net cash flow		6	21	6	182	215
Dorchester	20% funds			16			16
Duane Street	20% funds		12	11			23
Fifth and St. James	20% funds				4		4
Gifford Street	20% funds		19				19
Giovanni Center	20% funds		24				24
Jeanne D'Arc Manor	80% funds		87				87
Julian Street Inn	80/20 funds; \$3,509			35	35		70
Masson	80% funds			4	11		15
Metropolitan Court	80% funds				19	20	39
Montgomery Shelter	20% funds	85					85
Naglee Mansion	20% funds			17			17
New Century Commons	DDA; \$3,714,419		7		24	17	48
Parkside Condominiums	DDA				60	56	116
Paseo Plaza	DDA; \$8,875,000 % of sales					210	210
Plaza Hotel	20% funds		45				45
Plaza Maria (Sister of Mercy)	20% funds		13	39	1		53
R. Rotondo	Unassisted		1			4	5
Ryland Mews (Phase I, II, III, IV)	DDA; \$6,117,517			5	33	93	131
Saint James Place	20% funds?					32	32
San José Condominiums 100% affordable	20% funds				6		6
Troy Laundry	20% funds		15	15			30
University Gardens, PH I & II	20% funds				25	114	139
Vendome	80% funds; \$1,018,821			7		25	32
Villa Torino	DDA; \$12,218,000; 2ndary Financing				85	113	198
Vintage Towers	Loan foreclosure 20% funds			12	18	29	59
villa nueva	\$4,080,000 20% funds		62			1	63
TOTALS		85	345	182	334	1,201	2,147

Attachment IV
Redevelopment Agency Greater Downtown Housing (continued)

1999 through 2006							
Project Name	Type of Agency Involvement	Ex Low	Very Low	Low	Mod	Market	Total
101 San Fernando	DDA; \$9,100,000; Net cash flow		65			258	323
2nd & Santa Clara					15	61	76
33 South Third / Century Center Apts	DDA; \$13,249,746 Net cash flow		4		9	76	89
350 North 2nd Street (Cook)	Unassisted					62	62
800 North 8th (Regis)	Unassisted					66	66
Artist Ark					146	2	148
Autumn Terrace (KB)					9	45	54
Avalon@Cahill Park	\$500,000 for off-sites					218	218
Balbach (Des Nolan)						14	14
Brickyard Place (Fairfield/AGI)	Unassisted					176	176
Cahill Park South (Castle)	\$500,000 for Street Improv					160	160
Central Place (CIM)						197	197
City Heights (BSB)						124	124
Classics @ Bernal Park	Unassisted					28	28
College Park Homes (Pulte)	Unassisted					66	66
Delmas Park Teachers (EHC)					122	1	123
Esplanade (Picorne)	Unassisted					278	278
Georgetown (Summer Hill)	Unassisted					94	94
Inn Vision (184 11th St.)	80/20 funds		25	1	1		27
Keeble Place (Regis)	Unassisted				3	17	20
Keystone Place (Classic)					8	34	42
Legacy @ Museum Park	DDA; \$3,805,504; Net cash flow				19	98	117
Legacy Fountain Plaza (Legacy)	Unassisted				46	321	367
Lofts @ Alameda (BSB)					8	32	40
Mabuhay Court	\$5,460,313		95			1	96
Mariani Square (Pulte)	Unassisted					159	159
Market Gateway	DDA; \$4,170,000; Net cash flow				22	32	54
Market House Lofts (Regis)	Unassisted					53	53
Miraido Village	DDA; \$10,998,118; Net cash flow		22	14	18	54	108
New Brighton (Blackwell)					4	16	20
Park Townsend (G&K)	DDA; \$5,404,828; % of sales					98	98
Paseo Villas	DDA; \$9,795,000; Net cash flow					104	104
Pavona (Fairfield)	Unassisted					232	232
Pensione Esperanza	80/20 funds		109				109

Plant 51						265	265
Project Name	Type of Agency Involvement	Ex Low	Very Low	Low	Mod	Market	Total
Ryland Mews (Phase V)	DDA; \$1,048,000 Net cash flow				9	21	30
The Plaza (aka Julian Court)	DDA; \$4,229,538; Net cash flow				11	45	56
Twohy Live/Work Lofts	\$4,427,770					36	36
Almaden Towers					28	330	358
University Gardens, Ph. III (Siena Court)	20% funds				10	20	30
Vendome Place or Tower (BSB)	Unassisted					106	106
Villa Torre (aka-6th & Martha) Phase I	Park fees 80/20		31	71		1	103
Villa Torre (aka-6th & Martha) Phase II	Park fees 80/20		27	59		1	87
Works (BSB)					14	60	74
TOTALS			378	145	502	4,062	5,087

Attachment V

NOVEMBER 2001 SAN JOSÉ PRIMARY SURVEY

1. Would you support or oppose a bond measure that would provide \$143 million to build new firestations, build a police substation, improve 24 existing firestations and provide technology upgrades to our current 911 facilities? IF DON'T KNOW ... Which way would you lean? IF SUPPORT/OPPOSE ... Is that strongly or somewhat?

Str. Spt.	Smwt. Spt.	Lean Spt.	Don't Know	Lean Opp.	Smwt. Opp.	Str. Opp.
32	32	6	10	3	8	8

Total Support	Don't Know	Total Oppose
70	10	20

2. Now, would you support or oppose the bond measure I just described to you if it were \$50 per year for an average household's assessed property valuation? IF DON'T KNOW ... Which way would you lean? IF SUPPORT/OPPOSE ... Is that strongly or somewhat?

Str. Spt.	Smwt. Spt.	Lean Spt.	Don't Know	Lean Opp.	Smwt. Opp.	Str. Opp.
26	28	7	11	4	9	14

Total Support	Don't Know	Total Oppose
61	11	28

3. Would you support or oppose a bond measure that would provide \$252 million to build new firestations, build a police substation, improve 24 existing firestations and provide technology upgrades to our current 911 facilities plus build new training centers for police officers and fire fighters? IF DON'T KNOW ... Which way would you lean? IF SUPPORT/OPPOSE ... Is that strongly or somewhat?

a. Str. Spt.	Smwt. Spt.	Lean Spt.	Don't Know	Lean Opp.	Smwt. Opp.	Str. Opp.
22	23	7	15	4	14	16

Total Support	Don't Know	Total Oppose
52	15	33

4. Now, would you support or oppose the bond measure I just described to you if it were _____ per year for an average household's assessed property valuation? IF DON'T KNOW ... Which way would you lean? IF SUPPORT/OPPOSE ... Is that strongly or somewhat?

a. \$80						
Str. Spt.	Smwt. Spt.	Lean Spt.	Don't Know	Lean Opp.	Smwt. Opp.	Str. Opp.
14	22	4	14	4	16	26

Total Support	Don't Know	Total Oppose
40	14	46

b. \$90						
Str. Spt.	Smwt. Spt.	Lean Spt.	Don't Know	Lean Opp.	Smwt. Opp.	Str. Opp.
10	15	5	15	5	16	33

Total Support
31

Don't Know
15

Total Oppose
54

5. Now, I would like to go back and talk about police and fire services in San José. I'm going to list some possible improvements and ask how you would rate each.

How would you rate _____ on a scale of zero to ten?

ROTATE

Question Mean Score

a. Build new fire stations

6.1

b. Build a police substation

6.2

c. Improve 24 existing fire stations

6.8

d. Provide technology upgrades to our current 911 facilities

7.6

e. Build new training centers for police officers and fire fighters

6.1

f. Add a second police helicopter

6.0

Attachment VI
Final Election Results from County of Santa Clara Registrar of Voters

November 2000

Santa Clara County Measure A 1/2 cent sales tax for Transportation

	Percentage
Yes	70.6%
No	29.4%

**City of San José Measure O-
San José Neighborhood Libraries Bonds**

	Percentage
Yes	75.8%
No	24.2%

**City of San José Measure P San José Safe
Neighborhood Park and Recreation Bonds**

	Percentage
Yes	78.7%
No	21.3%

March 2002

**City of San José – Measure O
Public Safety Bond**

	Percentage
Yes	71.7%
No	28.3%

**City of San José Measure F-
Convention Center Expansion TOT increase**

	Percentage
Yes	65.0%
No	35.0%

March 2004

**City of San José, Measure S – Library
Measure Parcel Tax**

	Percent
Yes	67.18%
No	32.82%

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- ❑ Dr. Brian Murphy for teaching me that good political theory was useless unless you use it to make our society a better place.
- ❑ Dr. Frank Fiscalini for giving me my first taste of governing from inside the system.
- ❑ Mayor Ron Gonzales for keeping me focused on change and providing an environment where change could be explored as a staff person and as an academic.
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