This Comment explains why the Sustainable Communities Act will fail to significantly reduce vehicle emissions, and this Comment proposes legislative action to reach the goals established in the Global Warming Solutions Act. Part I of this Comment discusses the relationship between the automobile and urban decentralization in America. Part II discusses legislation in California targeting automobile emissions, including regional smart-growth measures and state legislative actions targeted at reducing GHGE.

Part III explains the impacts on travel mode choice from urban design, temporal components, and individual components such as attitude, preferences, costs, and the duration of the trip. To demonstrate the power of time, Part III also explains the inelasticity of travel time, the relationship between primary and substitute goods, and how different transportation modes have different values of quality. Part IV proposes changes to make public transit a “close substitute” for the personal automobile and describes savings these policies can bring. Part V demonstrates the viability of these policies by discussing several cities with similar policies. The Conclusion calls the California legislature to act by making funding changes. In order to make significant reductions in GHGE from the transportation industry, as set out in the Global Warming Solutions Act and in the Sustainable Communities Act, the legislature must make meaningful funding changes that significantly reduce automobile infrastructure while making other modes of travel more viable options.

A violation of an employer’s computer-use policy could be as minor as checking a personal Facebook page or personal bank account while at work. On the other hand, the violation of an employer’s computer-use policy could be more egregious, as in the case of United States v. Nosal. In Nosal, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit examined the scope of the CFAA as applied to an employee who used a work computer for personal purposes, addressing the issue of whether a violation of an employer’s computer-use policy can be considered criminal hacking.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s position that courts may not scrutinize certain aspects of the minister-church relationship. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit avoided the question of whether the First Amendment’s ministerial exception—usually invoked only in employment-law contexts—also applies to forced-labor claims under the TVPA. Instead, the court simply looked to the text of the TVPA to find that the plaintiffs’ labor was not, within the meaning of the statute, forced "by means of’ serious harm, threats, or any other improper methods.” In affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit found that the Headleys had voluntarily joined and worked for the Church because they believed in the Church’s doctrine and in the personal commitments they made to the Church. Pointing to the Headleys’ ability to leave the Church, and their failure to do so for well over a decade, the court found that the plaintiffs simply were not forced to remain in their respective conditions.

Part I of this Note explains why the possession of child pornography falls within the scope of § 2259, which requires mandatory restitution awards for victims. Part II explains why the majority of courts have found that proximate cause is necessary before such awards can be ordered. Part III explores the existing circuit split regarding whether proximate cause can be established in cases where a defendant is a mere possessor of child pornography and describes the various tests for establishing such cause. Part IV provides the facts and procedural history of United States v. Kennedy and explains the reasoning behind the court’s decision to overturn the restitution order. Part V argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in its holding in Kennedy because proximate cause was established in the case and that the amount of restitution sought was proper under § 2259.

In Part I, this Note introduces the primary presidential-threat statutes and explains why Presidents and presidential candidates should be treated the same for the purposes of true-threat jurisprudence. Part II traces the history of the true-threats doctrine and introduces the relevant tests of intent developed among the federal courts for evaluating presidential true threats. Part III discusses Bagdasarian, its procedural history, and the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and application of the true-threats doctrine. Part IV explains the shortcomings of using only an objective test for measuring true threats. Next, Part V argues the strengths of adding a subjective-intent element to the doctrine, and the special status of the President that necessitates its inclusion. Finally, this Note concludes by arguing that when the subject of a threat is the President or a candidate for the office, despite precedent to the contrary, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bagdasarian correctly interpreted the true-threat doctrine.

Cite as 42 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 661 (2012).

Cite as 42 Golden Gate U. L. Rev.657 (2012).

This Article provides strategic suggestions and practical applications for Ponzi scheme litigation, including filing a procedures motion, seeking substantive or administrative consolidation, and utilizing and overcoming evidentiary hurdles.

Cite as 42 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 641 (2012).