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60th Air Mobility Wing Information Protection Office Job Redesign

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Running Head: 60TH AIR MOBILITY WING INFORMATION PROTECTION OFFICE JOB
REDESIGN

60th Air Mobility Wing Information Protection Office Job Redesign

Submitted by

Eric Alber

for

EMPA 396 Graduate Research Project in Public Management

Golden Gate University
San Francisco, California

Faculty Advisors:
Joaquin Gonzalez, Ph. D and
Mick McGee, DPA

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Abstract

The current operations tempo at the 60th Air Mobility Wing, Information Protection Office (IPO), Travis AFB, California is not sustainable and program enhancement is minimal due to excessive administrative tasks levied upon the office. The 60th IPO has one dedicated position to process security clearances for a population of a 6000 personnel. The research proves by realigning non-critical processes from the Wing IPO to subordinate squadron security managers, expertise was increased, error rates reduced, and redundant processes were eliminated. This realignment of processes reduced security clearance processing time by 34 days and recouped 80 hours back to the Wing IPO PERSEC program monthly, thereby increasing mission readiness for Travis AFB, CA. The research is supported by current and relevant literature of existing job design processes along with direct observation of key functions. Additionally, the use of surveys and data analytics measured, analyzed and determined implementation to be successful.

Chapter 1- Introduction

Background of the Problem:

Currently, the Wing IPO and more specifically the Personnel Security (PERSEC) function located at Travis Air Force Base (Travis AFB), California is tasked with responsibilities outside the Government Standard Job Series GS-0080-11, Security Specialist Core Personnel Document (CPD) (Appendix A). These non-aligned responsibilities coupled with limited resources and manpower are preventing proper program management. The IPO has taken on responsibilities, subordinate squadrons should administer as they are inherent squadron commander functions.

The structure of Travis AFB is illustrated in Appendix B. Travis AFB is led by the Wing Commander. The Wing Commander has overall responsibility for all operations at Travis AFB. The IPO is part of the Wing Commander's staff (Appendix C). The Wing IPO is tasked with providing three specific disciplines under the Information Protection construct (Appendix D).

The PERSEC Specialist is responsible for the processing and tracking of governmental security clearances for associated squadrons assigned to Travis AFB. Currently, the IPO is only manned by one PERSEC Specialist, tasked with providing support to approximately 6000 people. Each squadron at Travis AFB has multiple security managers assigned to carry out security clearance actions for their respective squadrons. The PERSEC Specialist works in tandem with security managers to ensure the processing of personnel security actions. Squadron level security managers have limited knowledge and access to required resources to effectively manage their commander's security program without dependence on the Wing PERSEC Specialist.

Statement of the Problem:

Effective program management can optimally be achieved by shifting responsibilities from the Wing IPO to squadron security managers. Many functions are not the responsibility of the Information Protection Office (IPO) and other functions would benefit from a decentralized realignment. Additionally, most functions would give squadrons' greater autonomy of the security process and allow enhanced flexibility to control when security investigations are initiated.

Purpose of the Study:

The security program is a commander responsibility as outlined in all prescribing governmental guidance and the IPO is responsible for providing program management and oversight to assist commanders in running their respective programs. By standardizing procedures and reducing administrative functions at the Wing IPO, enhanced program management can be achieved on Travis Air Force Base. Under the current construct, there is not enough time to effectively handle all tasks assigned with precision and thorough completion (Appendix E). Through direct observation, interaction and facilitation by the IPO, responsibilities will be shifted, measured, assessed and surveyed to ensure all stakeholders are actively involved in the process realignment.

Significance of the Study:

Process realignment would allow the IPO to provide sound program management, enhanced squadron level training, and reduce redundant processes. Furthermore, by providing greater resources and knowledge to squadron level security managers, a culture change in the IPO and the squadron level can be expected. Lastly, security clearances and the successful

processing of clearances have a great impact on the ability of a squadron to deploy their members. Military members and select civilians are required to have a security clearance in order to deploy to various locations throughout the world. With realigned responsibilities at the squadron level, squadrons will have greater flexibility and oversight to ensure mission readiness.

Research Question:

Will organizational change(s) at TAFB's Wing Information Protection Office (IPO) result in increased efficiency and effectiveness?

Research Sub-questions:

1. What specific and measurable functions currently being performed by the Wing Personnel Security Specialist can be redistributed or streamlined to allow enhanced program management and time reinvestment to program management?
2. What specific training needs to be provided to squadron Level Security Managers to ensure redistributed responsibilities can be carried out with little assistance from the Program Manager?

Hypothesis:

Realigning non-critical processes from the Wing Information Protection Office (IPO) to subordinate squadrons will increase efficiency, reduce error rates and eliminate redundant processes thus enhancing mission readiness.

Limitations:

A limitation of this research will be time and scope. While the research is able to provide a snapshot of proposed outcomes, the volume of personnel involved in the full implementation of shifted responsibilities and to fully see if proposed actions produce desired results on a larger scale will require more time than is available for this research project.

Another limitation was the implementation of giving end-users eQip access for a population sampling. Initial sampling was projected to include six units but only two units were able to be fully implemented by the closure of the research. The other four units were poised to get access to the eQip system but due to numerous base level exercises, members deployed or temporarily assigned, the required training to get access was delayed preventing account creation.

Definition of Terms:

eQip- Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing. eQip is used to initiate security clearance investigations. The eQip system stores member's answers to questionnaires to allow the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) investigators to conduct investigations. For the IPO, the system is used for initiation, review, rejections, and termination of clearance actions.

Group- "A flexible administrative and tactical unit composed of either two or more battalions or two or more squadrons" (DoD Dictionary, 2017)

Information Protection- "Information Protection is a subset of the Air Force Security Enterprise and consists of the core security disciplines (Personnel, Industrial, and Information Security) used to determine military, civilian, and contractor personnel's eligibility to access classified information, ensure the protection of classified information released or disclosed to industry in connection with classified contracts, and protect classified information and Controlled Unclassified Information that, if subject to unauthorized disclosure, could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security" (SAF/AA, 2015).

Information Protection Office (IPO)- The Information Protection Office is a United States Air Force function aligned under the Wing Staff.

Information Security (INFOSEC)- “The system of policies, procedures, and requirements established to protect information that, if subjected to unauthorized disclosure, could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security” (Vickers, M. 2012).

Industrial Security (INDSEC)- “That portion of information security concerned with the protection of classified information in the custody of U.S. industry” (Cambone, S. 2006).

Personnel Security (PERSEC)- “A criterion of security based upon standards that must be met for clearance or assignment to sensitive duties. The allegiance, reliability, trustworthiness and judgment of the individual being considered for such positions must be assessed to ensure that the placement of each individual in such a position is clearly consistent with the interests of national security” (SAF/AA, 2017).

Squadron- “The basic administrative aviation unit of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force” (DoD Dictionary, 2017).

Wing- “An Air Force unit composed normally of one primary mission group and the necessary supporting organizations” (DoD Dictionary, 2017).

Expected Impact of the Research:

Expected research impact is an increase in security manager efficiency at the squadron level. Additionally, through the reassignment of IPO processes the research will show how recouped time can be reallocated to the squadron level in the form of training and enhanced program management. With the increase of training the data will show an increase in the squadron security manager knowledge level, a reduction in recorded error rates and an elimination of redundant processes thus increasing mission readiness.

Chapter 2- Literature Review

Introduction

A key component of the research is job design or redesign. It is important to look at relevant literature through cases studies and peer-reviewed articles to show the potential pitfalls associated with job design coupled with the shifting responsibilities from a macro to micro level. An in-depth look at previous literature should allow successful implementation of processes through lessons learned. Three separate literature themes relevant to this study were reviewed and examined. Each theme is discussed below: (1) Job Design and Change Management; (2) Guidance from Above: Root Rules and Regulations on Positional Responsibilities; and (3) Process Improvement.

Job Design and Change Management

The work of Tamara Miles (2014) illustrates how most of us have more tasks than we have time to complete and it is important to differentiate between what we should be doing in contrast to what we should not be doing is of critical importance (Miles, 2014). According to Stephen Covey in *7 Habits of Highly Effective People*, and more specifically Habit 3, Put First Things First, people place tasks in four quadrants known as the “Time Management Matrix” (Covey, 2013). These quadrants I through IV are Important/Urgent, Important Not Urgent, Not Important/Urgent, Not Important/Not Urgent (Covey, 2013). For us to truly know where our activities reside in this “matrix”, we must understand what is important in relation to what truly needs to be accomplished (Covey, 2013). Covey suggests that a highly effective person resides in Quadrant III, Important/Not Urgent.

By utilizing established governmental guidance and identified functions currently being performed by the Wing IPO, critical functions are identified and the non-critical functions being

performed but still important can be assessed, eliminated or realigned to the squadron level.

Focusing efforts on truly critical processes allow for the successful management of the Personnel Security Program (PSP) and resources will be directed to where they are needed most.

The Wing IPO can direct change immediately, however; implementing this change may create adversity, diminish credibility, and make individuals resistant to change. According to David Brown (2017) in his article on “Change Management”; transparency equals credibility and some early struggles were from implementing new processes and a failure to ensure employees were provided the tools and resources to do their jobs correctly (Brown, 2017). By articulating the purpose of the change and help shape the narrative of why the change is needed, unit level security managers can see how their future roles and responsibilities will aid to their squadron’s mission and why the change is needed (Kotter, 2012).

Another aspect to be considered when designing job requirements is the effect it will have on those impacted the most. It is important to break down the various silos within the hierarchy and work across the various agencies, in addition to engaging stakeholders amongst the various organizations (Lee, 2014). Equally important to ensuring effective change is you must capture the “hearts” and not the “heads” of those impacted by the change (Kotter, 2012). People are more compelled to adopt change if their values align (Kotter, 2012) to the change proposed. Lee (2014) further elaborates “Agency leaders should also consider the potential of repercussions of their decisions by proactively preparing for these issues (such as moral or external criticisms) by receiving greater buy-in from multiple stakeholders” (Lee, 2014). This is important as any process change is sure to bring criticism and by having solid data to support the proposed changes will aid in the implementation.

Additionally, prior to the change implementation, we must “establish the causes which generate the issue and the effects which factual situations have or may have for each type of issue” (Braica, 2013). The issues generating the change must be clearly versed as mentioned above and supported by the works from Lee and Kotter, so those impacted have a full understanding of the need for change. Change for the sake of change is never a good strategy and will most likely be met with resistance. Dr. Braica advises that “managers could implement a set of activities” to help “minimize the phenomenon of resistance to change” (Braica, 2013). When realigning the processes, participating in the actual process and offering encouragements along with assistance would aid in ensuring less anxiety about the proposed changes (Braica, 2013).

While important to ensuring those working the new processes receive encouragement and significance of the new alignment, those at the top also need to embrace the change to ensure their subordinates have the tools and resources to effectively carry out their new responsibilities. Daryl Conner, advises in *Leading at the Edge of Chaos*, “Nimble organizations excel, not only at seeing the need for change, but in actually executing whatever is required” (BusinessNews Publishing, 2014). Leaders in the organization will want to know what their return on investment is and how the changes implemented are going to benefit their organization. Reaching out to the commanders of the squadrons will be a crucial element in ensuring change success. This top-down buy-in will benefit not only from the Wing IPO engaging leaders but the subordinate personnel to the organization.

Additionally, the process of job design or the redesign, the stakeholders can gain increased motivation which could be the impetus ensuring a successful realignment. In the study published by Personnel Psychology (1990), motivation is increased by giving employees

increased responsibility and increased complexity which can increase motivation and job satisfaction thus providing a more skilled and vested employee (Campion, M. A., & Berger, C. J., 1990). This is the desired outcome of employee engagement to increase the expertise of squadron level security managers and to do so stakeholder buy-in could be a critical element.

Hackman and Oldham's Job Characteristic Model, illustrated by Gareth Taylor (2015) highlights another key factor to process when pursuing job design. Taylor explains how job design under the Hackman and Oldham model can be summarized in three areas (Organizational Factors, Environmental Factors and Behavioral Factors) as they relate to an employee's motivation (Taylor, G. 2015). Additionally, five aspects can have an impact on an employee motivation in regards to their job and are as follows: Skill Variety, Task Identity, Task Significance, Autonomy, and Feedback (Taylor, G. 2015). These attributes can be captured through the use of surveys, direct observation, and metrics. Once captured the results can be synthesized into action plans in order to meet desired objectives.

Guidance from Above: Rules and Regulations on Positional Responsibilities

The PERSEC program has its roots established in Presidential Executive Orders (E.O.). E.O. 9835, *Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an Employee Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch of the Government*, issued by President Harry S. Truman, established procedures for investigating personnel assigned to the Executive Branch of the Federal government to ensure disloyal employees were not retained in the various agencies assigned to the Executive Branch (Woolley & Peters, n.d.). The Executive Order further established a Civil Service Commission to ensure all cases involving personnel being recommended for removal had their cases reviewed by a three-member panel (Woolley & Peters, n.d.). Lastly, the action

taken by President Truman established standards for employment refusal (Woolley & Peters, n.d.).

Executive Order 10450, *Security requirements for Government employment*, issued by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, replaced E.O. 9835 and further established personnel under federal employment of the Executive Branch need to be “reliable, trustworthy, of good conduct and character and of complete unswerving loyalty to the United States” (Federal Register, n.d.). As its predecessor, the main theme of the E.O. 10450 is to ensure employment by personnel is consistent with the interests of national security and as such are subject to investigation (Federal Register, n.d.).

President George W. Bush issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13381, *Strengthening Processes Relating to Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information* on June 27, 2005. E.O. 13381 did not changed the previous mentioned Executive Orders but assigned duties to the Director of Management and Budget (Federation of American Scientists, n.d.). The Director of Management and Budget was charged to “ensure appropriate uniformity, centralization, efficiency, effectiveness, and timeliness in processes relating to determinations by agencies of eligibility for access to classified national security information” and “responsibility for improving the process for determining eligibility for access to classified national security information” (Federation of American Scientists, n.d.).

Through these Executive Orders, the Department of Defense is given the authority and direction to establish the Security Program for all employees under its purview. Current DoD Guidance is a blueprint for subordinate agencies to follow. The prescribing guidance for the PERSEC program is DoD Manual 5200.02, *Procedures for the DoD Personnel Security Program* (Lowery, 2017). DODM 5200.02 mandates the appointment of a “senior security

official” to lead the Personnel Security Program at the US Air Force level (Lowery, 2017). For the Air Force, this office is designated SAF/AA (Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force). SAF/AA is the authority for all Personnel Security Program matters in the US Air Force.

The US Air Force and SAF/AA have directed the use of Air Force Instruction (AFI) 31-501, *Personnel Security Program Management* (HQ USAF/XOFI, 2012). This guidance directs “Security Managers provide personnel security support to active duty military, civilian, and guard and reserve members assigned or attached to the active duty organizations” (HQ USAF/XOFI, 2012). Additionally, it is further directed commanders appoint their respective security managers to implement the security program for their units (HQ USAF/XOFI, 2012). The Installation Security Program Managers (Security Specialist Program Managers) implement the specific discipline for the installation or base (HQ USAF/XOFI, 2012).

Lastly, further clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the Personnel Security Program is provided in Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 16-1405. This guidance is currently in draft and tentatively scheduled for release in June 2018. The draft AFMAN 16-1405 outlines more specific responsibilities for the Information Protection Office and is the only guidance identifying key responsibilities that are being performed in current security programs at the Air Force level. Additionally, the guidance is written as a supplement to DoD Manual 5200.02. For the purpose of this research, draft AFMAN 16-1405 was incorporated into the process realignment and job redesign.

Draft AFMAN 16-1405 directs the IPO management and training of functions inherent to the Personnel Security Program (SAF/AAZ, n.d.). It further articulates the specific Personnel Security Specialist responsibilities such as “providing guidance and direction to commanders and

directors or designated security manager(s) when requested on all aspects of the Air Force Personnel Security Program” (SAF/AAZ, n.d.).

Additionally, as the basis of duties are outlined above, all duties being assigned to the Wing IPO and specifically, the PERSEC Specialist are contained in GS-0080-11, Core Personnel Document (CPD). This CPD is used for position classification that affects pay and work requirements and any added duties not listed in the CPD must be evaluated in accordance with Air Force Instruction (AFI) 16-1401, *Position Classification* (McGinty, 1997).

Lastly, AFI 16-1401 outlines Commanders, Supervisors and Managers responsibilities in relation to assigned responsibilities and more specifically, “Prepare accurate and adequate CPDs for subordinate positions. The responsibility for accuracy and adequacy of the description of duties must not be regarded lightly. Duty descriptions serve as a basis for setting pay and the commitment of public funds” (McGinty, 1997).

Through Executive Orders, Department of Defense guidance, and Department of the Air Force Instructions, the Wing IPO is accountable to ensure the successful implementation, operation, management of the Wing’s security program. While duties may be realigned, it is critical that any realignment is in accordance with established Department of Defense (DoD), Department of the Air Force (DAF), and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidance to ensure core functions are performed as designed within the Air Force.

Process Improvement

It is critical that any movement by the organization to realign processes in any direction, takes a holistic look at the best methods to do so. Looking at the case study on *Enhancing performance in service organisations* by Stadnicka, D., & Ratnayake, R. C. (2017) we can see, if the main focus of an organization is to center on its service provided, then little effort is used in

process improvement and especially improvement using “lean” principles (Stadnicka & Ratnayake, 2017). By using certain tools such as value stream mapping and showcasing current future value streams, an organization can lay a foundation of process improvement and identify current drawbacks to process implementation (Stadnicka, D., & Ratnayake, R. C., 2017). This identification can aide an organization and ensure they dedicate resources to those processes poised to yield results.

Another aspect to engage is in ensuring all personnel involved in the process improvement process share the same goal accomplishment and are in line with the shared ways to get to desired outcomes (Labowitz & Rosansky, 1997). The authors suggest that by integrating “the resources and systems of the organization to achieve that purpose” of “everyone heading in the same direction with a shared purpose” then this becomes the “main thing” in regards to business alignment and successful process improvement (Labowitz & Rosansky, 1997). Employees become more vested in ensuring the process succeeds and has shared motivation to see the process through. In essence by everyone on the same sheet of music there is now a common goal, filled with motivation and accomplishment (Labowitz & Rosansky, 1997).

Conclusion

While there seems to be an abundance of guidance and direction on the responsibilities of the Personnel Security Program, there are very few instructions on whom is responsible for what programs and what levels the operation of processes should reside. The only guidance that seems to solidify roles and responsibilities is in draft form and is not yet authorized for implementation. It can be argued, in the absence of guidance the Wing IPO can create processes and guidance to effectively manage the programs until further guidance is implemented directing

otherwise. A logical step would be to align with the draft guidance to minimize disruptions and change, if needed, once officially implemented.

Additionally, focusing on buy-in by engaging all stakeholders in the process will aid in effecting sound change management. By identifying causes of concern and keeping all process improvement functions above board, the implementation is expected to be more successful than if directed from the top down. Finally, by the Wing PERSEC Program Manager engaging with all players involved and sharing knowledge throughout the phase-in of realignment, expertise can be increased.

Lastly, using current process improvement tools such as “lean” principles and more specifically value stream mapping; the research will have quantifiable data to aid in the identification of process improvement areas needing attention or poised for elimination or reassignment. Value stream mapping will provide a visual representation of the waste versus actual time of certain processes that are part of the examined redesign. Using value stream mapping, the leadership and end user can see the “bank for the buck” of realigning responsibilities.

Chapter 3- Research Methods

Introduction

The research plan is to develop a theoretical framework or theme using observable data by the researcher. Observation was made at the Wing IP Office through the use of data analysis, utilizing the eQip program. Other sources of realignment and process improvements were observed from the point of view of captured time at the Wing IPO. Through the identification of patterns, data will be coded to reflect a trend analysis and relationships amongst the data.

Additionally, through content analysis, the researcher has shown the overarching issues studied as it relates to the implementation of process improvement efforts from the unit level perspective. Data was collected, counted, and used to identify specific trends concerning termination rates, eliminated redundant processes and reduced error rates, as illustrated in the research hypothesis below.

Of note, prior attempts at job realignment at the Wing IPO have been implemented haphazardly. While a survey was published and distributed to 162 personnel only 36 survey responses were received. Questions asked in the survey allowed the respondents to provide various answers based on their interpretation of the questions. This made the survey hard to measure and did not provide solid data on a course of action. A new survey was implemented with specific and measurable questions and answers.

Lastly, some process improvements were implemented with little regard to the stakeholder and their acceptance of the processes as the only goal was time recoupment at the Wing IPO.

Research Question:

Has the realignment of non-critical processes from the Wing Information Protection Office to subordinate squadrons increased expertise, reduced error rates and eliminated redundant processes?

Research Hypothesis:

Realigning non-critical processes from the Wing Information Protection Office to subordinate squadrons will increase expertise, reduce error rates and eliminate redundant processes.

Dependent and Independent Variables

The dependent variable examined in this study was the reorganized Wing Information Protection Office. The independent variable examined in this study was the realignment and assignment of non-critical processes from the Wing IPO to subordinate squadrons. Data was collected and analyzed to determine whether the realignment of the Wing IPO and the assignment of non-critical processes to subordinate squadrons resulted in (1) an increased efficiency in subordinate squadrons; (2) reduced error rates; (3) elimination of redundant processes; and (4) an increased level of mission readiness.

Operational Definitions:**Realigning Non-Critical Processes**

Processes measured against the GS-0080-11 job series illustrate the critical and non-critical measurable processes required for the Personnel Security Position.

Wing Information Protection Office

The image in Appendix B illustrates the relationship of disciplines located in the Wing Information Protection Office. On the basis of the research, the PERSEC Specialist was the focus of job realignment. The Wing IPO falls under the Wing Commander (Appendix A) and is

assigned to the Director of Staff (Appendix C) construct. The Wing IPO is responsible for the effective management of the Wings Security Program for all subordinate squadrons.

Subordinate Squadrons

Subordinate squadrons are charged with implementing the Information Security Program for their respective squadron. Subordinate squadron Security Managers take direction from the Wing Information Protection Office to ensure they are following established policy and guidance from Higher Headquarters and agencies outside of Travis AFB and the Air Force construct.

Increased Expertise in Subordinate Squadrons

Increased expertise was measured through the use of surveys (Appendix E) and data retrieved from the Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (eQip) (Appendix G). Reports were generated to show how many cases initiated, terminated, and the percentage of increase or decrease in initiated actions. A decrease in security terminations compared to previous actions prior to this research illustrates an increase in efficiency amongst the squadron level security managers.

Reduced Error Rates

Error rates were measured through the use of data built in the security investigative process. A sampling of past error rates, compared with current rates illustrates the success or failure of reducing errors. By utilizing the eQip program to retrieve data, a 30% decrease in security terminations or errors compared to previous security terminations or error rates prior to this research indicates a greater level of efficiency at the squadron level and a reduced error rate.

Eliminate Redundant Processes

A cross-section of Wing Information Protection Office PERSEC processes compared to the processes currently being performed at the squadron level identified redundant processes. An

analysis of which organization (Wing IPO or Squadron Security Manager) should maintain the process was identified based off the value added to the particular squadron needing the process, compared to the regulatory requirement to perform the function. Value added was identified by whom has the greatest need to ensure the process is performed and the benefit of such performance. Through analysis processes having no value added were identified for elimination.

Population Sampling Strategy

The Wing IPO PERSEC Specialist selected six squadrons to form the population sampling. Squadrons were selected based off attendance to the required eQip training held in September, October, and January of 2018. Each squadron was given access to eQip and allowed to initiate their own security investigations for their respective squadron. The PERSEC Program Manager provided support during this transition by ensuring all aspects of implementation were carried out with oversight from the Wing IPO.

Procedure

The PERSEC Specialist collected data from eQip through various reports inherent to the program, to gauge if there is a decrease in security terminations. A 30% decrease in security terminations based on previous data retrieved from the eQip program prior to this research shows successful unit implementation. Any percentage below the 30% resulted in analysis to assess the root cause of issues. Rejection of security clearance questionnaires by the unit security manager is expected to increase in the immediate term as squadron security managers are reviewing investigations in eQip versus a hard copy product prior to eQip submission. For processes realigned without measurable results, they were measured in time recouped at the Wing IPO.

Data Processing and Analysis

Data was extracted from the eQip system in the form of spreadsheets (Appendix G). These reports show termination rates, rejection rates, and initiated cases. Through the use of these reports, a trend analysis was able to be made. These trends correlate with the specific training provided to the squadron security managers and illustrate an increase their knowledge base.

Non-critical functions already realigned were not measured for the purpose of this research and were not included in the baseline measurements. Each non-critical function was measured on the time it took to complete and was the basis of estimated recouped time the IPO PERSEC program can expect. Additionally, the U.S. Air Force completed a manpower study (Carter, 2018) and this study illustrates estimated time it takes to complete processes assigned to Wing IP offices across the Air Force.

A comparison between Air Force level assessment and direct observation during the research was also included to show time differences between expected task accomplishment from the Air Force to actual task time of processes being performed at the 60th AMW IPO.

Controlling for Internal and External Validity

For the realignment of the security clearance initiations, transferred to unit security managers, the data illustrates whether or not the process is yielding the desired results of reduced error rates. Level of efficiency was also measured in reduced rejection rates by the IPO to the Security Manager due to fully completed investigations submitted and meeting the OPM standard versus being returned to the squadron for correction. Rejection rates were retrieved from the eQip program.

Limitations

A limitation of the research came in the form of competing priorities at the squadron level to ensure all members received the training needed to implement new processes at the unit level. It was critical for the PERSEC Specialist to establish relationships with Squadron Commanders thus ensuring security managers were given the time and resources to effectively carry out the duties levied upon them.

Summary

This research was designed for real-world application in the Wing Information Protection Office within the 60th Air Mobility Wing at Travis AFB, California. It is predicted by shifting responsibilities from the Wing IPO to unit level Security Managers that Security Managers will gain increased efficiency, reduced error rates, and a reduction of redundant processes.

Additionally, shifted responsibilities and processes allowed the Wing IPO to recoup time that was used to enhance program management and align the PERSEC position in line with the GS 0080 Security Specialist position description.

Chapter 4- Results and Findings

Objective:

Results and findings were derived from multiple sources. Primary data came in the form of surveys from end users, interviews from commanding officers responsible for security program implementation for their units and interviews from key leaders in the security (GS 0080 Security Specialist) profession. Additionally, data was extrapolated from reports within the eQip program and value stream mapping, as well as US Air Force level data analytics on process completion timelines. Lastly, direct observations where available, along with past Wing IPO initiatives, were incorporated into the research.

Research Question:

The research examined and analyzed the realignment of non-critical processes from the Wing Information Protection Office to subordinate squadrons and whether or not this increased expertise, reduced error rates and eliminated redundant processes.

Additional research sub-questions were also examined to include:

1. What specific and measurable functions currently being performed by the Wing Personnel Security Specialist can be redistributed or streamlined to allow enhanced program management and time reinvestment to program management?
2. What specific training needs to be provided to squadron Level Security Managers to ensure redistributed responsibilities can be carried out with little assistance from the Program Manager?

Overview of Results:

Survey with Training Data:

There were two surveys conducted for this research. The first survey (Appendix E) was paper-based and used in conjunction with training conducted by the Wing IPO on the use of the eQip system. The survey was administered after the training and results were calculated using the Likert Scale method. The three representative ranges were 1. Most buy-in, 2. Adequate buy-in and 3. Least buy-in. The survey was administered to 54 Security Managers in attendance with 35 surveys being returned (a 64% response rate). Of the members surveyed, 33 respondents fell in the “most buy-in” category and accounted for 94.3% of the respondents. Next, in the “adequate buy-in” category, two respondents’ scores (5.7%) fell within this range. Lastly, in the “least buy-in” category, zero respondents fell within this range.

Analysis:

Based on the above figures, it can be assured that implementation of key processes and specifically access to initiate security clearance processes from the Wing IPO to the unit level will be met with little resistance and this alignment will be embraced by those having attended the Wing IPO training session. Of note, the survey results also suggested Security Managers do not have adequate knowledge to complete their assigned tasks and they would benefit from more training by the Wing IPO.


Survey without Training Data:

The second survey was the same as survey one (Appendix E) but was posted on the 60th AMW IPO SharePoint site and utilized the built-in survey function. The survey was sent to a population sample of 62 security managers. 30 participants answered the survey with a 48.4% response rate. This survey was distributed to Security Managers who did not receive the eQip training that the first survey group received. Scoring and range categories used in the first survey calculations were applied for the second survey as well. Of the participants surveyed 0

respondents fell in the “most buy-in” category, 29 (96.7%) fell within the “adequate buy-in” range and 1 (3.3%) fell in the “least buy-in” category.

Analysis:

Of the two surveys distributed, the first survey yielded the greatest response in regards to the “most buy-in”. Of note, the second survey still had an extremely high “adequate buy-in” rate, giving an indication that shifting responsibilities will still garner buy-in, but not at the level from those in the first sample group. Additionally, it can be derived that by increasing training opportunities to those not available for the first session, buy-in will increase amongst the unit security managers. It is assumed the reason there was zero “most buy-in” from the second



survey was due to the respondents being unsure of the benefits afforded with increased access to the security clearance process.

Leadership Interviews

A total of six interviews were sent by email to personnel in key leadership positions at Travis AFB. These individuals have worked with the Wing IPO in the past and are responsible with implementing their PERSEC program within their units. Of the six requests, two individuals provided responses to the interview questions. (Appendix F).

Of the questions asked, the first interviewee shared they communicate regularly with their unit security manager and most of the issues they discuss are clearance issues, to include the renewal of security clearances (J. Longmire, personal communication, February 14, 2018). When asked to rate their knowledge of the Personnel Security Program the respondent stated they have “intermediate” level knowledge of the PERSEC program (J. Longmire, personal communication, February 14, 2018). When asked if they would support additional training for their unit security managers to improve the PERSEC program the respondent stated they would need more information to answer this question (J. Longmire, personal communication, February 14, 2018).

Many of the question responses fell more in-line with the INFOSEC program and did not relate to this research. The responses will be forwarded on to the INFOSEC program manager for action. Of note, the overall tone of the interview responses suggested an interest in improving their program, provide their unit security managers with the tools they need for successful performance of their duties.

The second interviewee provided similar responses but specially noted that unit level security managers needed increased functions from the Wing IPO so they had the autonomy to handle clearance actions at their level and free up time at the Wing IPO (G. Gottschall, personal communication, February 26, 2018). Additionally, continuity amongst the security managers within the unit was also a concern for the respondent (G. Gottschall, personal communication, February 26, 2018).

Further interviews will be needed to fully see the level of buy-in from leadership but the two respondents gave a glimpse into leadership involvement. The two interviews also provided a sense of motivation for the process improvement efforts to the benefit of their unit members.

eQip Realignment to the Unit Level:

The Wing IPO initiated a sample population of units on Travis AFB to receive access and start implementing security investigations from the unit level. The Wing IPO previously gave this access to two units and the researcher attempted to add an additional four for a greater population sampling however, the required paperwork to give access was not completed in time for this study. The Wing IPO still provides oversight and quality assurance prior to releasing the investigation to the Office of Personnel Management as this responsibility is still inherent to the responsibilities of the PERSEC Specialist. All six units participating are actively working their own security clearance initiations with two units working these processes for six months.

Data was measured prior to and after unit implementation of the eQip realignment to the unit level. Data was measured in the form of security clearance terminations (members did not complete in the prescribed time) and rejection rates (members had missing data or required further explanation on the security clearance questionnaire). Data was pulled for 13 months to show past termination and rejection rates as well as to show current numbers after Wing IPO training.


Analysis:

The data over a 13-month period reflects a decrease in rejection rates. More specifically, the first quarter of 2017 (Jan-Mar) showed a 46.90% average rejection rate based off 175 initiated monthly cases compared to a 14.28% rejection rate from the last quarter of 2017 (Oct-Dec). The overall decrease for security clearance questionnaire rejections was 68.75%.

Looking at the past six months and comparing it to the first six months of 2017 we see a decrease of 47.46%. This decrease is attributed to the increased security manager training started by the Wing IPO in August of 2017. With Security Manager expertise increased security


managers were able to ensure initiated cases were filled out correctly resulting in a decrease of rejections from the Wing IPO.

Rejection rates are expected to continue to decrease from the Wing IPO perspective as more units have access to the eQip program. While rejections in the system will increase, it will be used as a tool by unit level security managers to communicate with personnel about the corrections needed on their security clearance questionnaire. For the Wing IPO, rejections will only go from the Wing IPO to unit level Security Managers versus going direct to personnel submitting investigation packages. These rejections will be for quality assurance purposes and limited in scope.



For the past 13 months there also have been a decrease in the amount of security clearance questionnaire terminations. Comparing the first quarter of 2017 (Jan-Mar) and the last quarter of 2017 (Oct-Dec) there was a 40.58% reduction in the amount of security clearance questionnaire terminations. Pulling data from the first six months of 2017 and comparing to the past six months we see a reduction of 28%. Additionally, comparing the third quarter of 2017 (Jul-Sep) to the fourth quarter of 2017 (Oct-Dec) we see a 33% reduction in terminations.

Again, these percentages are based off an average of 175 cases initiated per month.



Process Realignment:

A thorough look of all processes currently being performed at the Wing IPO and comparing those to processes also being performed at the unit level allowed a better picture of processes that overlapped or could be eliminated. If a process was kept, it was due to a regulatory requirement to perform this function. The processes were then aligned against the PERSEC position description to see if it was a function to be kept at the Wing IPO. If a process was to be eliminated then there was not any supporting guidance to keep it, it was not inherent to processes required to be performed and it was not listed in the PERSEC position description.

Analysis:

All processes being performed at the Wing IPO and more specifically the PERSEC position are listed in the below table. The “*” in front of the position signifies the process is required to be performed by the PERSEC Specialist within the Wing IPO. All other processes are not required to be performed by the Wing IPO and can be shifting to unit level security managers, other agencies or eliminated.

PERSEC Current Responsibilities		
*Fingerprinting personnel for clearances	*Call OPM for case status	*DoD CAF Statement of Reasons
*Retrieving fingerprint results	*Request Case Status from DoD CAF	*DoD CAF Request for Information
Individual Local Records Checks	Out-processing members	Meetings
Police Records Check	Weekly Status Reports	*Derogatory Case Initiation/Tracking/Submission
Create Investigation Shell in eQip	*Naturalization Upgrades	*Commander Initiated Security Information Files
Clearance Reviews	*Deployment Re-opens	Local Police Blotter Review
Clearance submission rejections	*Quarterly Security Manager Initial Training	Continuous Evaluation Process
Download Clearance Files	*Program Inspections	
*Clearance Quality Check before submission to OPM	*Self Inspection	* Denotes Critical Functions

All processes listed above were evaluated on the time it took to complete. Additionally, if the process could not be personally evaluated, the U.S. Air Force Manpower Standard, detailing time it takes to perform Wing Information Protection processes was used (Carter, 2018). Of the processes assessed above, 11 processes were evaluated for process improvement, realignment, or elimination. Of the 11 processes, three were eliminated (Appendix G) and as a result 7.5 hour per week was recouped back to the Wing IPO. The remaining eight processes were realigned to either the unit level security manager or to the appropriate agency responsible.

For example, police records checks were being performed by the PERSEC Specialist. While it is a regulatory requirement to be performed, it is not required to be performed by the Wing IPO. This duty came about to assist the Security Police on Travis AFB due to a manning shortage and eventually became a regular function of the Wing IP Office. This process was moved back to the agency responsible and no longer is a Wing IP function. Time recouped to the IPO is 2 hours per week.

The process of out-processing or off-boarding personnel from the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) and signing members out from a virtual off-boarding system fell on

the Wing IPO due to the culture of not trusting unit level security managers to properly handle this responsibility. This function is not required by guidance to be accomplished by the Wing IPO and furthermore is verified through annual program reviews that are required to be performed by the Wing IPO. This process was redundant and eliminated from the Wing IPO. Recouped time to the Wing IPO is 4 hours and 40 minutes.

Lastly, some processes will realign themselves through the implementation of eQip access to unit security managers. Weekly reports, clearance reviews, downloading clearance files and creating investigation requests in eQip will all be aligned with the unit level security managers as they have access to these functions through their access to eQip. Looking at the table below gives a better understanding of the future roles of the Wing IPO in respect to the PERSEC position.

Future Responsibilities		
*Fingerprinting personnel for clearances	*DoD CAF Statement of Reasons	
*Retrieving fingerprint results	*DoD CAF Request for Information	
*Clearance Quality Check before submission to OPM	*Derogatory Case Initiation/Tracking/Submission	
*Call OPM for case status	*Commander Initiated Security Information Files	
*Request Case Status from DoD CAF		
*Naturalization Upgrades		
*Deployment Re-opens		
*Quarterly Security Manager Initial Training		
*Program Inspections		


While these reduced responsibilities will give the Wing IPO greater flexibility and increased time to take care of more critical functions, it is also important to increase the training to the unit level security managers to ensure they fully understand their new roles. This was also

a concern from the survey participants as most of them responded with “strongly agrees” in relation to the Wing IPO providing increased security manager training.


Recouped Time at the Wing IPO:

Through process improvement and moving functions from the Wing IPO to the unit level, there is an opportunity to capture the recouped time in order to allow the Wing IPO to carry out required responsibilities. Additionally, this recouped time can aid in providing unit level training, continued process improvement and ultimately enhanced program management. A Value Stream Map (VSM) was used to analyze the security clearance initiation process.

The VSM was created from the perspective of units not having eQip access. Looking at the VSM below, the non-value added (NVA) time accounted for 472.20 hours in the initiation process. While these functions may be required to get from point A to B, they hold no value to the initiation of the investigation. Total value-added time to the process was 4.20 hours giving a total lead time of 476.40 hours, based on a Monday through Friday schedule with eight hours in the workday.



Moving to the future state, processes are realigned as discussed earlier in this research. Specifically, units have access to eQip and are responsible for initiating their own clearance paperwork and reviewing case files prior to submission to the Wing IPO. By realigning the processes, the total NVA time is reduced to 200 hours and total value-added time is 3.43 hours resulting in a total lead time of 203.43 hours.



This realignment has reduced the process of security clearance initiations sent to the Office of Personnel Management by 57.3%. This effort results in 34 days being recouped in the investigative process (specifically for unit level security managers waiting for the initiation of the case) and 27 minutes returned to the Wing IPO. The Wing IPO on average processes 175 investigative requests per month, equating to 78.75 hours per month recouped.

Significant Findings:

Overall, many aspects of the current processes impeded to the Wing IPO were looked at through direct observation, data analytics, surveys and interviews. There are many moving pieces to the security clearance process and the findings suggest there is significant room for the

streamlining of processes, recoupment of time to the IPO and the increase of training opportunities for unit level security managers in addition to the reduction of errors and terminations of security clearance initiations.

Below illustrates additional process and the time associated with task accomplishment.

These times are based off direct observation and not in sync with the recommended U.S Air Force manpower study used to show times of task accomplishment. While this research does not address the varying differences in time between task accomplishment between the US Air Force manpower study and the 60th AMW/IPO, it is an area worth exploring for further research.

RESPONSIBILITIES	Frequency	Completion Time (minutes)	QTY MONTHLY	QTY Quarterly	QTY weekly	Time Monthly	Time Quarterly	Total Time Weekly	Function to be shifted	Recovered Time Monthly	New Time Weekly
Fingerprinting	Daily	5			15			75	Partial	180	25
Fingerprint results	Weekly	2			30			60	Partial	208	20
2583 JPAS Check	Weekly	5			43.75			218.75	YES	875	0
2583 Police Records Check	Weekly	5			43.75			218.75	YES	875	0
Create Shell in eQip	Weekly	5			43.75			218.75	YES	875	0
Clearance Reviews	Weekly	5			43.75			218.75	YES	875	0
Clearance Quality Check before submission to OPM	Weekly	10			43.75			437.5	NO		100
Download Clearance Files	Weekly	3			43.75			131.25	Proposed elimination	525	0
Call OPM for case status	Daily	5			6			30	NO		30
Request Case Status from DoD CAF	Daily	5			12			60	NO		60
Outprocessing mbrs	Daily	2			30			60	Proposed elimination	240	0
Weely Status Reports	Weekly	45			1			45	Proposed elimination	45	0
Naturalization Upgrades	Weekly	15			2			30	NO		30
Deployment Re-opens	Weekly	10			2			20	NO		20
Qrtly Training	Quarterly	480		1			480	120	NO		120
Program Inspections	Monthly	120	2			240		60	NO		60
Self Inspection	Quarterly	60		4			240	60	NO		60
SIF Initiation	Weekly	25			1			25	NO		25
SOR	Quarterly	10	2					20	NO		20
RFI	Weekly	10			4			40	NO		40
Meetings	Monthly	60	2					120	NO		120
Possible SIFS	Daily	4			5			20	Proposed elimination	80	0
								2288.75	Time in minutes	4778	730
								38.145833	Time in hours	79.63	12.17

As it can be seen from the above chart, the Wing IPO can recoup 80 hours and 13 minutes by eliminating processes, shifting processes to unit level security managers and reassigning functions back to the agencies responsible for action. Quantity of tasks or items worked will vary month to month and can increase or decrease the recouped time.

Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations

This chapter provides the conclusions and recommendations derived from this research study. While the research was limited in time and to some degree in scope, many valuable conclusions and recommendations can be gleaned from this research. Over the past sixteen weeks, the majority of processes at the Wing IPO and specifically within the PERSEC program were explored, challenged and dissected. It is the researcher's attempt to give a true understanding of what is value-added and what is not so the Wing IPO can evaluate, implement and enhance operations in order to effectively support the processing of national security investigations. This was done by consulting guidance, job design, surveys, data analytics and subject interviews.

Conclusions:

Conclusion 1:

The Wing IPO PERSEC program is currently performing functions outside their guidance and position description. Due to these additional functions the Wing IPO PERSEC program does not have the time it needs to effectively perform core responsibilities as illustrated in DoD Manual 5200.02, US Air Force Instruction 31-501 and in accordance with the GS-0080-11 Air Force Core Personnel Document (CPD). As such these added functions take away from the processing of national security investigations more expeditiously. Any delay in security clearance processing decreases the mission capability of Travis Air Force Base.

Conclusion 2:

Many functions within the Wing IPO and as identified in this research, can be delegated to lower level unit security managers. Greater program management from the wing level can be realized with proper realignment of responsibilities. The research shows the PERSEC Specialist

spends a majority of their duty day performing non-essential administrative functions. This prevents the ability to provide proper program management as identified in supporting guidance. The Wing PERSEC program has limited time to effectively adjust processes to ensure they remain current, relevant and provide value to not only the Wing IPO, but the units they are charged to support.

Conclusion 3:

Throughout this research it was observed there are many ways to extrapolate data to gauge, access and evaluated current functions in relation to the submission of security clearances. However; there is no current process inside the Wing IPO to use this data to measure continued process improvement or to assess the strength and weaknesses of current processes. This data is invaluable in order to gauge the effectiveness of current required processes.

Conclusion 4:

Many processes were added to the Wing IPO although no guidance supported these processes. There is no process in place to ensure added processes are vetted to ensure they are required to be performed by the Wing IPO, supported by guidance or value-added.

Recommendations:

Based off the data collected in this study and provided in Chapter 4, the following recommendations are suggested for the 60th AMW/IP Office PERSEC program on Travis AFB, CA. It is believed by implementing these recommendations, the PERSEC Security Specialist can focus duties on program management and reduce security clearance errors and terminations. Additionally, unit level security managers will gain greater experience through increased training and enhanced oversight from the Wing level. This increased training and oversight is likely to

increase expertise amongst unit level security managers, increase motivation as supported by supporting literature and foster greater program implementation at the unit level.

Recommendation 1:

By May 1, 2018, the Wing PERSEC Security Specialist should develop a monthly training schedule for unit level security managers with an emphasis on the functions that were realigned and core responsibilities they are required to perform. This monthly schedule should be approved by the Chief, Wing Information Protection semi-annually to ensure de-confliction with training provided by the Wing INFOSEC and INDSEC Program Managers. The goal of this review is to combine training where appropriate and to reduce duplication of effort.

Narrative:

With the added responsibilities, it is critical to ensure unit level security managers have the tools to effectively carry out their new responsibilities. Through training, unit level security managers will have more knowledge to complete assigned tasks. It is supported through literature reviews and end-user surveys that security managers will be motivated and empowered to fine-tune their processes to further reduce terminations and rejections of initiated clearances. Survey data supports a sense of excitement and extreme buy-in in the ability to have greater control of the security clearance process.

Of note, the Wing IPO PERSEC program manager has developed a draft training schedule to enhance security manager knowledge, increase communication and to ensure security managers have the resources of the Wing IPO for successful program implementation. Recouped time through process realignment will aid immensely in ensuring continued training where it is needed.

Recommendation 2:

By August 30th, 2018, the 60th Wing IPO, Chief of Information Protection should require the incorporation of data metrics into all Wing IPO PERSEC processes to measure and gauge the successful implementation of improvement efforts. Specific data to be captured should include the termination, initiation, and rejection rates of clearance processing. The derived metrics should be captured quarterly to show program successes or failures so appropriate resources are allocated to ensure continued program success. Any decline of program statistics should result in the Wing IPO working with unit level security managers and unit level leadership to develop a course of action to identify and fix problem areas to increase desired results.

Narrative:

Consistent measuring of implemented processes by the Wing IPO will help solidify whether or not processes are still working and effective. It is important for the Wing IPO to not lose focus of the reasons for implementation and continue to ensure all stakeholders are aware of metrics effecting processes to ensure all involved have the buy-in to address issues. Stakeholder involvement and buy-in is crucial for continued program success as shown through supported literature.

Recommendation 3:

By September 1, 2018, the Chief, Information Protection within the 60th Wing Information Protection Office, should authorize the creation of eQip user level accounts within Travis AFB, CA and assign to all unit level security managers.

Narrative:

Based on the data extracted from the eQip system, surveys from unit level security managers and value stream mapping, it is supported that unit security managers and the Wing

IPO benefited from reduced security clearance terminations and a lower rejection rate. These reduced rates reduced the amount of time it takes to submit investigations to the Office of Personnel Management. With the Wing IPO only having one PERSEC Security Specialist it is implausible to expect one individual to handle the caseload for all Travis AFB personnel and tenant units assigned without adjusting the administrative burden placed upon the Wing IPO. The use of security managers or security assistants is supported throughout all guidance researched.

Recommendation 4:

It is recommended that the 60th AMW, Vice Wing Commander or Director of Staff approve any new processes not supported by guidance or contained in the current GS-0080-11 CPD from being added to the Wing IPO. No process should be adopted unless it is evaluated against current guidance, reviewed by the installation Civilian Personnel Office (CPO), the Chief of Information Protection and the Wing PERSEC Program Manager to see if it is required, is value-added, and is listed in the position description of the employees required to perform it. Once it is determined a process is to be adopted. The formal process of including it into the GS-0080-11 CPD should be made to ensure all documentation is currently reflecting the work requirements of the Wing IPO PERSEC Specialist and in accordance with Air Force Instruction 16-140, *Position Classification*.

Narrative:

The culture of the Wing IPO created the current state it is in of not having enough time to complete all required tasks. Processes that were not required, not listed in position descriptions and provided no value to the responsibilities of the Wing IPO were allowed to remain within

Wing IPO. Current guidance, GS-0080-11 CPD and support agreements outline the responsibilities of the Wing PERSEC Specialist.

Through direct observation many processes recommended for elimination or shifting to other agencies had no procedural basis to be within the Wing IPO. While there may have been compelling reasons to ensure mission accomplishment, they were not founded in baseline guidance designed for the position description within the Wing IPO.

Areas for Further Study

While there are many moving pieces within the Wing IPO office located on Travis AFB, there were some items that are worth exploring further. These areas are outside the purview of this research and are suggestive. By exploring these recommendations, it is believed the Wing IPO will further benefit and to some level may save the U.S. Air Force a substantial amount of time and resources.

It is recommended that the below areas are considered for further research:

Recommendation for Further Study 1:

The U.S. Air Force has distributed a manpower study detailing the processes within the IPO across the Air Force. This study has questionable data concerning the timeline it takes to complete processes. While the processes in the 60th AMW IPO were observed and assessed, the U.S Air Force Manpower Study does not show how data was measured. While this measurement may be contained in other documents not privy to the researcher, it is worth exploring as their suggested times for processes seem inflated and impractical when compared to the same processes being performed at the Wing IPO.

A comparison of the U.S Air Force Manpower study should be measured against actual “takt time” or the “rate at which a finished product needs to be completed” across the U.S. Air Force and not rely on IPOs across the Air Force to provide this data without strict validation (iSixSigma, n.d.). When the possibility exists, that IPOs can increase their manning, an inflation of time to complete processes cannot be ruled out.

The 60th Wing IPO is poised to receive three additional personnel due to this US Air Force level manpower study, yet the purpose of the positions are not disclosed or defined. If the purpose is to perform the inherent function of the Wing IPO then process improvement and re-

delegation of processes as shown in this research can save the U.S Air Force substantially in adding positions and use tax payer dollars more effectively.

Recommendation for Further Study 2:

The Wing IPO has multiple disciplines assigned. While the research has shown the PERSEC program can save a substantial amount of time and increased process improvement, there are two other disciplines (INFOSEC and INDSEC) that will also benefit from further research. It can be assumed the same culture and reasons for the PERSEC program taking on added responsibilities has also permeated into the two other disciplines as well.

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Appendix A

U.S. Air Force approved position description for the GS 0080 Job Series, Security Specialist.

The position description is the standard for the Personnel Security Specialist.

AIR FORCE CORE PERSONNEL DOCUMENT (CPD)

ORGANIZATION:	60 AMW/IP	CPD NUMBER:	
SUPV LEVEL CODE:	8	COMP LEVEL CODE:	033A
TARGET GRADE:	11	FLSA:	Exempt
DRUG TEST:	Yes	CAREER FIELD ID:	8
SENSITIVITY:	Critical Sensitive	CENTRALLY MANAGED TYPE:	N/A
EMERGENCY ESS:	No	BUS:	8888
KEY POSITION:	No	POSITION HIST:	

CLASSIFICATION: Personnel Security Specialist, GS-0080-11
DUTY TITLE: Personnel Security Program Manager

ORG & FUNC CODE: SSV Security

PPP OPTION CODE: INA - Industrial
INS - Information System
PEB - Personnel

CLASSIFICATION CERTIFICATION: CPD adequately and accurately reflects the local work situation to meet classification, staffing, and performance management purposes.

CLASSIFIER'S SIGNATURE

DATE

SUPERVISOR'S CERTIFICATION: I certify that this CPD is an accurate statement of the major duties, knowledges, skills, and abilities, responsibilities, physical and performance requirements of this position and its organizational relationships. The position is necessary to carry out government functions for which I am responsible. This certification is made with the knowledge that this information is to be used for statutory purposes relating to appointment and payment of public funds and that false or misleading statements may constitute violations of such statutes or their implementing regulations.

SUPERVISOR'S SIGNATURE

DATE

PERFORMANCE PLAN CERTIFICATION:

Rater/Supv.				
Date				
Reviewer				
Date				
Employee*				
Date				

*Signature acknowledges receipt. It does not indicate agreement/disagreement.

CORE PERSONNEL DOCUMENT

Number: 5XR18597

PURPOSE OF POSITION AND ORGANIZATIONAL LOCATION:

The primary purpose of this position is: To develop, implement, and administer the Personnel Security Program for the installation. Includes measures to protect the installation from espionage, terrorism, and threats of unauthorized disclosure and/or compromise of information considered vital to mission interests, national defense or national security. The employee is under the Chief of Information Protection and ensures all personnel security and standards are met for every member of the installation. The employee provides security expertise in a wide variety of security management functions required by Presidential Executive Order, DoD and Air Force Security Program regulations. Performs duties as the Wing authority for Personnel Security and ensures all other Wing security specialists are adequately prepared and informed so as to best support their assigned areas of responsibilities at bases, and other locations. The incumbent is directly responsible for the development of the Personnel Security Program throughout the installation and all agencies supported by the Wing. Position has significant and constructive contact with other Wings, MAJCOM, other agencies and industry. The incumbent develops and trains subordinate personnel; implements quality control; monitors and collects metrics on program operation, resolves issues, provides innovative solutions and improvements. Incumbent serves as the recommending authority to either the Wing CC/CV on all requests across the entire installation on the Personnel Security Program.

The organizational location of this position is: 60th Air Mobility Wing, Information Protection Office, Travis AFB CA.

ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS OR OBJECTIVES:

The organizational goals or objectives of this position are: To serve as the installation personnel security specialist; have working knowledge of physical, information and industrial security functions.

DUTY 1:

40% Critical

The technical authority for the Wing Personnel Security Program. Enforces all operational, functional, and mission assurance aspects of the program to include the establishment and maintenance of Security Information Files (SIFs). Formulates program goals, plans, policy implementation guidelines, procedures and work plans dealing with the development and operation of Wing-wide Personnel Security programs and activities; provides technical and administrative direction to Wing Personnel Security monitors. Develops and advises senior leadership on the establishment and related actions for SIFs. The incumbent is responsible for interpreting AF, DoD, and national regulations and laws for Personnel Security processes as they apply and are implemented within the Wing. The incumbent demonstrates a complete mastery of the personnel security field that is necessary to provide effective guidance, training, and direction to subordinate Squadron level organizations/activities/units. Develops operational standards and provides oversight for Wing requests for security investigations and clearances. Ensures complete documentation requirements are met prior to submitting to the Defense Security Service (DSS), Office of Personnel Management (OPM) or the Department of Defense Adjudications Facility (DODCAF). The incumbent establishes and maintains liaisons with senior personnel at Wing, MAJCOM, and Headquarters Air Force (HAF) in the development and implementation of DoD and Air Force policy. The incumbent is required to maintain continuous contact with personnel at the MAJCOM and other Wings as a normal aspect of program management. The incumbent uses program metric data to monitor system health and develops long range goals to meet AF and federal statutory requirements; prepares personnel security review reports and briefs the Wing Commander and Vice Commander (CC/CV) and provides recommendations and advice. Reviews and optimizes the Personnel Security pre-investigative structure to maximize resources for efficient operations. As the Wing expert in Personnel Security requirements, the incumbent is able to periodically review and improve Wing security operations using continuous improvement process techniques; assures that procedures and policies relative to evaluation, maintenance, and review of Personnel Security Investigations (PSIs) for all National Security positions are established and properly administered for the entire installation. Oversees responsibility for Personnel Security clearances for the installation and serves as the principle point of contact with the Department of Defense Adjudications Facility (DODCAF) in resolving sensitive security clearance issues as appropriate. Evaluates derogatory information and provides guidance to senior managers on the establishment of Security Information Files (SIFs) and/or the suspension, revocation, or denial of an individual's security clearance. Evaluates compliance of activities with security requirements, identifies deficiencies, and ensures plausible corrective action is identified and tracked for each deficiency found. Reviews, analyzes, and briefs on the results of preliminary inquiries and formal investigations

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resulting from security violations/incidents. Conducts or assists in the conduct of IG inspections and staff assistance to the field. Monitors the control and safeguarding of Security Information Files (SIF). Authorizes appropriate course of action to take upon receipt of derogatory information with commanders and higher authority. Analyzes personnel security problems, mission vulnerabilities, security impacts to mission assurance, and convergence difficulties involving multiple security disciplines and other functional areas; and provides cost effective, efficient, and productive solutions to ensure mission success. Analyzes weaknesses identified during wing inspections and higher headquarters inspections of systemic security problems in order to modify and apply recommended solutions.

STANDARDS:

- A. Generally develops comprehensive and clear operational and ensures complete documentation requirements are met prior to submitting packages to the Defense Security Service (DSS) or Office of Personnel Management (OPM).
- B. Ensures SIFs are 95 percent accurate upon submission to the appropriate agency.
- C. Ensures Personnel Security policies are well defined and normally adhered to by all Wing organizations.

KSAs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

DUTY 2:

20% Critical

Serves as the advisor to the Chief of Information Protection and Wing commanders (CC/CV) on the full spectrum of personnel security matters across the installation and all subordinate organizations. Provides direct support, senior level security expertise, guidance, training, and direction to a civilian and military work force, to include subordinate organizations, and serves as their representative for all related Personnel Security issues. Ensures proper implementation of the official requestor program; modifies it to meet individual organizational needs and ensures proper training is administered to official requestors and assistants. Develops and provides technical advice, training, and assistance to commanders, directorates, and security managers regarding all aspects of Personnel Security and the convergent effect on information security and industrial security. Briefs leaders/program managers as necessary to ensure Personnel Security program management effectiveness. Provides advice, assistance, and training on Personnel Security matters to all security specialists supporting other programs and organizations throughout the Wing. Formulates and manages supplemental security training courses, meetings, and aids to assure maximum effectiveness of the programs. Presents security material and distributes pertinent security information as required to ensure mission assurance.

STANDARDS:

- A. Technical advice and training is almost always accurate.
- B. Interfaces well with technical and program management personnel at Wing, MAJCOM, and AF levels.
- C. Generally provides clear and comprehensive guidance, education, and training required for subordinate organizational mission success.

KSAs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

DUTY 3:

30% Critical

Implements and administers the installation Personnel Security investigations/adjudication systems for case management. Establishes installation procedures for processing requests for National Security investigations. Is the approval authority for all Personnel Security Investigations and Adjudication System accounts for the installation. Oversees processes for submitting official requests for personnel security investigations and ensures they are consistent with National, DoD, and AF directives. Directs and ensures that requests for security clearances are properly screened and verified, and that all necessary forms and documentation have been completed before processing for clearances. Analyzes request processes for determination of validity for access indicated. Directly

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responsible to ensure that subordinate organizations across the installation evaluate the sensitivity of positions, determine the degree of clearance required, and special access requirements to perform duties to determine type of investigation required which include employment suitability. Directs and oversees the maintenance of security files and records pertinent to clearances for the installation. The incumbent establishes Wing priority processing of requests for investigations and correspondence pertaining to clearance records; ensures subordinate unit review of security clearance requests and similar related material for information that adversely reflects on the individual's loyalty or character, such as sabotage, espionage, sedition, or subversive tendencies; criminal, infamous, notorious, or disgraceful conduct; drunkenness; drug addiction; or sex perversion; and ensures an effective reporting system established for results revealing a misrepresentation and follows-up to ensure correspondence to appropriate authorities summarizing any falsified or derogatory information is accomplished. Conducts necessary program assistance visits for areas assigned in order to support operational needs throughout the installation. The incumbent provides guidance to commanders and organization security specialists across the installation in determining if Security Information File (SIF) should be established. Ensures all necessary information for suitability or clearance eligibility is established, maintained, recorded and documented accordingly.

STANDARDS:

- A. Ensures the installation has an effective security clearance program in effect.
- B. Ensures official requesting offices and security specialists are trained on their specific tasks IAW National, DoD and AF directives.
- C. Makes recommendations to senior leadership that are almost always accepted.

KSAs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

DUTY 4:

10 % Critical

Incumbent is responsible for providing Subject Matter Expertise to the Information and Industrial Security Program Managers, as well as the Chief, Information Protection to ensure the three core information protection security disciplines of information, personnel, and industrial security are fully converged from a policy and programmatic viewpoint to ensure overall information protection requirements meet mission requirements. Ensures all Wing security specialists are adequately informed, trained, and supplied with necessary support for personnel efforts for issues within their respective areas of responsibilities. Likewise, works directly with the other Lead Security Specialists to ensure incumbents are sufficiently versed in all facets of the Personnel Security Programs in order to best support assigned areas of responsibility. Collaborates with and navigates through Information and Industrial Security disciplines and associated issues to provide the Chief, Information Protection recommendations relating to risk identification, avoidance and mitigation.

STANDARDS:

- A. Provides critical support to Information and Industrial Security Program Managers and ensures all three programs work efficiently together and present unified mission capabilities.
- B. Methods established to review actions are always effective and ensure legal and regulatory compliance issues and/or customer concerns are promptly identified and addressed.
- C. Technical recommendations are almost always accepted by peers and supervisors.

KSAs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

RECRUITMENT KNOWLEDGES, SKILLS, AND ABILITIES (KSA):

- 1. Knowledge of Suitability and Personnel security concepts, principles, and practices to review, analyze, and resolve issues.

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2. Knowledge of required security training concepts, programs, and procedures to develop security education programs, provide training, and assist in operating security programs.
3. Skill in planning, developing, implementing, and evaluating security programs to meet mission requirements and improve the security program.
4. Ability to establish effective professional working relationships with coworkers and customers, contributing to a cooperative working environment and successful accomplishment of the mission.
5. Ability to plan, organize work, and meet deadlines.

CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA:**Factor 1, Knowledge Required by the Position**

Level 1-7

1250 Points

-- Knowledge of a wide range of personnel security concepts, principles, and practices to review, independently analyze, and resolve difficult and complex security problems; apply policy direction to contractors and government/military officials, and develop guidance for applying security policy, procedures, techniques, equipment, and methods to a variety of work situations and various levels or degrees of security controls.

-- Knowledge of a broad range of security program relationships, and expertise in information, personnel, and industrial security to effectively implement and administer applicable security programs and/or coordinate with other specialized security programs.

-- Knowledge of security classification methods, concepts, and eligibility for access to classified or sensitive information to review plans for proposed or new projects, organizations, and/or missions to assure the presence of adequate planning for information security and other controls.

-- Ability to plan and carry out reviews of unit and/or contractor security programs, analyze and evaluate reports and conditions to recommend remedial actions.

Factor 2, Supervisory Controls

Level 2-4

450 Points

Supervisor sets the overall objectives and decides on the resources available. The employee and supervisor in consultation determine the approach to program implementation and management. The incumbent plans and carries out the assigned security program(s), resolves most of the conflicts that arise, integrates and coordinates the work of others as necessary, and interprets policy in terms of established objectives. The employee keeps the supervisor informed about program progress, potentially controversial matters, or developing security conditions or requirements with far-reaching implications. Completed work is reviewed from an overall standpoint in terms of feasibility, compatibility with other security program requirements, or effectiveness in meeting objectives and achieving expected results.

Factor 3, Guidelines

Level 3-3

275 Points

Guidelines include DOD, Air Force, MAJCOM, and local regulations, manuals, and operating instructions. The guides are not always applicable to specific conditions or there are gaps in specificity in application to specific security system requirements. The employee must interpret and apply a number of subject-matter policies and regulations such as those that apply to access to and protection of classified information. The employees must use judgment in interpreting, adapting, and applying guidelines, such as instructions for security clearance levels required; document control systems and storage facilities where there is some overlap or conflict in the levels of persons with access to a facility; and other conditions requiring the employee to analyze and develop security plans within the intent of available guidelines. The employee analyzes the applicability of guidelines to specific circumstances and proposes regulatory or procedural changes to improve the effectiveness or efficiency of security controls within the intent of directions concerning the level of security required.

Factor 4, Complexity

Level 4-4

275 Points

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Assignments consist of a variety of security duties involving many different and unrelated processes and methods relating to well-established areas of personnel security planning and administration; require analysis and testing of a variety of established techniques and methods to evaluate alternatives and arrive at decisions, conclusions, or recommendations. Organizations serviced generate a variety of security problems that require analysis of the kind and level of security, complexity, and local conditions or circumstances that require adjustment or modification in established procedures. In deciding what is to be done, the employee typically assesses situations complicated by conflicting or insufficient data or evidence that must be analyzed to determine the applicability of established methods, the need to digress from normal methods and techniques, the need to waive security and investigative standards, or whether specific kinds of waivers can be justified. The employee is responsible for planning the work, developing recommendations, refining the methods and techniques to be used in the assignment.

Factor 5, Scope and Effect

Level 5-3

150 Points

The work involves resolving a variety of conventional security problems, questions, and situations such as investigating security breaches and recommending solutions to preclude a recurrence, recommending security systems for new facilities protecting information, and advising managers, operating officials, and/or contractors of established security criteria, methods, techniques, and procedures. The work affects the effectiveness of security programs on the installation. The effect of the work is primarily local in nature, although some programs may be part of a multi-facility or program operations with interlocking security requirements.

Factor 6, Personal Contacts

Level 6-2

25 Points

Contacts are with persons from across the Wing and IP staff at the MAJCOM, industry representatives and other Defense Agencies. Contacts include other security specialists, program analysts, and managers at all levels within the Wing. Incumbent normally confers with managers in order to present optional security plans for alternative levels of protection, making recommendations on process, facility, or personnel changes in order to minimize risk. Incumbent briefs officials up to the Wing Commander level on issues relating to specialty area.

Factor 7, Purpose of Contacts

Level 7-2

50 Points

Contacts are made for the purpose of resolving Wing security issues and problems or for carrying out security plans and reviews to achieve Wing, MAJCOM, and AF security and program objectives. Typically, the employee has extensive contacts with personnel and commanders at all levels on Wing staff support offices for the purpose of consolidating requests of Wing organizations into single or coordinated Wing security plans and similar purposes which involve explaining and coordinating security program efforts. Such contacts may also include those with managers and employees in contractor facilities to plan and coordinate inspections, provide advice, and resolve security issues.

Factor 8, Physical Demands

Level 8-1

5 Points

The work is sedentary and is usually accomplished while the employee is comfortably seated at a desk or table. Some walking and standing may occur in the course of a normal workday in connection with travel to and attendance at meetings and conference away from the work site. Items carried typically are light objects such as briefcases, notebooks, and data processing reports. Lifting of moderately heavy objects is not normally required. No special physical effort or ability is required to perform the work.

Factor 9, Work Environment

Level 9-1

5 Points

The work is primarily performed in an office-like setting involving everyday risks or discomforts which require normal safety precautions typical of such places as offices, meeting and training rooms, libraries, and private or commercial vehicles, using of work practices with office equipment, avoiding trips or falls, observing fire regulations and traffic signals, etc. The work area is adequately lighted, heated and ventilated.

Other significant facts pertaining to this position are:

DATE:

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1. Work may occasionally require travel away from the normal duty station on military or commercial aircraft.
2. This is a drug testing designated position. The incumbent is subject to random testing for drug use.
3. The employee will be required to obtain and maintain a TS-SCI security clearance.
4. The agency career program covers this position.
5. The employee may be required to work overtime.
6. Department of Defense Security Fundamentals Professional Certification and Security Asset Protection Professional Certification conferrals are required within 2 years of the established employee EOD or initial assignment date to this position in accordance with DOD 3305.13-M, DoD Security Accreditation and Certification. The listed certification requirements may not be deleted or modified without the written approval of the AF Security Functional Authority (SAF/AA) or their delegated security career field representative. This certification requirement only applies to employees assigned to an indexed CPD or SCPD position on or after 14 March 2016. Incumbent employees assigned on or before 13 March 2016 are not required to obtain the DoD certification(s) listed above.

CLASSIFICATION SUMMARY:

CLASSIFICATION STANDARD(S) USED: US OPM Position Classification Standard for the Security Administration Series, GS-0080, TS-82, Dec 1987, (HRCD-7, July 1999).

Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) Determination: Exempt – 5 CFR 551.206(b)
Bargaining Unit Status (BUS) Determination: 8888 – USC 7112(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION REMARKS:

Series and Title Determination: The primary purpose of the position is to develop, implement, and administer the Personnel Security Program for an Air Force Wing. The employee is under the Chief of Information Protection and ensures all personnel security and suitability standards are met for every member of the Wing. The employee provides security expertise in a wide variety of security management functions required by Presidential Executive Order, DoD and Air Force Security Program regulations. The incumbent plans, develops and manages all aspects of the personnel security programs, specifically to provide analysis, evaluations, recommendations to the leadership and to security managers in the areas of personnel and other assigned security duties. This type of work falls within the type of work covered by the position classification standard for the Security Administration, GS-0800 Series, which includes positions of which the primary duties are analytical, planning, advisory, operational, or evaluative work that has as its principal purpose the development and implementation of policies, procedures, standards, training, and methods for identifying and protecting information, personnel, property, facilities, operations, or material from unauthorized disclosure, misuse, theft, assault, vandalism, espionage, sabotage, or loss.

Personnel Security Specialist is the prescribed title for positions primarily concerned with performing personnel security work as described above. Such work may be performed in Government, contractor, or other facilities.

Grade Determination: The GS-0800 standard is in the Factor Evaluation System (FES) format. This system requires that credit levels assigned under each factor relate to only one set of duties and responsibilities. Under FES, work must be fully equivalent to the factor-level described in the standard to warrant credit at that level's point value. If work is not fully equivalent to the overall intent of a particular level described in the standard, a lower level and point value must be assigned, unless the deficiency is balanced by an equally important aspect of the work that meets a higher level.

Factor Levels and Points: 1-7/1250; 2-4/450; 3-3/275; 4-4/225; 5-3/150; 6-2/25; 7-2/50; 8-1/5; 9-1/5

GS-11 Point Range: 2355-2750
Total Points: 2435
Grade: GS-11

DATE:

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Final Classification: Personnel Security Specialist, GS-0080-11

AFPC Free Flow Format

DATE:

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Investigate : Position Designation of National Security and Public Trust Positions (Summ... Page 1 of 1

U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

INVESTIGATE POSITION DESIGNATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC TRUST POSITIONS
(SUMMARY)

Position Designation Record

Agency	Department of the Air Force
Position Title	Personnel Security Specialist
Series and Grade/Pay	GS-0080-11
Band	
Position Description Number	5XR18597

Nature of the Position

Critical-Sensitive- Positions with the potential to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security, including:

- Access to Top Secret or "Q" classified information

National Security

Investigation	Form Required
SSBI	SF 86

Signature: _____

Date: 10/15/2015


Chief of
Information Protection, Air
Name: Mobility Wing

Appendix B

Travis Air Force Base, California Wing Structure


60TH AIR MOBILITY WING, TRAVIS AFB, CA

Eric Alber | December 12, 2017




Appendix C

Wing Staff Structure



Appendix D

Wing Information Protection Office Disciplines/Positions



Appendix E

Eric Alber
Golden Gate University
EMPA396
Survey

Greetings! My name is Eric Alber and I am completing my Master's Degree in Public Administration at Golden Gate University. I am requesting your participation in a brief survey to obtain your personal perspective and insight on the Personnel Security (PERSEC) program at Travis AFB, CA, and ultimately, help examine or evaluate whether shifting responsibilities, eliminating redundant processes and removing non-value-added processes would benefit the Wing Information Protection Office and Squadron Security Managers. Expected completion time of the survey is about 5 minutes. Your name is not required for the survey and your answers will be kept confidential and anonymous. I plan to close the survey on Wednesday, January 31, 2018. Please use your experience working with the Wing Information Protection Office as well as a Squadron Security Manager to provide honest and candid responses. Your participation will shape the future of the PERSEC program here at Travis AFB. Thank you!

Questions:

1. You would benefit from having access to the program used to initiate security investigations (eQip).
 - a. Strongly Agree
 - b. Agree
 - c. Neither Agree or Disagree
 - d. Disagree
 - e. Strongly Disagree
2. You would benefit from increased security manager specific training from the Wing Information Protection Office.
 - a. Strongly Agree
 - b. Agree

- c. Neither Agree or Disagree
 - d. Disagree
 - e. Strongly Disagree
3. You would benefit from direct access to members submitted clearance status.
- a. Strongly Agree
 - b. Agree
 - c. Neither Agree or Disagree
 - d. Disagree
 - e. Strongly Disagree
4. You would benefit from greater autonomy to control security clearance actions at the unit level.
- a. Strongly Agree
 - b. Agree
 - c. Neither Agree or Disagree
 - d. Disagree
 - e. Strongly Disagree
5. Your Squadron Commander is directly responsible for the successful implementation of the Personnel Security Program for your unit.
- a. Strongly Agree
 - b. Agree
 - c. Neither Agree or Disagree
 - d. Disagree
 - e. Strongly Disagree
6. Increased specific security manager training and greater autonomy over security clearance actions will reduce security terminations.
- a. Strongly Agree
 - b. Agree
 - c. Neither Agree or Disagree
 - d. Disagree
 - e. Strongly Disagree
7. Increased specific security manager training and greater autonomy over security clearance actions will increase mission readiness.
- a. Strongly Agree
 - b. Agree
 - c. Neither Agree or Disagree
 - d. Disagree

e. Strongly Disagree

Step 1. Assign point values to each response.

5- Strongly Agree

4- Agree

3- Neither Agree or Disagree

2- Disagree

1- Strongly Disagree

Step 2. Total responses to items 1-4 to assess Security Managers perceived buy-in to new initiatives. Values can range from 5 (least buy-in) to 25 (greatest buy-in).

Step 3. Data will fall into three groups

Range 5-10 Least Buy-in

Range 11-15 Adequate buy-in

Range 16-25 Most buy-in

Appendix F

Eric Alber
EMPA 396
Golden Gate University
Interview Questions

Greetings! My name is Eric Alber and I am completing my Master's Degree in Public Administration at Golden Gate University. I am requesting your participation in a brief interview to obtain your personal perspective and insight on the Personnel Security (PERSEC) program at Travis AFB, CA, and ultimately, whether shifting responsibilities, eliminating redundant processes and removing non value-added processes would benefit the Wing Information Protection Office and your organization. Your name is not required for the interview and your answers will be kept confidential and anonymous unless you chose to provide your information.

I plan to close the interview on Wednesday, February 7, 2018. Please use your experience working with the Wing Information Protection Office as well as your interaction with your organization's security manager to provide honest and candid responses. Your participation will shape the future of the PERSEC program here at Travis AFB. Thank you!

1. If you could change the Personnel Security (PERSEC) program at Travis AFB what would you change?
2. (If applicable) Why do you feel changing the item you suggested in question 1 is important?

3. If the Wing Information Protection office could reduce the amount of time it takes to submit security investigations and PERSEC actions while increasing your autonomy to initiate security investigations, would you be supportive?
4. Would you support additional training for your security manager(s) in order to enhance your PERSEC program?
5. In a given month, how often do you and your security manager(s) communicate about issues affecting your member's security clearance? (Daily, Weekly, monthly).
6. What security issues are most commonly discussed?
7. As a leader in your organization do you feel comfortable your security manager and you have the needed knowledge and tools to successfully implement the PERSEC program for your organization?
8. Is there any further information you would like to add concerning the Personnel Security program?
9. Please rate your knowledge of the Personnel Security Program (New, Intermediate, Jedi)
10. Would you like to remain anonymous? If not please provide the following:
 - a. Name :
 - b. Organization:
 - c. How long have you been at Travis AFB?

Appendix G

eQip Data Reports (Example)

Reports

Providing a summary or more detail information about agencies, users and investigation requests.

Overview

Run a Report

Help

Generated Reports

Select a report from the listing, then select an action below.

Report Info	Next Run / Frequency	Completed On
<input type="checkbox"/> Requests By Case Status Criteria: Case Status: Reviewed Pending Agency Approval (PAPV); Filter Groups: - All Groups -; Report Dates: Within the Last 30 Days; Output Format: CSV;	Dec 18, 2017 6:00:00 AM Weekly	Dec 11, 2017 6:01:05 AM
<input type="checkbox"/> Requests By Case Status Criteria: Case Status: Initiated Untouched by Applicant (UTCH); Filter Groups: - All Groups -; Report Dates: Within the Last 30 Days; Output Format: CSV;	Dec 18, 2017 6:00:00 AM Weekly	Dec 11, 2017 6:00:46 AM
<input type="checkbox"/> Requests By Case Status Criteria: Case Status: Released to Parent Agency (RLTP); Filter Groups: - All Groups -; Report Dates: Within the Last 30 Days; Output Format: CSV;	Dec 18, 2017 6:00:00 AM Weekly	Dec 11, 2017 6:00:46 AM
<input type="checkbox"/> Requests By Case Status Criteria: Case Status: Applicant Certified Pending Release (CTFY); Filter Groups: - All Groups -; Report Dates: Within the Last 30 Days; Output Format: CSV;	Dec 18, 2017 6:00:00 AM Weekly	Dec 11, 2017 6:00:46 AM
<input type="checkbox"/> Requests By Case Status Criteria: Case Status: Pending Agency Review (PRVW); Filter Groups: - All Groups -; Report Dates: Within the Last 30 Days; Output Format: CSV;	Dec 18, 2017 6:00:00 AM Weekly	Dec 11, 2017 6:00:46 AM
<input type="checkbox"/> Requests By Case Status Criteria: Case Status: Applicant Editing Form (EDIT); Filter Groups: - All Groups -; Report Dates: Within the Last 30 Days; Output Format: CSV;	Dec 18, 2017 6:00:00 AM Weekly	Dec 11, 2017 6:00:46 AM
<input type="checkbox"/> Requests By Case Status Criteria: Case Status: Terminated by System (TERM); Filter Groups: - All Groups -; Report Dates: Within the Last 30 Days; Output Format: CSV;	Dec 18, 2017 6:00:00 AM Weekly	Dec 11, 2017 6:00:46 AM
<input type="checkbox"/> Requests By Case Status Criteria: Case Status: Rejected to Applicant Initiated New (RJCT); Filter Groups: - All Groups -; Report Dates: Within the Last 30 Days; Output Format: CSV;	Dec 18, 2017 5:00:00 AM Weekly	Dec 11, 2017 5:00:06 AM

View

Edit

Repeat

Repeat All

Delete

e-QIP 3.24.03

Appendix H

Redundant Processes between IPO and Squadron Level

