In this article it will be argued that the legislative history of the attorneys' fees provision of Title VII requires that fee awards be computed by a method which produces fees sufficient to sustain a Title VII bar, and that this may best be accomplished by a modified version of the approach customarily used in the antitrust area.
First addressed will be a brief overview of Title VII litigation problems, with emphasis on the complexity, duration, and high-risk nature of the work involved. Then follows a discussion of the legislative purpose of Title VII and its fee provisions, with particular attention to the strong public policy considerations which must underlie judicial implementation of the fee award provisions of the Act. Next addressed will be the comparative advantages of the two primary methods of fee calculation employed by federal courts in complex litigation based, respectively, on the Title VII case of Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express and the antitrust case of Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. It will be argued that the Lindy method should be adopted by courts in computing Title VII fee awards. Lastly, two selected problem areas of implementation of Lindy in the Title VII context will be discussed.
58 U. Detroit Mercy J. of Urban L. 609 (1981)