<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
<rss version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Digital Commons: The Legal Scholarship Repository @ Golden Gate University School of Law</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2013 Golden Gate University School of Law All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu</link>
<description>Recent documents in Digital Commons: The Legal Scholarship Repository @ Golden Gate University School of Law</description>
<language>en-us</language>
<lastBuildDate>Sat, 25 May 2013 01:35:42 PDT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>3600</ttl>


	
		
	

	
		
	

	
		
	

	
		
	

	
		
	







<item>
<title>Early disclosure would gut judicial complaint system</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/579</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/579</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 10:33:30 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	
	]]>
</description>

<author>Susan Rutberg et al.</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>A Cinderella Story: ‘Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters’ Meets the Prince. Review Article of Eva Storskrubb, Civil Procedure and EU Law: A Policy Area Uncovered</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/578</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/578</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2013 09:39:18 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	
	]]>
</description>

<author>Helen E. Hartnell</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>2013 Awards Ceremony Program</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/commencement/17</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/commencement/17</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 13:07:50 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	
	]]>
</description>


</item>






<item>
<title>Commencement Program 2013</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/commencement/16</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/commencement/16</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 13:06:53 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	
	]]>
</description>


</item>






<item>
<title>Soveriegn Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/577</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/577</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 08:59:14 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>The phrase “sovereign debt crisis” has been in the news a lot recently, primarily because of the precarious fiscal situation of Greece and fear of dire consequences for the Eurozone and even the global economy if the Greek government defaults. Although the differences are many, for some of us the Greek crisis called to mind another sovereign financial crisis that began more than 30 years ago and still has not been entirely resolved—at least so far as the nations of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are concerned.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Jon H. Sylvester</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>GGU’s New Dean, Rachel Van Cleave</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/deanvancleave/2</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/deanvancleave/2</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 09:15:22 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	
	]]>
</description>

<author>Eric Christiansen</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Transformative Properties of FDR&apos;s Court-packing Plan and the Significance of Symbol</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/576</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/576</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 15:08:54 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>In this Article, I begin by laying a basic theoretical foundation for understanding how language choice provides contextual cues to direct interpretation. Next, I analyze cases that use the "Court-Packing Plan" language. I argue that these references are intended to trigger a response in the reader that is sympathetic to judicial independence and, in some instances, to judicial incursions into policymaking. I then analyze references to the "switch in time" language, extracting the arguments about constitutional methodology and judicial activism embedded in that phrase. Here, I argue that the phrase "switch in time" is deployed to remind the reader of what happens when the Court overreaches and finds it necessary to radically change course or risk permanent institutional damage. Finally, I consider the implications of using both of these phrases in the same opinion. I contend that attention to language choice uncovers how the judiciary uses the institutional clash of the 1930's as a rhetorical tool and reveals how this episode in America's political and legal history entered our culture of argument about our system of government and the role of the judiciary as a constitutional decision-making body within that system.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Laura A. Cisneros</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Youngston Sheet to Boumediene: A Story of Judicial Ethos And the (Un)Fastidious Use of Language</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/575</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/575</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 14:56:34 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>My goal in this Article is not to provide a comprehensive survey of the Court's separation of powers cases from 1952 to the present. Rather, I want to present a modest-sized account of this shift from humility to arrogance and to do so not by the direct method of scrupulous narration, but through a combination of stealth and selectivity, with the idea that less could be more. With this model in mind, I have focused on the language of a few representative opinions: Jackson and Frankfurters concurrences in Youngstown, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Dames & Moore v. Regan, Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion in Medellin v. Texas, and Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush. It is my hope that plucking these few specimens from the great ocean of material to be examined with careful curiosity will yield an interesting analysis of how the Court made the transformation from reticence to insistence on judicial supremacy. My narrative, while willfully episodic in character again, no comprehensive coverage of all events is claimed-follows a chronological line.</p>
<p>Part II provides a textual analysis of Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown, with emphasis on his tripartite framework for evaluating presidential action. I am especially interested in Jackson's Category , the socalled "zone of twilight." I contend that Jackson, in identifying the zone of twilight as an area where presidential power is exercised in the absence of guiding legal referents, was actually describing a political reality, not establishing a normative legal category. As a result, Jackson's Category 2, properly understood, contains cases that are nonjusticiable (at least until an act of Congress provides the necessary legal parameters and removes such cases to either Category 1 or 3). By including an area of nonjusticiability within his taxonomical system, Jackson was following, and giving expression to, an ethos of humility.</p>
<p>Part III provides a similar textual analysis of Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown, with emphasis on his desire to avoid the "explosive potentialities" of constitutional adjudication. Here, I argue that Frankfurter's concurrence has a dual dynamic. On the one hand his concurrence represents the ethos of humility and eloquently espouses the value of judicial restraint as he warns of the danger of aggressive judicial intervention. On the other hand, his insistence on the need to respect the historical gloss on executive power as manifested through "systematic, unbroken, executive practice" has provided a platform for subsequent Courts to engage in the very intervention he warned against.</p>
<p>Part IV reviews two post-Youngstown cases-Dames & Moore v. Regan and Medellin v. Texas' -and shows how the Court capitalized on Frankfurter's historical gloss language and married it with Jackson's taxonomical structure to usher in a new era of judicial dominance in the separation of powers arena. This linguistic turn transformed Jackson's zone of twilight from an area of nonjusticiability to one that allowed for more judicial tripartite framework with Frankfurter's interpretive approach. The Court's adoption of Frankfurter's approach, however, was not wholesale. Rather, the Court appropriated Frankfurter's "gloss" theory while discarding Frankfurter's institutional statements about the Court's limited role in separation of powers cases. In so doing, the Court cast off the ethos of humility individually contained in Jackson and Frankfurter's concurrences and replaced that ethos with one of interpretive arrogance.</p>
<p>Finally, Part V examines this new ethos as expressed in the majority opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, one of the so-called "War on Terror" cases. In contrast to Jackson and Frankfurter's concurrences in Youngstown, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Boumediene assumes an authoritative posture. The underlying ethos is one of judicial dominance on matters of constitutional interpretation. The language, which is at times scolding and at others merely business-like in its diction, does not confine itself within a frame of restraint or reservation. Instead, it presumes that the circumstances created by the War on Terror require the judiciary to enter the debate over the war powers of the political branches.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Laura A. Cisneros</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Use of Role Play and Interview Modes in Law Clinic Case Rounds to Teach Essential Legal Skills and to Maximize Meaningful Participation</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/574</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/574</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 14:35:31 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Case rounds are a common feature of the seminar component of clinical programs. This article describes using in the case rounds setting multiple design elements, including role plays and formalized interviews, to enhance student learning and engagement. In the rounds described here, a student presenter is asked to adopt the role of her opponent in her clinic case and to explain succinctly the opponent's case, followed by an informational session in which the student presenter is allowed only to give short answers in response to questions from her clinic peers; and after the question-and-answer session, students and their professors debrief the role play. The role play aspect - where the clinic student adopts the role of an opponent in her clinic case - compels clinic students to better anticipate the other side's legal strategy and arguments and to delve into facts that they might overlook without having assumed the other side's role. Adopting the other side's position also allows students to explore legal and policy issues deeply. In addition to providing these benefits, the question-and-answer format of the rounds allows students to develop presentation and interrogatory fundamentals. Having the opportunity to practice questioning the "opponent" also provides students with the prospect of learning how best to obtain information through experimenting with different modes of inquiry. For example, students can learn that hyperbole common to stereotyped exchanges between opponents may not be appropriate for gathering facts and exploring nuances in facts and areas of uncertainty. At the same time that students are learning these skills, preserving the essential elements of rounds (involving real cases, with real practice issues, and exchanges between students) means that students have the opportunity to learn to think like lawyers as they do in traditional rounds that do not use role plays or formalized question-and-answer structures. Students, for example, gain insights about professional reasoning, judgment, and values and engage in self reflection in preparing for and participating in the role play. Combining the elements of traditional case rounds - that are so critical in teaching clinic students how to think like lawyers - with opportunities to practice the essential lawyering skills of storytelling, counter-analysis, and interrogatory basics has many benefits worth exploring.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Helen Kang</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>The Emergence of Customary International Law Recognizing Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human Rights and Environmental Law</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/573</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/573</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 14:16:39 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>“With the exception of a handful of nation-states, multinationals are alone in possessing the size, technology, and economic reach necessary to influence human affairs on a global basis.”  Half of the world’s 100 greatest powers are transnational (or multinational) corporations.  The vast financial power and economic influence of transnational corporations (TNCs) enables them to affect human rights and the environment in a fundamental way.  TNCs represent a huge proportion of the world’s economy and much of their operations exploit natural and human resources in developing countries.  Unfortunately, TNCs have been responsible for human rights abuses and environmental disasters of immense magnitude.  TNCs also have the power to protect the human rights of people in the developing countries in which they operate.  International custom stemming from judicial recognition of corporate liability, international instruments addressing TNCs, stricter corporate regulations in developing countries, as well as voluntary codes of conduct by TNCs have begun to develop which should allow TNCs to be held legally liable for human rights abuses and environmental damage they cause.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Kathleen Morris</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/572</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/572</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 14:10:28 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This Article calls for the overruling of the central rule in <em>Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh</em> (1907) on Erie grounds. <em>Hunter</em> announced as a matter of federal law that local governments are powerless instrumentalities of state governments. Legal scholars have criticized <em>Hunter</em> for exacerbating the doctrinal and practical problems that plague local government law. This Article goes further by challenging <em>Hunter</em> directly. It argues first that<em> Erie v. Tompkins</em> (1938), properly read, effectively overruled the central rule in <em>Hunter</em>. Second, it argues that we should not mourn the loss of that rule because its analytic support structures are historically, doctrinally, and logically defective. The Article then narrows its focus to a doctrine derived from <em>Hunter</em>, the federal rule barring localities from invoking the Constitution against their own states (the "Hunter doctrine"). It argues that after Erie, the Hunter doctrine is best understood as a doctrine addressing capacity to sue; that federal courts should defer to state law in deciding whether a particular locality has the capacity to bring a constitutional challenge against its own state rather than superimposing a national rule; and that courts and scholars should welcome localities into constitutional debates because their full participation is pro-local and pro-democratic, and would raise the overall competence of constitutional debate and local public advocacy. Finally, looking to the future, the Article calls for scholars to address which of the Constitution's provisions should apply to localities qua localities; to consider the circumstances under which the Court should permit localities to pursue representative constitutional claims on behalf of their constituents; and to develop an alternative, post-Hunter theoretical framework for local government law.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Kathleen Morris</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Marriage and the Court: San Francisco&apos;s Role in the Debate</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/571</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/571</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 13:24:02 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	
	]]>
</description>

<author>Kathleen Morris</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>From Violence Against Women to Women&apos;s Violence in Haiti</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/570</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/570</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2013 10:48:28 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Much of the current scholarship, as well as international policy studies focusing on civil conflicts and armed violence, has primarily construed women as victims and men as perpetrators of violence. Although this prevalent interpretation certainly reflects conventional wisdom and tells part of a true war story, the remainder, which has been very much less publicized and addressed, also perceives women as participants in violence and men occasionally as victims. This Article joins the chorus of scholars that have only recently begun to highlight the flaws of this common belief and conversely, describe female participation in conflict and armed violence, often in order to discover a convincing explanation for why women engage in violence.</p>
<p>This Article goes even further in seeking to deepen the understanding of why women and girls, living in the slum communities of Haiti, participate in violence, by looking at the specific nexus between their prior victimization through sexual abuse and their ensuing decision to join the armed factions. To be sure, pertinent studies focusing either on violence against women and women's violence, or their reciprocal influences and correlations have already been conducted in several countries tom apart by civil conflict or armed violence. To date, however, this issue has not yet been explored in Haiti, where available data has nonetheless suggested a high prevalence of sexual violence against girls and women as well as their involvement in armed violence.</p>
<p>In particular, this study aims to shed light on female internalization of gender stereotypes and experience with violence, which produces common patterns of retaliation. It investigates the incentives, conditions and decision-making processes that motivate victims of rape and sexual abuse to join armed groups and to become active affiliates and perpetrators of violence themselves. Ultimately, by investigating the current international legal norms and Haitian legislation on both female victimization and aggression, this analysis aims to contribute to the design of effective measures to free women from violence, to dispel their anger and resentment towards forms of community reconciliation, and to adequately reintegrate them into society.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Benedetta Faedi Duramy</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Future of the Legal Profession</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/569</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/569</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 09 May 2013 09:39:42 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Many books and articles in the last few years describe a "profession in crisis" with no shortage of demons to blame: many equity partners in large law firms pursuing ever increasing profits, tenured law professors sitting on big salaries with no incentive to change how they teach, accrediting institutions imposing expensive regulation on law schools, and the examples of finger-pointing continue. In the words of YouTube sensation Kid President, "I think we all need a pep talk."</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Rachel A. Van Cleave</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>2013 Annual Report for Digital Commons: The Legal Scholarship Repository @ Golden Gate University School of Law</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/reports/1</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/reports/1</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 11:12:01 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Digital Commons: The Legal Scholarship Repository @ Golden Gate University School of Law, or, simply, DC@GGULaw, is the institutional repository for the law school’s intellectual work and contributions to the field of law, whether produced by faculty, students, centers or conferences. This report highlights the major accomplishments of DC@GGULaw since its launch on July 1, 2010.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Janet Fischer</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Environmental Justice As an Essential Tool in Environmental Review Statutes — A New Look at Federal Policies and Civil Rights Protections and California’s Recent Initiatives</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/568</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/568</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 08:54:17 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>Recent litigation by the California Attorney General has sparked renewed interest in the role of environmental justice under federal and state project environmental review laws. Some say that inserting environmental justice into environmental review marks a “radical expansion” of the role of social justice in environmental review. Environmental justice is now a wellestablished federal legal doctrine addressing communities disproportionately exposed to environmental hazards as a result of their social or economic demographics. The doctrine is supported by President Clinton’s executive order, along with agency guidelines and regulations under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), which govern federal project environmental review. Using the environmental justice doctrine as a tool during project environmental review assures careful analysis of local or regional impacts on communities burdened by adverse social and economic conditions. Federal civil rights laws also support the doctrine, notwithstanding recent U.S. Supreme Court civil rights decisions restricting access to justice and consideration of race in employment testing. California has followed the federal lead and has been a leading state in adopting environmental justice statutes and policies. Thus, it is no surprise that the Attorney General of California has sought to employ environmental justice during the environmental review process.</p>
<p>California’s civil rights laws are stronger than federal civil rights protections, and the state has endorsed environmental justice, both generally and specifically, in its global warming regulatory regime. These legal requirements support incorporating environmental justice when applying the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), which is largely modeled on NEPA. Environmental justice assures that the physical impacts are properly understood in the socioeconomic context, and that cumulative impacts, possible mitigation, and alternatives are properly assessed. Recent California case law questioning CEQA’s application to projects situated near hazards does not impact the fundamental role of environmental justice in environmental review. The Attorney General is properly concerned with projects that add to the burdens of vulnerable low-income communities or communities of color.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Alan Ramo</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Thirty Minutes or Less: The Inelasticity of Commuting</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/7</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/7</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:24:44 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This Comment urges the legislature to manipulate travel time in order to reduce GHGE (greenhouse gas emissions). Specifically, the legislature must incentivize mass transit by creating easier, quicker transit systems while simultaneously disincentivizing personal automobiles by increasing automobile travel time. By manipulating the travel time for various modes of travel, the legislature can effectively reduce GHGE while increasing individuals’ quality of life by creating an infrastructure that costs less and provides transportation systems not dependent on the automobile.</p>
<p>This Comment explains why the Sustainable Communities Act will fail to significantly reduce vehicle emissions, and this Comment proposes legislative action to reach the goals established in the Global Warming Solutions Act. Part I of this Comment discusses the relationship between the automobile and urban decentralization in America. Part II discusses legislation in California targeting automobile emissions, including regional smart-growth measures and state legislative actions targeted at reducing GHGE.</p>
<p>Part III explains the impacts on travel mode choice from urban design, temporal components, and individual components such as attitude, preferences, costs, and the duration of the trip. To demonstrate the power of time, Part III also explains the inelasticity of travel time, the relationship between primary and substitute goods, and how different transportation modes have different values of quality. Part IV proposes changes to make public transit a “close substitute” for the personal automobile and describes savings these policies can bring. Part V demonstrates the viability of these policies by discussing several cities with similar policies. The Conclusion calls the California legislature to act by making funding changes. In order to make significant reductions in GHGE from the transportation industry, as set out in the Global Warming Solutions Act and in the Sustainable Communities Act, the legislature must make meaningful funding changes that significantly reduce automobile infrastructure while making other modes of travel more viable options.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>John Andrew Brunner-Brown</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>The Inability of Intellectual Property to Protect the New Fashion Designer: Why the ID3PA Should Be Adopted</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/6</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/6</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:24:43 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This Comment argues that Congress should adopt legislation that affords copyright protection to new fashion designers. The present state of the intellectual property regime leaves a new designer without any legal protection against blatant copying and can easily result in the designer’s business demise. Part I of this Comment provides a brief background of copyright law, as well as other doctrines of intellectual property law, and the limited protection these doctrines provide for fashion designs. Part I also explains how the limited protections afforded to fashion designs vis-à-vis intellectual property law are rarely, if ever, applicable to the new designer. Part II provides a more thorough history of the predecessor bills discussed above, including the recent ID3PA (Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act) and IDPA, and explains why the IDPA ignores the needs of the new fashion designer. Part III claims that common arguments by those against the adoption of the ID3PA and future proposed legislation, including increased and frivolous litigation, are unwarranted. Ultimately, the enactment of the ID3PA or similar legislation would ensure a level playing field for new designers and the possibility that they too can realize the American Dream.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Jessica Rosen</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Decoding Student Speech Rights: Clarification and Applica-tion of Supreme Court Principles to Online Student Speech Cases</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/5</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/5</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:24:42 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This Comment identifies the underlying principles of Supreme Court precedent governing student speech rights and applies those principles, as appropriate, to analyze online student speech. Part I provides a background of the four Supreme Court cases governing student speech. Four factors are identified from the Supreme Court decisions that continue to guide the analysis of student speech rights: sponsorship, location, effect, and content. Part II explores lower courts’ confusion in applying the four factors to online student speech cases. Finally, Part III examines the factors applicable to online student speech and provides guidance for future courts to analyze online student speech rights. As the predominant Supreme Court precedent, the Tinker standard should be used to analyze online student speech cases because it correctly addresses the effect of a student’s speech felt within the school. Further, three categories are presented that should guide courts’ assessment of the content of online student speech: outrageous or inherently offensive speech; speech that is focused or targeted toward the school, students, or faculty; and general school-related speech. Lower courts need a standard to analyze student speech, but until the Supreme Court specifically rules on online student speech, the principles set forth in previous rulings must be consistently applied.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Courtney M. Willard</author>


</item>






<item>
<title>Castle in the Cloud: Modernizing Constitutional Protections for Cloud-Stored Data on Mobile Devices</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/4</link>
<guid isPermaLink="true">http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol43/iss2/4</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 29 Apr 2013 11:24:42 PDT</pubDate>
<description>
	<![CDATA[
	<p>This Comment argues that the current state of Fourth Amendment law vis-à-vis searching cloud-stored documents on a mobile device is untenable. Part I of this Comment defines cloud storage and cloud computing, and it provides background information on the Stored Communications Act (SCA). Part II discusses the intricacies of applying the SCA to computers and email, which is to date the best analog for applying the SCA to cloud computing. Part III details the legislative and judicial solutions to the problems raised by new technology and concludes that, while new legislation is the most desirable response, in the meantime courts must rethink their notions of what it means to search a mobile device. If either the legislature or the judiciary can reform a troubled Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to new technology, hope remains that reports of the Fourth Amendment’s death have been greatly exaggerated.</p>

	]]>
</description>

<author>Mark Wilson</author>


</item>





</channel>
</rss>
